Keynotes in Music Education

A Philosophical Analysis

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KEYNOTES IN MUSIC EDUCATION

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Sociale Wetenschappen

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TO MY PARENTS

Preface

Music education has traditionally been very practical in orientation. It is only since the last decades that various theoretical approaches to the field have come to the fore. The purpose of this book is to make a contribution to the development and the refinement of philosophical theorizing about music education. At the beginning of this book I would like to express my gratitude towards a number of people who have supported me during my investigations.

In the first place, I am most grateful to professor Wouter van Haaften for supervising and guiding my work. Without his critical comments, his fine ideas and suggestions, and his catching enthusiasm and optimism, the present result would have been unthinkable. In the second place, I owe very much to my parents who have always stimulated me in my studies and my work. In particular, I thank them for their practical, mental, and material support during the past five years.

I also wish to thank those who have commented on parts of my dissertation: my colleagues in the Nijmegen Institute of Philosophy and History of Education, professor Th. Wren (Chicago), professor R. Jonathan (Edinburgh), professor P. Duker (Nijmegen), professor R. de Groot (Amsterdam), professor J. D. Imelman (Utrecht), and Ellis van Dam (Amsterdam). Furthermore, I owe much to discussions with doctor Gy. Véber (Malden) and professor K. Swanwick (London).

Last, but not least, I want to thank Jethro Zevenbergen for taking care of the lay-out of this book.

Nijmegen, September 1997

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Introduction

Philosophy of music education is a very young discipline. Surely, there have been theorists in the past who have reflected upon philosophical questions in relation to music education. Plato, Aristotle, Comenius, Rousseau, and Pestalozzi are among the most prominent. However, the subject of music education only held a marginal position in their writings, and they were individuals rather than exponents of a continuing tradition of systematic reflection.

The most important event in the rise of philosophy of music education as an independent subject was the appearance of Bennett Reimer's *A Philosophy of Music Education* (1970). Reimer was preceded by a number of theorists who had reflected on philosophical issues. For instance, James Mursell (1893–1963) tried to elucidate in numerous publications what, in his view, were the nature and value of music education (e.g., Mursell, 1927, 1934). Likewise, in Charles Leonhard & Robert House's *Foundations and Principles of Music Education* (1959) philosophical questions also played a significant part. Furthermore, *Basic Concepts in Music Education* (Henry, 1958), an important publication in which various theoretical approaches to music education were taken, featured two important philosophical essays: Foster McMurray's "Pragmatism in Music Education" and Harry Broudy's "A Realistic Philosophy of Music Education". Starting from divergent philosophical positions, these two studies explore a number of questions in the field. However, being the first one to write an entire volume on the philosophical foundations of music education, Reimer developed a scope of the subject that was without precedent. He embarked upon investigations into basic concepts in aesthetics and elaborated a specific aesthetic position.

Reimer's premise was that "the essential nature and value of music education are determined by the nature and value of the art of music" (1970, p. 1). Hence, he devotes the major part of his book to elaborating a distinct view of the nature and value of music. Reimer calls the position he takes *Absolute Expressionism* (1970, chap. 1). It is absolutist in that it holds that the meaning and value of musical works can be grasped only by attending to the qualities of the work as such, that is, to the aesthetic qualities of the sound configurations. Contrary to what *Referentialists* hold, according to this view the meaning of a work of art does not exist in ideas, emotions, events, et cetera outside the art work but is inherent to the art work itself. Reimer also opposes to the *Absolute Formalists* whom he takes to consider music

merely as the intellectual exercise of contemplating form. Music has a deeper meaning in that it gives us a deeper sense of human life. Reimer's view is inspired by the aesthetic position of Susanne K. Langer. He adopts her view that "[b]ecause the forms of human feeling are much more congruent with musical forms than with the forms of language, music can reveal the nature of feelings with a detail and truth that language cannot approach" (Langer cited in Reimer, 1970, p. 38). In his book Reimer elaborates his aesthetic position by discussing a number of key concepts in music: feeling, meaning, experience, creation. The tenor, however, remains the same throughout his book: the value of music derives from aesthetic experience, that is, from experiencing the "conditions of livingness" the artist has captured in musical form.

According to Reimer (1970), the major task of music education is to influence people's aesthetic sensitivity, that is, their ability to have aesthetic experiences (p. 82). Teaching and learning should be arranged so that aesthetic experiencing is central and all other matters play a supporting role. Musical works employed in music education are, in Reimer's view, to be selected for their capability of being aesthetically perceived and aesthetically reacted to. The study of music ought to concentrate on the qualities of sound that make music expressive (p. 84). That is, teaching should be directed at enhancing the objective part of aesthetic experience — aesthetic perception. Aesthetic reaction, on the other hand, belongs to the domain of subjectivity and teachers should not try to influence this (pp. 79–81).

For some two decades Reimer's philosophy completely dominated the field. In this period innovative philosophical studies in music education remained scarce and the aesthetic conception of music education held the monopoly. It was only after 1989, when the second edition of Reimer's *A Philosophy of Music Education* appeared — revised, but unaltered in its basic premises and its outline — that opposing voices began to become prominent. Wayne Bowman and David Elliott put forward serious criticism against Reimer's position and against aesthetic approaches to music education in general (Bowman, 1991a; Elliott, 1991a, 1991b). So did Philip Alperson when he tried to answer the question "What would one expect from a philosophy of music education?" (Alperson, 1991). He argues that music education should be based on a view of music as a practice. Whereas the aesthetic "formalism" only yields a limited insight in music, the *praxial* view allows us to "understand music in terms of the variety of meanings and values evidenced in actual practice in particular cultures" (p. 233).

A new milestone in the philosophy of music education was the appearance of David Elliott's *Music Matters: A New Philosophy of Music Education* (1995). Elliott takes up and radicalizes Alpersons views. He works out a praxial conception of music as well as of music education. Whereas Alperson in his explorations of a praxial philosophy of music education still assigns an important — though no longer privileged — position to aesthetic considerations, Elliott presents his philosophy as completely overcoming what he calls "music education as aesthetic education". Instead of being seen as a collection of aesthetic objects, music should be conceived as an activity, as something people *do*. In Elliott's view, the value of musical practices is to be found in making music — "musicing" — rather than in listening. Hence, attaining musicianship should be the goal of music education. Elliott argues that musicianship is essentially a matter of procedural knowledge, knowledge that is manifested in the activities of musicing and listening. The only way to acquire this knowledge is to engage in these very activities. According to Elliott, music education should have the form of reflective musical practicums in which the actions pupils engage in closely parallel those of real music cultures.

Within a few years, philosophy of music education has become a lively discipline in which new subjects are explored and alternative positions are defended with respect to traditional issues. More and more studies are appearing in journals like the *Journal of Aesthetic Education* and the *Quarterly Journal of Music Teaching and Learning* and since 1993 the discipline even has its own periodical: *The Philosophy of Music Education Review*. However, at the present the study of the discipline is almost exclusively restricted to Northern America, that is, The United States and Canada. In Great Britain and Germany, for example, philosophy of music education does not exist as an independent specialization, even though there have been major contributions made by Keith Swanwick (1979, 1988, 1994) in the United Kingdom and Sigrid Abel-Struth (1985) in Germany.

Up to now, the approach that has dominated philosophy of music education is that of developing substantial views of music and music education. In this conception, the task of philosophy of music education is to provide music educators with ideas about the nature and value of music, the aims of music education, and about what, accordingly, practices of music education should look like. Philosophers taking this approach tend to head for straight answers to philosophical questions. Rather than thoroughly elucidating various alternative positions and assessing their pros and cons, they try to

demonstrate the superiority of one view and to investigate its consequences for music education.

The dominance of this substantive approach can easily be explained in view of how philosophy of music education came into being. It originated from the idea that music educators and those being trained for the profession need a clear conception of what their subject is and what it is good for. But now that music education philosophy becomes a more mature and independent discipline, we may raise the question whether this heavy emphasis on substantive approaches should not be complemented by a more analytical approach. According to an analytical conception of the discipline, the aim of philosophy of music education is to clarify philosophical issues emerging in music education, rather than to argue for one specific substantial vision of the field.[1]

Bowman (1992) argues for a similar approach. In his view, philosophy of music education yields the impression of a body of doctrine. He rejects such a conception of the discipline; rather than a commodity providing clearcut answers to fundamental questions, philosophy, as he sees it, is a process of systematic exploration or inquiry into the grounds for human beliefs and practices. Central to philosophy is the activity of uncovering underlying assumptions, of rendering explicit the implicit, with the intent of enriching understanding and perception (1992, pp. 3–4).

Bowman's conception is in line with the approach I take in this book. However, we can refine this approach by distinguishing several levels and steps in philosophical investigation.[2]

1. The content level. A first level of inquiry concerns the content of music education theories and practices. Besides all sorts of practices of music education, the philosopher can examine various types of theoretical contributions:

- practical theories of music education: theories offering concrete directions for organizing educational practices (e.g., methods);
- scientific theories of music education: theories conveying factual knowledge about music education.
- substantive philosophies of music education.

1.a. Analysis. As a first step, the philosopher describes and analyzes the beliefs, claims, arguments, and discussions in music education theories and substantive philosophies of music education, or in practices of music education. Implicit beliefs are rendered explicit, arguments and patterns of argumentation are analyzed, different claims and viewpoints are carefully distinguished. If discourse is obscure or equivocal, the philosopher can

elucidate why they are so: he may point out that terms are ambiguous, that aspects of a subject matter fail to be distinguished and thus get confused, that arguments can be interpreted in different ways, and so on.

1.b. Evaluation. After positions have been clearly analyzed, the next step is evaluation. The question now is whether the arguments given are sound. Have claims been sufficiently substantiated? Are the patterns of argumentation used and the concrete arguments given valid? Fallacies may be traced and the absence of arguments necessary for demonstrating particular propositions may be pointed out.

1.c. Improvement. As a third step, the philosopher can make proposals for strengthening our thinking about music education. For example, he can make suggestions for using terms more consistently or for better structuring discussions. He can also point to arguments that can make the author's case stronger or to related claims that can be substantiated more easily.

2. *The foundational level.* At a deeper level the philosopher can examine the conceptual frameworks underlying theories and practices of music education and the fundamental presuppositions expressed in these frameworks. Concepts never occur in isolation; rather, they always belong to conceptual frameworks in which they are connected with other concepts in specific ways. For example, aesthetic theories of music (in the narrow sense) rest on frameworks in which concepts like those of the work, aesthetic perception, aesthetic experience, aesthetic value, and disinterested involvement take an important place. Conceptual frameworks are constitutive of the way we experience the world and the way we think about it. On the one hand, they open up the space of possible experience and thinking; without certain conceptual frameworks any coherent experience of reality would be impossible. On the other hand, however, a conceptual framework also restricts our view of reality, because our experience is structured by this rather than that conceptual constellation.

The notion of foundations is closely connected to that of conceptual frameworks. Foundations are the fundamental presuppositions characteristic of a particular framework. We may find them expressed in metaphors (music as a universal language), slogans ("Music is for all!"), and — most clearly — in emphatic statements in substantive philosophies ("what music is, at root, is a human activity" — Elliott, 1995, p. 39). But they can also be deduced from the specific way central concepts in theories are being understood.

At this more fundamental level the philosopher can take three steps parallel to those distinguished with respect to the level of investigating the content of discourse and practices.

2.a. Analysis. First, he can analyze the key concepts of a framework and the way they cohere. He can also clarify the relations between competing frameworks. For instance, it may be explained that the concept of musical experience is not as central to Elliott's praxial philosophy of music education as it is in Reimer's aesthetic philosophy. It may also be pointed out how this concept gets a different interpretation in the two philosophies because of the different ways it is connected with other concepts.

Besides clarifying concepts and conceptual relations, the analytic philosopher can concentrate on the philosophical foundations, that is, the fundamental ideas that guide music educators, educational theorists, or philosophers of music education in their actions, their thinking and their judgments. For instance, he can analyze the anthropological or ethical presuppositions that underlie the Suzuki method.

2.b. Evaluation. The analysis of conceptual frameworks and philosophical foundations may be followed by critique. It may be concluded that the domain in question has been conceptualized in a satisfying way. However, evaluation may also lead to the judgment that a conceptual framework in certain respects offers too limited a perspective of the domain. It may be found that phenomena that in fact are essential to the domain are not adquately taken into account or even obscured by a certain framework; or that the conceptual framework hinders our understanding of crucial matters. For instance, Elliott criticizes the aesthetic framework for impeding insight into the processes of making music (see chapter 4). Worse still, critical evaluation may lead the philosopher to conclude that the conceptual system is inadequate because of serious internal or external contradictions. Internal contradictions occur if some of its foundations turn out to be logically incompatible. External contradictions occur if the conceptual system is inconsistent with data from experience, intuitions, or generally shared convictions (e.g., democratic ideals).

2.c. Improvement. Negative evaluations may in turn be followed by a next, constructive step: making proposals for adjusting conceptual systems. Conceptualizations may be improved by introducing new concepts or rearranging conceptual relations in order to overcome the failures of the original conceptual systems. Furthermore, as far as possible, integration of competing conceptual frameworks may be proposed.

To be sure, the various steps of analytical inquiry presented here do not present a program the analytic philosopher will systematically work through every time he studies a subject. Rather, they present a survey of the various ways he can proceed. The philosopher may limit himself, for instance, to clarifying arguments given in a certain context; or he may concentrate on analysis, rather than evaluation. On the other hand, the various steps do suggest a logical order: before we can reasonably evaluate a certain claim, argument, or conceptual framework, it will have to be carefully analyzed; and before we can study the foundations of a practice, we will have to analyze it at surface level.

In summary, philosophers can clarify various aspects of music education: practices of music education, practical theories of music education, scientific theories of music education, and substantive philosophies of music education. They can do their clarifying work at two levels: (1) the content level of the concrete beliefs, claims, arguments, et cetera current in theory and practice; and (2) the foundational level of the conceptual frameworks and the fundamental presuppositions that underlie these. And clarification can proceed in the forms of (a) analysis, (b) evaluation, and (c) proposals for improvement.

It is not my purpose to argue that substantive approaches to music education should completely give way to analytical approaches. I agree with Reimer that the music education profession needs clear conceptions of what music is, what its value is, and how music education should be organized accordingly. They can have an important inspiring function in helping music educators and theorists of music education to develop a view of the field they operate in. My point is rather that substantive approaches should be better balanced by analytical approaches. We need the latter for several reasons.

First, we should take very seriously the body of ideas current in the various regions of music education. By analyzing and evaluating the beliefs, claims, and arguments put forward in theories of music education or inherent in practices of music education we can greatly enrich our understanding of the field. Second, substantive philosophies offer a limited view of the domain. Because the phenomena of music and music education are very complex and our understanding of them is limited at present, one theory cannot pretend to give an all-embracing treatment of the field.

We need metatheoretic approaches that transcend the closed views presented by substantive philosophies. Thus we can put substantive views into perspective: we can examine their strengths and weaknesses, present alter-

natives that are suppressed, relate competing substantial views to each other, trace the pivots of the discussions and controversies involved, and so on.

A host of topics in the philosophy of music education are waiting for further clarification. The purpose of this dissertation is to address a number of basic issues in the field. In doing so I have tried to strike a balance between breadth and depth. In view of the immature state of the discipline, I have found it more fruitful to address various topics rather than to go for an extensive treatment of one limited subject. On the other hand, I have attempted to dig more deeply into the issues I raise than has been done before. In view of this twofold aim, the five articles presented here can not pretend to be comprehensive studies providing definitive answers. Rather, they are explorations into philosophical questions that have remained largely beyond the scope of the philosophy of music education so far.

In my first study I consider the issue of *justification* of music in school curricula. Traditionally music does have its place in general education but can we argue that it should really be that way? This is a classical question which has led to a huge amount of statements about the value of music education. Describing and evaluating all these statements would by far exceed the scope of the study undertaken here. Apart from this, the desirability of doing so can be doubted, since the majority of these statements do not amount to solid arguments in favor of music education. I decided to concentrate on three serious types of argument which have not always been sufficiently kept apart. According the first type, music education contributes to the development of the whole person. The second states that musical experience involves a special kind of knowledge. According to the third type of argument, the value of music lies in the richness of musical experience itself. These three positions are analyzed and evaluated. I conclude that, though none of them succeeds in justifying music education conclusively, the third argument can provide a ground for a consensus that music should be taught at school.

In this first study I argue that no convincing arguments have been given to demonstrate that music yields deeper insight into the nature of human feeling. The significance of music appears to be largely internal to the musical domain. However, though they use expressions like *formal meaning, formal significance, musical sense,* and *intrinsic meaning,* musicologists and philosophers have given remarkably little attention to explaining this type of meaning. The purpose of the second study, written in collaboration with Wouter van Haaften, is to make a contribution to this difficult task. In a

number of ways we try to elucidate *intrinsic musical meaning*, as we call it. We explain and elaborate the distinction between extrinsic meaning and intrinsic meaning. Then, we compare intrinsic meaning with related notions of form-bound musical meaning put forward by other theorists. Furthermore, we consider the relations between intrinsic meaning and musical experience and the problem of the ineffability of intrinsic meaning.

There is no doubt that what music can mean for someone changes during the course of life. People's musical understanding develops with age and together with this the way they can experience music. But is musical development different for every individual or can we reconstruct developmental patterns characteristic for all (or nearly all) people? In my third study I investigate three *theories of musical development* that take musical development to proceed in a number of stages. After having outlined a theoretical framework for the analysis of developmental theories, I critically examine each of these theories. Subsequently, I look at the conceptual relations between the theories. Next, I argue that evaluative claims that later stages are better than the ones preceding them can be justified with respect to each of the three theories. Finally, the relevance of theories of musical development for music education is discussed.

The fourth study is devoted to the subject matter of *aims in music education*. Instead of taking a prescriptive approach, I focus on the concept of *aims*, I start with outlining the views of two leading philosophers of education on the issue. After this orientation on *aims* I concentrate on two topics. The first topic concerns the distinction between internal and external aims in music education. Analysis of the philosophies of Reimer and Elliott shows that each of them present both internal as well as external conceptions of aims. I argue that the distinction between internal and external aims is obscured in their writings and that, hence, they fail to give a clear picture of the relation between these two types of aims. The second topic features another distinction: the one between conceptual and empirical aspects of aims. Departing from a schema presented by Reimer, I point out how empirical questions of means and ends on the one hand and logical questions of the conceptual connections between various activities on the other hand can easily get mixed up and how this can lead to confusions. In this second part of this study I also try to clarify the conceptual relations between the various aspects of musical activities Reimer refers to in his survey.

My fifth article — *Music Education: Aesthetic or Praxial* — deals with the controversy that has emerged with the appearance of David Elliott's *Music Matters*. Elliott does not content himself with presenting his philosophy as a

fresh approach to the field. Rather, he intends it to replace the traditional aesthetic approach to music education. Throughout his book he attacks "music education as aesthetic education", contrasting its obsolete tenets (as he sees it) with the promising viewpoints of a *praxial* philosophy. The purpose of my study is to strike a balance between these competing views. After having outlined Elliott's main objections to the aesthetic view, I give a critical evaluation of these. Next, Elliott's own praxial view is examined. My conclusion is that Elliott's new philosophy does not defeat the aesthetic view of music education. Furthermore, I argue that — contrary to what Elliott suggests — aesthetic and praxial views of music education are in principle compatible. Music educators need not make a radical choice between the two perspectives; rather, they are well advised to combine the valuable insights from both.

Except for a few minor corrections, the studies are presented in the form in which they have been published or submitted. However, for the sake of uniformity the format of all articles has been adapted to APA-standards. The publication data are as follows:

Koopman, C. (1995). Stage theories of musical development. *Journal of Aesthetic Education, 29* (2), 49–66. (Copyright © 1995 Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois).

Koopman, C. (1996). Why teach music at school. *Oxford Review of Education, 22* (4), 483–494. (Copyright © 1996 Carfax Publishing Ltd.).

Koopman, C. (1997, in press). Aims in music education: A conceptual study. *Philosophy of Music Education Review, 5.*

Koopman, C. (in press). Music education: Aesthetic or praxial? *Journal of Aesthetic Education.* (Copyright © 1995 Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois).

The paper "Intrinsic meaning in music" has been submitted.

Notes

1. As becomes clear from the following outline, what I call an analytical approach here is not restricted to the once favored linguistic analysis approach.
2. The following outline of analytical inquiry derives from: Snik, G., Haaften, W. van, & Tellings, A. (1994). Pedagogisch grondslagenonderzoek [Investigating the foundations of education]. *Pedagogisch Tijdschrift, 19* (4), 287–303.

1. Why teach music at school?

In most countries of the Western world music is a compulsory subject in general education at the primary and secondary levels. There are large differences between various countries as to the amount of time spent on music at school and the contents of the curriculum, but the idea is widely accepted that music education should have a place in general education.

The question I would like to raise in this study is whether this common sense view can be validated in a rigorous discursive demonstration. The case for reserving a place for music in the curriculum of primary or secondary schools is not as self-evident as it might seem at first sight.[1] Music may be an important feature of Western society, but there are many other activities that play a vital role in our lives and that are, nevertheless, excluded from general education. Which specific arguments, then, can be given in favor of requiring music education? Up to now numerous reasons have been proposed, but most of these cannot bear scrutiny.

If a place for music in general education is to be justified three things should be demonstrated: (a) the value of music is such that everyone should have the opportunity to engage in musical activities; (b) musical abilities are capable of being cultivated; and (c) the school is the appropriate place for cultivating musical capabilities. So far, literature addressing the issue of validating music education has focused on the first of these three issues.

The purpose of the present study is to elucidate a number of the most serious positions with regard to the first issue, that is, with regard of the value of music. Preceding this I shall make a distinction between arguments that are based on the nature of music itself and arguments that rely merely on nonmusical outcomes of music education. After having dismissed the latter category, I shall investigate three types of argument belonging to the former category. The first type appeals to the ideal of the completely developed person. According to the second type, music involves a special kind of insight. The third type of argument is based on the intrinsic value of musical experience.

1.1 Musical and nonmusical arguments

The arguments that have been advanced in favor of music education can be divided in two groups. Arguments belonging to the first group are based on aspects considered to be constitutive of music; they link the value of en-

gaging in music to the nature of music itself. Arguments of this group rest (either implicitly or explicitly) on a definite position with regard to musical aesthetics.

The second group of arguments appeals to the positive nonmusical outcomes of musical activities. These arguments are not concerned with the nature of music, but it is simply claimed that particular desirable effects are related to engaging in musical activities. For the sake of simplicity I shall refer to this second group of arguments as *nonmusical* arguments and to the first group as *musical*.

With respect to the nonmusical arguments many positive effects have been claimed: music education would, for instance, contribute positively to the development of mathematical insight, learning to read, concentration, creativity, the development of general intelligence, the formation of a positive self-image, the acquisition of social skills, the channelling of emotion, and physical health. In a survey of research on the outcomes of arts education Haanstra and Van Oijen (1985) distinguish five categories of such effects: (a) cognition; (b) sensorimotor capacities; (c) personality, behavior, attitude; (d) other fields of learning; and (e) other effects — principally physical abilities.

Despite all claims about positive side effects of music it should be stated that none of these have been demonstrated convincingly. Some purported effects simply have not been investigated seriously up to now; and with those effects that have been examined the issues turn out to be too complex to justify rapid conclusions. Problems arise, for example, in designing sufficiently sensitive measures, in controlling for confounding variables, and in dealing in a satisfying way with variables like intelligence, creativity, and personality (Haanstra & Van Oijen, 1985; Peery & Peery, 1987). Not surprisingly, conclusions of experiments are often at variance. Univocal results have not been found for any effect of the five categories.

Apart from this, in order to justify a place for music in the curriculum it is not sufficient to demonstrate that musical activities have positive effects. We should also be able to demonstrate that teaching music is an efficient way of bringing about these effects. For example, it seems likely that a few extra exercises in reading can improve children's reading abilities more than many hours of music education. If so, we cannot claim that music education is desirable because of its stimulating effects on children's reading abilities. Partly because of the problem of demonstrating positive effects at all, virtually no attention has been paid to the question of efficiency up to now.

A more fundamental problem of arguments that refer to nonmusical outcomes of music education is that they can at best justify only those musical activities that are directly related to the effect claimed. For example, if we could prove that music contributes to the improvement of social skills, this result would justify only those musical activies in which pupils do actually cooperate. And if we could demonstrate that musical activities advance children's motor development, this result would entitle us solely to include those types of music in the curriculum that strongly stimulate motor systems. Thus the scope of music education would be seriously restricted. The problem of justifying a place for music education at school on nonmusical grounds is, therefore, that along these lines one cannot defend a curriculum that is balanced from a musical point of view. If we wish to plead for a fully fledged music education, we need to rely on arguments according to which music is valuable in itself; that is, arguments that belong to the group of arguments that I have called *musical* at the beginning of this section.

My point is not that we should exclude all nonmusical considerations from music education: there is nothing wrong with relating music to other subjects, such as mathematics, literature, or history. Nor am I denying that if research were to vindicate some of the nonmusical arguments this would constitute a welcome support for teaching music at school. However, one or two valid nonmusical arguments are not sufficient to justify a full music program. They justify only particular aspects of it. Of course we cannot exclude the possibility that so many nonmusical arguments might prove to be valid that by additive reasoning one might make a plausible case for a comprehensive music curriculum. What I intend to do here, however, is to examine whether there are arguments that constitute in themselves sufficient reasons for including music in the school curriculum.

In the following I shall discuss three types of argument that relate the value of engaging in musical activities to the nature of music itself. First, I wish to make a preliminary remark about the scope of the arguments to be discussed. The majority of these are not specifically aimed at music but at the arts in general or at the even larger domain of aesthetics. Therefore, these arguments can demonstrate at best the importance of music as one of the arts (or as a part of the aesthetic domain). In order to justify the situation prevalent in Western countries, in which music is a separate subject at school and is given preference above several other arts, we need an additional argument.[2]

1.2 Music as contributing to the completely developed person

The first type of argumentation appeals to the ideal of the completely developed person. Music — or, more generally, the aesthetic domain — is conceived as a part of reality that entails a specific approach. According to this position, if education pays no attention to this specific realm, important capacities of the individual will remain unemployed. Education aiming at the complete development of individuals should, therefore, also be directed at developing their aesthetic capacities.

Within this type of argumentation we can distinguish four versions depending on what one considers to be constitutive of music. Some authors (e.g., Reid, 1969; Reimer, 1989) defend more than one of these versions. According to the first version, the specificity of the aesthethic domain is constituted by the *attitude* a person takes in dealing with phenomena in the world. If we approach phenomena with an aesthetic attitude, we contemplate them for their own sake. No utilitarian purpose is served when we are engaged in aesthetic perception. The aesthetic attitude may therefore be characterized as one of *disinterested interest*. Aesthetic experience is self-sufficient; it is complete by itself. According to this position, the arts are pre-eminently the field in which the aesthetic attitude dominates and the aesthetic experience yielded by the aesthetic attitude is cultivated. Among the authors who try to justify music education at school on these grounds are Osborne (1985) and Simpson (1985).

In a second version of the argument from development the specificity of the musical domain is conceived as a unique form of *cognition* rather than a particular attitude. The psychologist Howard Gardner (1983) believes that the human mind is best understood as consisting of several intellectual competences ("intelligences") that are relatively autonomous. He distinguishes linguistic, musical, logical-mathematical, spatial, bodily-kinesthetic, and personal intelligences. Interestingly, Gardner views music as a separate intelligence. In this respect his theory is at variance with the views of many philosophers who treat the arts together.

Hirst (1974), for example, argues that the arts involve a unique *form of knowledge*. According to him, the arts exhibit a logical structure equivalent to the structure of language. The physically observable features of art works (forms, colors, sounds, etc.) "are used as symbols, have meaning, can be seen as making artistic statements and judged true or false just as words and sentences can be used to make scientific statements" (p. 152). Thus, art can be viewed as a language that involves a specific kind of propositional knowledge. However, Hirst position remains rudimentary; he does not explain

what entities in the arts function as symbols or statements. In the end he must leave open the question whether the arts do indeed entail a typical form of knowledge.

Other philosophers hold that meaning in the arts is fundamentally different from the meaning contained in propositions. According to Phenix (1964, p. 141 ff.), the domain of aesthetics constitutes one of the nine *realms of meaning* that should be included in general education. Phenix considers the aesthetic realm as being characterized by its focus on the specific form of individual objects. Each work of art contains its own unique meaning and speaks for itself. This meaning is inalienable from the art work and cannot be expressed in propositions. We can grasp aesthetic meaning only in the direct perception of phenomena in their wholeness.

Reid takes a similar though more elaborated position (Reid, 1969, 1980, 1985, 1986). He also states that the meaning of art works can be expressed neither in language nor in any other symbol system. A unique meaning is contained in each art work and can be experienced only in direct engagement with it. Reid (1980) refers to the meaning of art as *meaning-embodied*:

> ...we know art not through symbols that refer to anything else, but by direct cognitively felt acquaintance with meaning: meaning-embodied. This is a way of knowing which...is unique. And anyone who has no experience of this way of knowing has missed out on a major factor of his education as a human being. (p. 14)

Understanding meaning-embodied is not a purely intellectual act. Reid (1980, p. 10) believes that the division between feeling on the one hand and thinking and knowing (or cognizing) on the other hand has had disastrous consequences for the understanding of the functioning of the human mind. In aesthetic experience feeling is inseparable from cognition; the two have become one. Reid calls the fusion of knowing and feeling *cognitively feeling*. Feeling is taken as active:

> ...feeling has a positive, active function; it reinforces (conative) interest and sharpens attention. Partly by doing this, it illuminates what we cognitively see or hear. We may know the notes, understand intellectually the structure of, say, a piece of music as performer or listener; but unless we discriminatingly feel the flow and progress of it directly and intuitively, we are still mainly knowing *about* it in a detached way. (Reid, 1980, p. 12)

According to this position, feeling is not just the subjective part of consciousness accompanying aesthetic cognition, but it plays a crucial role in apprehending the *meaning-embodied.*

The important role Reid assigns to feeling leads us to the third version of the argument from development: the arts as cultivating *feeling.* Reimer (1989) states: "The arts are the means by which humans can actively explore and experience the unbounded richness of human subjective possibilities" (p. 50). Although the claim that arts are pre-eminently suitable for cultivating the life of feeling is often put forward in defence of arts education, it is rarely elaborated. Reimer is one of the few authors who attempts to do so. He tries to demonstrate that "[c]reating art, and experiencing art, do precisely and exactly for feeling what writing and reading do for reasoning" (p. 33). According to Reimer, our inner life is characterized by a jumble of feelings that come and go without any logical organization. The arts enable us to get more hold on our feelings. With the assistance of an artistic medium (e.g., sound) we may objectify a feeling that has impinged on us. Once we have captured this feeling in a melody we can *"improve the feeling itself by improving the melody"* (p. 35). Reimer distinguishes several ways of improving a feeling embodied in a melody: for example, a feeling may be clarified, organized, broadened, deepened, concentrated, or refined.

Reimer's analogy between thinking and feeling raises some urgent questions. Can feelings really be controlled in the same way as thoughts can? Is it possible to abstract life-feelings from the context in which they occur and transfer them to artistic media? If this is possible, is this really a procedure an artists normally follow? Is the musical medium rightly pictured as a neutral device for moulding feelings that originate from an nonmusical context? Do feelings that are embodied in music derive from pre-existent extramusical feelings or do they rather take shape only in the process of musical composition? I shall not pursue these questions further here but it seems clear that Reimer's theory cannot be accepted right away.

According to the fourth and last version of the present argument, the specific character of the arts is constituted by the *holistic experience* they bring about. We may approach aesthetic experience from several perspectives (e.g., cognition, feeling, sensuous engagement, motor responses) but limiting ourselves to one of these results in a distorted picture. Aesthetic experience cannot be reduced to one of these aspects; it is neither purely cognitive, nor purely emotional, nor purely physical. Neither would it be correct to consider aesthetic experience as a sum of various components. Although we can conceptually distinguish the various aspects of the aes-

thetic encounter, in actual experience they are completely merged. Phenomenologically there is one total and indivisible response. Thus, engagement in the arts involves the whole person — the senses, the intellect, the emotions, and the motor system. However, the contemplation of multifaceted art works does not result in a gamut of separate responses but in one single experience that is total and unified.

The view that the arts occupy the whole person can be found in Reid's work (Reid, 1969, 1985, 1986). As we have seen, he holds that cognition and feeling are fused in aesthetic experience. Although he emphasizes these two aspects, he also indicates that, in fact, aesthetic experience is even more encompassing.

The four characterizations of music emerging from the above versions of the argument discussed here are in principle compatible. If one wishes to do justice to the full scope of musical experience, one can emphasize its holistic character. If, however, one wishes to discuss the matter more thoroughly, one cannot avoid choosing a particular perspective from which this total experience can be elucidated. The aspects of attitude, cognition, and feeling then suggest themselves.

In addition to being compatible at least three of the four characterizations of the specific nature of music are plausible as well. It seems that no serious objections can be raised against the last of the four characterizations — music as a holistic experience. Major controversies in the field of aesthetics are associated with the second and the third characterizations: the issue how the concepts of knowledge and meaning can be applied to music and the issue how musical feelings relate to life-feelings. However, it seems likely that music involves a specific form of cognition. And the idea that music cultivates feeling in a specific way is beyond doubt.[3] Of the four characterizations the first one seems to be the most problematic. During the last decades the time-honored idea that the arts involve a specific attitude has come under attack (cf. Hospers, 1982, p. 335 ff.). However, the question has not yet been decided and the idea is still present in much theorizing about the arts.

Suppose that one or several of the four characterizations of the specific nature of music can be maintained, can we then justify the inclusion of music in general education? I suggest we cannot. There may be general agreement that individuals should be developed broadly rather than one-sidedly, but the simple fact that a domain occupies a special place in human existence can never be a sufficient reason for cultivating it. For example, if it were shown that alchemy or astrology involved a special kind of associative

thinking we would not incorporate them in education for this reason. Developing a particular domain is desirable only if some good is inherent in it. We do not cultivate some domain for the sheer sake of cultivating it, but because by doing so we can share in particular values. Several authors (e.g., Phenix, 1964; Reimer, 1989) incorrectly suggest that music education at school could be justified by arguing merely that music entails a specific kind of cognition. If the claim that music education should have a place in the curriculum is to be founded, however, we must demonstrate that one or more major positive values are inherent in musical activities that cannot (to the same extent) be obtained through other means.

The characterizations of music given in the context of the argument from development are relevant to the extent that they indicate where the value of music might reside. The argument by itself, however, is insufficient because it fails to take the crucial step, that is, identifying the specific value of music.

In the next sections I shall discuss two claims about the value of music, which to my opinion, are the most serious ones that have been raised so far.

1.3 Music as a specific form of knowledge

Knowledge is generally considered to be one of the most important goods in life. Promoting knowledge is consequently a major aim of general education. When looking for arguments in favor of music education it is, therefore, natural to examine whether music can convey knowledge of a specific nature. If we follow this path, we can distinguish two types of knowledge: (a) knowledge of music that is vital to the engagement with music itself; and (b) knowledge of music that has significance beyond the musical domain.

With respect to the first type of knowledge there are numerous aspects of music we can acquire knowledge about: its forms, its social and historical background, the way it should be performed, and so on. As we have seen in the previous section, one cannot, however, argue in favor of music education merely by appealing to the fact that music entails a specific kind of knowledge. One should be able to indicate what the particular value of acquiring musical knowledge is. The most obvious answer to this question is that knowledge of music enhances musical experience. Subsequently, one should demonstrate that musical experience represents a substantial value. If we pursue this line, we no longer appeal primarily to the value of knowledge but to the intrinsic value of musical experience. I shall deal with this type of argumentation in the next section.

Regarding the second type of knowledge, does music entail knowledge that plays a vital role beyond musical experience itself? Obviously it does

not in the sense that music makes a significant contribution to the knowledge individuals needs to ensure physical survival. Moreover, there is no evidence that unmusical persons fail to adapt to the demands of society. Arguments suggesting that music education is not only desirable but also necessary, then, cannot be uphold without seriously inflating the notion of necessity. However, we need not demonstrate that music is an absolute necessity for survival. In Western society individuals need not continually struggle for their bare existence. They have the opportunity to satisfy other needs. An important need of humans is to have insight in the existence they lead. According to several authors (e.g., Aspin, 1982; Ross, 1984; Osborne, 1985) music can satisfy this desire. Claims are made in terms of enlarging one's self-knowledge, making the world more comprehensible, and elucidating one's individual existence. However, a thorough exposition of these claims is rarely given.

The most elaborated and influential position in this respect is Langer's (1953, 1957a, 1957b). Although she has not applied her ideas directly to the field of education, Reimer (1989) bases his view of music education as an indispensible part of the curriculum largely on Langer's theory. Langer argues that music is able to clarify the nature of feeling more adequately than language: "Because the forms of human feeling are much more congruent with musical forms than with the forms of language, music can reveal the nature of feelings with a detail and truth that language cannot approach" (1957a, p. 235). Langer refers to music as a *presentational symbol*: through its dynamic structures it shows us feeling in a direct way. Such a presentation of feeling is not a neutral reflection. Langer uses several terms to indicate that music does more with feelings; music is able formulate, to express, to articulate, to reveal them. Music, then, is a source of insight in the life of feeling.

A problem of Langer's theory is that it does not tell us precisely what music reveals: human feeling in general or specific feelings. Langer often speaks in general terms like *felt life, sentient responsive life, sentience, subjective experience*, or, simply, *feeling*. However, she also remarks that every work of art may have a single reference, that is, that a work of art expresses a particular feeling (1953, p. 373–374). Furthermore, Langer's formulations often seem to indicate that the specific insights art works offer us concern general *principles* that can be found in the dynamics of many feelings. She implies this, for example, when she relates music to "forms of growth and attenuation, flowing and stowing, conflict and resolution, speed, arrest, terrific excitement, calm, or subtle activation and dreamy lapses" (1953, p. 27).

If we put this lack of clarity aside and focus on Langer's central thesis that music reveals the *forms of feeling*, several objections can be raised against her position. First, Langer does not tell us how the purported correspondences between the forms of musical works and those of feelings should be conceived. She fails to explain at which level musical structures correspond to the forms of feeling. Which musical units match specific forms of feeling: complete works, movements, themes, or motifs? How do these forms of feeling relate to apparently autonomous musical principles like those of thematic development and to the various types of musical form? Langer does not even provide us a clue to answer these questions.

Second, one might wonder whether one can attain deeper insight into the nature of feelings, if one is confronted with their dynamic forms only. Langer stresses that music does not represent the full range of feelings but only their formal aspects. Some musical forms can bear various interpretations, for example, a happy as well as a sad one. Budd (1985b, p. 114) objects against Langer's view that feelings have no special forms that distinguish them from other phenomena. The dynamic patterns that characterize feelings can also be found in numerous natural and artificial processes.

This leads me to my principal objection. Langer's argumentation is based on an unwarranted move: the one from the assertion that there is a similarity between forms of musical works and forms of feeling to the assertion that the former elucidate the latter. No arguments whatsoever are given for this crucial move. Reimer (1989) also makes this transition tacitly when suggesting that propositions like "art has the same patterns as (is a semblance of, corresponds to, is analogous to) the life of feeling" do not differ considerably from propositions like "art gives insights (understanding, revelations) of the life of feeling" (Reimer, 1989, p. 52). It is clear, however, that two completely different types of claims are involved. Langer and Reimer should demonstrate that musical forms do not only correspond to forms of feeling but that they also can lead to a deeper understanding of the nature of human feelings. They fail to accomplish this task.

In summary: notwithstanding her elaborate expositions, Langer's argument remains unclear in important respects. Furthermore, serious objections can be raised against her position. Therefore, Langer's theory does not constitute an adequate basis for justifying music education by means of knowledge claims.

1.4 Musical experience as valuable in itself

The last type of argumentation to be discussed here appeals to the intrinsic value of musical experience. According to this position, dealing with music is not a means to attain some further good but musical experience is an aim in itself.

The view that music is an intrinsically valuable experience provides a natural argument in favor of music education. It seems to receive support from the great popularity of music in Western society: people spend much time and money on music, and they do this not because they think that music furthers their insight into their existence, but because they feel that music *as such*, that is without being functional to other things, enriches their lives. In spite of this plausibility at first sight the argument is seldomly treated seriously in literature on the value of music education. Therefore, I want to examine the prospects of this argument here.

Several authors (e.g., Kivy, 1991) try to dismiss the argument by stating that there are numerous other activities that make a positive contribution to the lives of many persons: baseball, computer games, good cooking, and so forth. It is impossible to include all pleasurable activities that are capable of being cultivated through general education. Why, then, include especially music into the curriculum instead of one of those other activities?

We can object to this counterargument that it places the value of musical experience into the context of a shallow form of hedonism. It is incorrectly assumed that if different activities can be related to the same type of concepts — pleasure, joy, amusement, etc. — they are all equally valuable. A hedonistic theory of value, however, does not exclude the possibility of ranking some pleasures higher than others.[4]

Moreover, appealing to the intrinsic value of musical experience does not necessarily imply one's endorsing a hedonistic point of view. The argument discussed here also accords to other conceptions of the good: the good as *happiness*, and the good as *self-realization*. In addition to theories that subsume the good under one concept (pleasure, happines, or self-realization), there are also pluralistic conceptions of the good. Some of these rank *beauty, aesthetic experience, harmony,* and *self-expression* among the highest values (Frankena, 1963). These ideals point even more specifically into the direction of music.

Willem Gehrels, the principal Dutch music educator of this century, appeals to several of these conceptions of the good, when he discusses the importance of music education: pleasure, happiness, harmony, self-expression, and aesthetic experience (Gehrels, 1931, 1956). Reimer's (1989) eloquent

plea for the intrinsic value of musical experience, on the other hand, accords with the ideal of self-realization:

> ...if any experience in human life can be valued intrinsically — for the sheer, sweet sake of the experience itself and our unique capacity to be aware that we can experience our aliveness — then surely artistic experience is of this sort. In this sense to ask what the value of such experience might be is like asking what the value of the experience of love might be. To experience love is to be profoundly what we as humans are capable of being. That is a value requiring no other to justify or explain it. It is the same with artistic experiencing, which raises to the highest possible levels our capacity to experience for the sheer sake of being experiencing creatures. To require other justifications is, in a way, to demean the very nature of the human condition. (pp. 52–53)

The argument that music education is justified because of the intrinsic value of musical experience can therefore not be dismissed by objecting that there are so many other nice things that qualify just as well for being included into the curriculum of general education. But the counter-argument of Kivy does make clear that, if we refer to the intrinsic value of musical experience, the question arises to what extent we can demonstrate that this value is superior to the intrinsic value of many other practices. Here we already reach the limits of the present argument for it is in principle impossible to argue for the claimed value of musical experience in a discursive way. The value of musical experience is given only in musical experience itself; there is no way of isolating essences from the total musical experience that would constitute in themselves the value of music. Authors who refer to the specific value of musical experience try to approach this value by using terms like *refined* (Broudy, 1976, p. 96), *sacred, numinous* (Ross, 1984, p. ix, p. 14) *dignity, glory, grandeur* and *sublimity* (Aspin, 1982, p. 51). But the richness of musical experience cannot be reduced to general characterizations like these. Moreover, these metaphorical characterizations are convincing only to those who have experienced music themselves as refined, sacred, numinous, et cetera. For people who have not had such sweeping experiences the characterizations mentioned have no power of persuasion at all. The intrinsic value of musical experience is not unique in its being ineffable, however. The value of many other things cannot be verbalized adequately either, for example, the value of friendship, faithfulness, and security. Everyone agrees on the importance of these values in human life. The question whether something has value is, in other words, *not* tantamount to the question whether its value can be argued for discursively.

The issue whether the intrinsic value of musical experience is of such stature that music qualifies for being included into the curriculum of general education cannot be settled by means of conclusive argumentation. The desirability of music education seems to be something about which we can attain only intersubjective consensus on the basis of our experiences (both individual and collective) with music. The issue here is *not* whether musical experience is equally valued by everyone — neither in the sense that everyone relates music to the same conception of the good, nor in the sense that music is equally appreciated by all; rather the issue is whether we can agree that musical experience is an important value in the lives of many people.

The "value-in-itself" argument has an interesting implication. The argument as such assigns an important role to music education. We can come to know the value of musical experience only if we are sufficiently initiated into music, for the intrinsic value of music cannot be demonstrated by words — it must be experienced. Good teaching of music can stimulate the broadening and deepening of this experience. This means that good teaching of music contributes to its own legitimization. We can see now that not only does the value-in-itself argument support teaching music, but also conversely that teaching music enlarges the chances of the argument being successful. On the one hand, the following holds: if music represents an exceptional value that is capable of being experienced rather than of being put into words, then everything that furthers this experience (e.g., music education) is not only desirable but also defensible solely by appealing to this experience. On the other hand, the question whether people can endorse the view that music represents an exceptional value is determined largely by the extent to which they have had extraordinary musical experiences of their own. And it is to furthering this kind of experiences that teaching music can make a positive contribution.

1.5 Conclusion

In the preceding sections I have discussed three types of argument that attempt to identify the value of music. According to the first type of argument, music — in its own or together with other arts — constitutes a specific domain of reality. The cultivation of this domain is taken to contribute to the ideal of the completely developed person. I have dismissed this argument because it is insufficient. The mere fact that some domain involves a specific type of attitude, knowledge, or experience is by itself no reason for developing it. Cultivating a domain is worthwhile only if some substantial value is inherent in the domain as such.

According to the second type of argument, music enlarges our knowledge of human existence. The most elaborated position is Langer's. She holds the view that music offers insight in the life of feeling by showing us the forms of feeling. Apart from the fact that the precise nature of her claim is not entirely clear, her position is contestable in several respects. Langer does not indicate how musical forms correspond to the forms of feeling. Nor does she justify the crucial move in her exposition, namely the one from the thesis that there are similarities between forms of music and those of feelings to the thesis that musical forms yield some deeper understanding of the nature of feeling.

The third type of argument states that musical experience itself has an exceptional value. I have argued that this type of argument does not lend itself to further elaboration. If one appeals to the intrinsic value of musical experience one has given a plausible argument in favor of music education, but by doing so one has exhausted the possibilities of argumentation. The value of musical experience can be experienced only; it cannot be conveyed with words.

The three types of argument all fail to argue conclusively that music should be included in general education but each one fails for a different reason. The first type of argument fails to identify and to elucidate the specific value of music. The second type of argument is unsuccessful because the claim that music is capable of providing deeper insights into human existence has not been convincingly substantiated. The third type of argument fails because the intrinsic value of musical experience by its nature cannot be expressed in words.

It must be emphasized that the failure of the first and the second types of argument is not on a par with the failure of the third argument. Arguments appealing to the ideal of development, and Langer's argument that music clarifies feeling, suffer from faulty argumentation: from the fact that music constitutes a specific domain it does not follow that cultivating the musical domain is desirable; and from the fact that there are similarities between the forms of feeling and the forms of music it cannot be concluded that music yields deeper insight into the life of feeling. In the case of the third type of argument, however, there is no question of inaccurate reasoning. The problem here is that there is no way of demonstrating that musical experience has an exceptional value by way of discursive argumentation. Whether music is actually something special we can only decide on the basis of our experience.

We may, then, conclude that all three types of argument fail to argue conclusively that music represents an important value in human life. But from the viewpoint of careful argumentation it is a correct procedure to let the issue whether the intrinsic value of musical experience justifies a place for music in general education depend on intersubjective consensus. This consideration does not equally apply to the argument from knowledge: the question whether music entails a specific form of knowledge must be decided on the basis of discursive argumentation and does not depend on whether people believe this to be the case. Nor is this consideration relevant for the argument from development. This argument as such relies on a faulty supposition and is, therefore, bound to fail as an independent argument in favor of music education.

Notes

1. Readers may make their own application of these remarks to college-level liberal arts curricula.
2. This additional argument need not necessarily demonstrate that music is of greater value than the other arts. One might also try to argue that musical abilities are capable of being cultivated better than other artistic abilities, or that music lends itself better for education *at school* than other arts (cf. the three conditions mentioned in the introduction).
3. The point here is not that music can *express* life-feelings that cannot be expressed by other means but that music *appeals* to our faculty of feeling in a very special way.
4. A classical case for the view that "some *kinds* of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others" can be found J. S. Mill's *Utilitarianism* (1874, p. 11 ff.).

2. Intrinsic meaning in music

Does music have meaning? If so, what is its nature? Many authors have suggested that music's primary function is the expression of feelings. Through music we can communicate our deepest emotions (see, for example, Cooke, 1959; Tolstoy, 1960; Ferguson, 1960). Others take the view that basically music has no meaning at all. Music involves pure sound structures which, though being quasi-syntactical, lack semantic content. Therefore, music fails to meet a crucial requirement for being meaningful. Thus Kivy (1990) concludes that "although musical meaning may exist as a theory, it does not exist as a reality of listening" (pp. 8–9).

In our view, neither standpoint is correct. For all their differences, both answers to the question what musical meaning consists in are inspired by a linguistic or referential model of meaning. This, however, is a misleading model as far as music is concerned. Surely, language is our most appropriate and most generally used medium for communicating. Moreover, language is by far the best researched medium. Nevertheless, we will argue, the analogy with language has led to an inadequate conceptualization of musical meaning. The main reason is that linguistic communication is usually about extralinguistic reality, whereas in music reference to extramusical reality plays only a secondary role.

The critique that musical meaning has been erroneously modeled after linguistic meaning is not new. For instance, Davies (1995, chap. 1) and Nattiez (1990, pp. 115–116) have emphasized the crucial differences between meaning in language and meaning in music. Nevertheless, these authors are themselves caught in the paradigm of linguistic meaning at a more fundamental level; they hold on to the view that a bearer of meaning (the signifier) directs our attention to something beyond itself (the signified). It is precisely this focus on extrinsic meaning that leads discussions about musical meaning on the wrong track. In our view the type of meaning most typical of music is fundamentally different: it is intrinsic.

In this article we will try carefully to delineate this aspect of musical meaning, which we will call intrinsic, from extrinsic meaning and other types of meaning which also play a role in music but should not be confused with it. When discussing intrinsic musical meaning, we are faced with the difficulty that it resists exact reproduction by other means. Intrinsic meaning is a phenomenon *sui generis* which cannot be reduced to, or adequately rendered by anything else. However, this can be no reason for neglecting this

type of meaning, which is crucial in music. It only means that we will sometimes have to use a negative strategy in explaining its nature, carving out intrinsic meaning by clarifying what it is not. The ineffability of musical meaning also poses special problems for music education, as one of its major aims is to convey the meaning of music (rather than, e.g., merely teaching music history). We will come back to these issues at the end of this paper.

In section 1 we begin by discussing various forms of meaning, concentrating on the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic meaning. In section 2 we elaborate this distinction with regard to music, referring to the work of L.A. Reid in particular. Next, in section 3, we further elucidate the notion of intrinsic musical meaning by contrasting it with diverse notions of internal meaning that several authors have proposed to account for intramusical relations. In section 4 we discuss the differences, and the relations, between musical meaning and musical experience. Finally, in section 5, we will briefly go into the problem of the ineffability of intrinsic musical meaning and make some suggestions for music education.

2.1 Different types of meaning

The word *meaning* has many meanings only some of which are relevant here.[1] First, we can say that music means a lot to us. By this we mean that music is important to us, that it is of great value. However, the question *how much* music means to us is different from the question *what* its meaning is or *what* it means to us. Whether or not a piece of music means much to us largely depends on what its meaning is. In the following, we will only deal with the latter, qualitative, meaning of *meaning*.

That music has meaning in this sense is apparent from all sorts of discourse about musical works. As Davies (1983, p. 222) observes, music is generally considered as something that can or cannot be understood correctly. The use of the verb *understand* in this context indeed shows that music is a bearer of meaning — somehow. But what does this meaning consist in? To answer this question the most important distinction we need to make is between intrinsic and extrinsic meaning. Many authors have used these terms with different meanings, however. Therefore, we will take the following steps: first we will briefly define these terms in general, giving examples of each of them; next, we relate the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic meaning to music in particular; and thereupon, we extend our analysis to a number of connected distinctions made in the philosophy of music in order to elucidate their similarities and differences.

Briefly, *extrinsic meaning* (1) results from the meaning-bearer's signifying something outside the bearer; and (2) does not depend on the specific form of the meaning-bearer. *Intrinsic meaning*, on the other hand, (1) is inherent to the bearer of meaning; and (2) is crucially dependent on its form.

The meaning of *words* can be taken as prototypical of extrinsic meaning. For example, we can use the word *building* to refer to some building and *Empire State Building* to refer to the Empire State Building in New York. In communication these words are *used*, they are employed in order to direct someone's attention to something beyond the words themselves. By speaking of the referential use of words we are not wedded to any specific theory of meaning. Terms like *reference* and *denotation* are central to the so-called referential theory which identifies the meaning of signs with the objects they refer to, or at least more generally identifies meaning with reference. This theory has been rightly criticized (see Alston, 1964, pp. 11 ff.; Nöth, 1990, p. 97). Many words, such as *and*, *although*, adjectives like *good*, or even concrete verbs like *run*, do not refer to concrete objects at all, so that the referential use of words cannot be the sole paradigm of meaning. Other theories stress different aspects that are relevant to the notion of meaning, for instance that which is constituted by the mind (the idea, the concept), or the pragmatic context in which words function (meaning as a function of their use). However, the differences between these diverse views about the precise nature of the meaning of words are not relevant here. All of them agree that the meaning of words depends on their being connected somehow with reality outside the words themselves. In using language our attention is drawn normally not to the words but through them to something else.

The specific form of the word is not decisive for its meaning. Changing the form of the word *table* to *TABLE* does not make a difference in this respect. Other combinations of letters, such as *taleb* or, in a different language, *Tisch*, could or do have the same meaning. Words are conventional means for communicating meanings that are independent of the signs used, and in cases of referring use (with the exception of self-reference) their referents are extralinguistic matters. Usually, the conventional form of the word is arbitrary. Although the form is sometimes motivated by the meaning (as in so-called onomatopoeia such as *cuckoo*, *hissing*), extrinsic meaning is never uniquely and completely determined by the form as such. Because of the conventional character of language, any form could in principle have any meaning.

With intrinsic meaning things are fundamentally different. This type of meaning, by contrast, is precisely constituted by the specific nature of the

bearer of the meaning. The meaning of a *work of art* can be taken as prototypical of intrinsic meaning (even though this is not the only kind of meaning a work of art can have). Whereas the phrase *Empire State Building* has a specific meaning because these words refer (or: we can use these words to refer) to a building in New York while the specific form of these words does not add anything to this meaning, a painting can have a very specific meaning without referring to anything else at all while its specific form is precisely decisive for that meaning. For instance, the paintings by Mark Rothko have meaning though not through their referring to anything outside. Neither does this meaning coincide with their being meaningful in the sense of important or valuable to us (the meaning of *meaning* we distinguished at the beginning of this section), for two paintings of Rothko can be very different in meaning yet equally valuable to us. With this type of meaning, which we call intrinsic meaning, everything crucially depends on the features of the art work itself. Design, choice of materials, proportions, color contrasts, they are determining for the meaning of the painting. Surely, many paintings, and art in general, can also refer to external reality, but that is a different kind of meaning. The intrinsic meaning of a work of art is directly and immediately given in the aesthetic experience. Whereas in the case of extrinsic meaning the bearer functions as a medium calling attention to *something else*, outside the medium, in the case of intrinsic meaning our attention is first and foremost directed at the meaning bearer *itself* and *as such*. Our point is that these two notions of meaning should not be conflated.

The specific form of a work of art is constitutive of its intrinsic meaning. Any change in form involves a change in meaning. As we will explain more fully later on, the intrinsic meaning of an art work is determined by how we can cognitively and feelingfully experience its form. Although form and intrinsic meaning are thus closely connected, they should not be identified. (In section 4, we will show how easily discourse about form gets confused with discourse about meaning.) With a term borrowed from R. M. Hare (1952, pp. 80–81, 130–131), intrinsic meaning is supervenient on the form of the meaning bearer: the art work has its specific intrinsic meaning in virtue of its specific form. This is the reason why form *per se* is so important in the arts and why intrinsic meaning can often be elucidated to a large extent by pointing to the formal characteristics of the meaning bearer.

2.2 Musical meaning: primarily intrinsic

With the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic meaning in mind we can now see that the two viewpoints mentioned at the beginning of this paper

give an inadequate account of musical meaning, and we can now make clear why this is so. Both views depart from the notion of extrinsic meaning. According to the first, the meaning of music is based on its conveying feelings and emotions. This is an overrating of the communicative function of music at the expense of its intrinsic meaning. According to the latter view, musical works are self-contained formal entities without external reference. When it is recognized that music often does not refer to extramusical entities, but at the same time meaning is identified with (external) reference, then the conclusion seems inevitable indeed that music cannot be said to have any meaning. This conclusion is unwarranted, however, because it derives from too narrow a definition of the general notion of meaning. Only on presupposition of this restricted definition the counterintuitive conclusion would follow that it makes no sense to talk about musical meaning at all.

In our view, music does have meaning, but a central part of it is intrinsic meaning. Musical works have meaning in themselves, not merely or even primarily as a result of their drawing our attention to some extramusical reality. Even in clearly referring pieces (e.g., vocal music, program music) music is not just a means for communicating about extramusical matters. Any extrinsic meaning will always depend on a limited number of characteristics of the musical theme or composition. There will always be many aspects besides that are not referential. It is the work in its entirety that we experience as meaningful in the first place. This meaning is immediate: it is imparted on us when we experience the work as a whole. By using the word *immediate* we do not want to suggest that musical meaning is independent of learning processes or musical conventions. It is a truism that music is mediated by numerous conventions. However, this does not affect the question as to whether music is primarily extrinsically or intrinsically meaningful. Here we take the word *im-mediate* in the literal sense that music is not merely and even hardly ever primarily used as a *medium* to simply communicate something which is entirely beyond itself.

Musical form in all its aspects and details is constitutive of the intrinsic meaning of musical works. Changing two notes of a theme usually means totally modifying its character. A few subtle alterations of the form of a composition yields a different musical experience, as a consequence of which the meaning we attribute to the composition will change as well.

In brief, musical meaning is primarily intrinsic and form-bound. In addition to this, a musical work may have extrinsic meaning. Features such as the melody, rhythm, or harmonic progression of the work may establish

associations with extramusical reality (feelings, objects, situations, etc.). However, extrinsic meaning may just as well be absent. Even Karbusicky, whose *Grundriß der musikalischen Semantik* (1986) focuses exclusively on extrinsic meaning, repeatedly emphasizes that this function is not constitutive of music. He approvingly quotes Mukařovský who refers to the *potential* semiological character of the formal elements (*"potentiellen* semiologischen Charakter der 'formalen' Elemente"; p. 31).

Whether or not a piece of music has meaning is not dependent on its serving some semiological or sign function. There need be no extramusical reference for it to have meaning. Its meaning is primarily determined by the way we can immediately experience its autonomous form. Although intrinsic meaning is so central to music, it has received relatively little attention from both philosophers and musicologists. Many authors totally and exclusively focus on extrinsic meaning. Authors who acknowledge that musical forms have meaning in themselves generally do not elucidate this type of meaning, and their spare remarks on intrinsic meaning are often completely overshadowed by extensive discussions of extrinsic forms of meaning.[2]

Stephen Davies' recent *Musical Meaning and Expression* (1994) unfortunately fits entirely into this picture. In this book the question of musical meaning is addressed exclusively from the framework of extrinsic meaning. According to Davies (1994), "Meaning involves a directional (usually nonreciprocal) relation between two things, signifier and signified" (p. 29). Davies suggests that all relevant types of musical meaning conform to this definition. He devotes over 300 pages to various kinds of extrinsic meaning. Only in one passage of a few lines Davies acknowledges that there is also another type of meaning, namely, formal meaning. Moreover, he notices that according to many this is the most important type of meaning. Davies also mentions the analogy with language:

> If the significance of musical ideas were exclusively formal, there would be no temptation to argue that music is a language. To understand a musical work would be to understand how it is put together; musical meaning would consist in the coherence of the structure of the work, and the significance of elements would derive from their contribution to the creation of this structure. Most theorists hold that, mostly, musical significance is 'internal' and formal in this way, but they also hold that music refers to, or denotes, or brings to mind nonmusical ideas, events, or things — in particular, that music expresses emotion. (1994, p. 48)

Surprisingly, in spite of the fact that most theorists are said to give priority to formal meaning, Davies does not discuss its nature. By ignoring this type of meaning and presenting a purely extrinsic concept of meaning, Davies' book, however impressive for its many detailed discussions, contributes to preserving and furthering the one-sided linguistic approach.

German musicologists generally have given more attention to intrinsic musical meaning. In German the term *musikalischer Sinn* (musical sense) has come to be used for meaning as contained in the form of musical works. However, although authors like Dahlhaus and Eggebrecht offer some insight into the idea of intrinsic musical meaning, they do not aim at clarifying it systematically (Eggebrecht, 1973, pp. 48 ff.; Dahlhaus & Eggebrecht, 1991, pp. 139 ff.).

It is surprising to find that the philosopher who, as far as we can see, has shed the clearest light on musical meaning does not write about music but about the arts in general. When speaking about meaning in the arts, L. A. Reid (1969, 1980) uses the term *meaning-embodied*. He writes:

> When I apprehend a work of art which is worth attending to...and do so with all my attention, discrimination, feeling, alive, I find that there is something immediate, of intrinsic significance and importance there. It is different in each work, and it is so *embodied* in what I perceive that I can never *say*, never translate exactly into terms other than what is before me what the *meaning-embodied* is. (1980, p. 3)

Reid's *meaning-embodied* comes close to what we have called intrinsic meaning. It is immediately apprehended: "The meaning-embodied is directly *presented* to us: *we are not referred away to something else* [italics added]" (1980, p. 6). The difference between extrinsic and intrinsic meaning is reflected in Reid's comparison of language and the arts. In spoken or written language, Reid (1969) says, the sensuously perceived structure of a message is merely instrumental to the grasp of its meaning. The individual forms of sounds or written marks are not constitutive of the meaning of sentences.

> In *aesthetic* embodiment, on the other hand, perceived sounds, shapes, rhythms, etc., are not only instrumental to the grasp of aesthetic meaning; the experience of attentive perception to them is an essential part of the apprehension of the meaning. The attention to perceived forms is both instrumental *and* intrinsic to the grasp of aesthetic meaning. (p. 76)

Our emphasis on the relevance of the specific form of the musical work is in conformity with Reid's contention that each work of art has a unified single

meaning which it alone can possess. The meaning of a work of art cannot be transferred to any other object. It is intrinsic to, or embodied in, its unique structure. Because of its being bound to its specific structure, the meaning of a work of art cannot be adequately expressed in words.

> Although every work of art includes being an instance of many concepts...its aesthetic value as a work of art is never exhaustively assessed in this way; it is an *individual* rather than merely a *particular*, or complex of particulars, and an individual rather than an *instance*. (1969, p. 299)

Reid's position is also interesting because of the role he assigns to feeling in grasping musical meaning:

> Although in looking at a picture or listening to music with great care, attention and discrimination, we are perceiving a complexity of formed content, up to a point (but never, never completely) describable in factual terms — yet we are perceiving it in a feelingful way. We are cognising it with intense feelingful interest; we are apprehending it with what can fairly be called 'cognitive feeling'. We are cognitively feeling, or feeling cognitively, the art as yielding valuable meaning. (1980, p. 11)

This characterization is very helpful in clarifying the concept of intrinsic meaning in music. As we have argued above, the form of the musical work is crucial to its intrinsic meaning. However, intrinsic meaning is not identical to musical form. Rather, it is supervenient on the form. Reid (1969) argues that the form of the aesthetic perceptuum can always be distinguished analytically from *what* it means, but also that in the actual experience of the work of art, in "the perceptuum...aesthetically apprehended" this distinction cannot be made (p. 199). The intrinsic meaning of a musical work is determined by the way its form can be experienced. This experience has been very aptly characterized by Reid as cognitively feeling. Apprehension of musical form is not a matter of mere cognition. We have to feel the flow and progression of the work. In musical experience cognition and feeling are fused. Therefore, the apprehension of musical form should be conceptualized neither as a simple cognitive act nor as cognition plus feeling but as cognitively feeling or feeling cognitively.

In sum, following Reid we propose to conceptualize the intrinsic meaning of a musical work as determined by the way we can cognitively and feelingfully experience its form. However, although Reid's theory of artistic meaning is very valuable for clarifying a number of characteristics of intrinsic musical meaning, we should also recognize now that his *meaning-em-*

bodied is in an important respect crucially different from what we mean by intrinsic meaning. In Reid's view artistic meaning always starts from extrinsic meaning. Form is not as such constitutive of meaning, but always as taking up and transforming meanings from life outside: "Art *draws* from an unlimited source of meanings from life outside art, but it takes them up into itself, transforms, transmutes, transsubstantiates them and presents us with complex and utterly irreducible and indivisible meaning-embodied" (1980, p. 10).

It may be agreed with Reid that this picture holds for literature, figurative art, and also for art forms like film and dance. However, it does not hold for pure music. Music does not have to look outside for its subject matter, it can stay with its own. What we call subjects or ideas in music are themselves musical entities: motifs, themes, and so on. Musical composition departs from small-scale sound structures that are already inherently meaningful and develops these into large wholes in which intrinsic meaning is vastly accumulated. We see, then, that — in contrast to Reid's meaning-embodied — intrinsic musical meaning does not or does not necessarily depend on extramusical subject matter for its being meaningful. It can derive from the autonomous form of the musical work.

In the next section, we will discuss some related but different theories that try to account for musical meaning that is internal to the musical domain. As we hope to show, they fail to offer a convincing picture by their adhering to concepts that belong to the model of extrinsic meaning.

2.3 Related but different notions of *internal* meaning

Several influential authors make distinctions between external and internal notions of meaning that at first sight resemble our contrast between extrinsic and intrinsic meaning but that are quite different nevertheless. *External* musical meaning mostly corresponds with what we have called extrinsic meaning: a composition as a whole, or parts of it, can refer to extramusical objects, actions, feelings, and so on. *Internal* musical meaning, by contrast, is taken to be a form of *referring* to something within the musical context itself. For example, some part of a musical work may refer to another part of the same piece, or to another work, or to a particular style. This distinction between external and internal forms of meaning should not be identified with what we have distinguished as extrinsic and intrinsic meaning. For both internal and external musical meaning are extrinsic in the sense defined in the above. Both are forms of referring to something else, the difference

being that internal meaning involves reference to something within the musical domain.

The distinction between internal and external meaning in music (both extrinsic) has been made in various terms. For instance, Meyer (1956) speaks of *embodied* versus *designative* meaning, Coker (1972) distinguishes *congeneric* and *extrageneric* meaning, and Nattiez (1990) contrasts *intrinsic* with *extrinsic referring*. Similar distinctions have been made by other theorists: Jakobson (1971) uses the terms *introversive semiosis* and *extroversive semiosis*, Green (1988) uses *inherent meaning* versus *delineated meaning*, and Nöth (1990) makes a distinction between *endosemantics* and *exosemantics*. We will discuss the first three of these authors. Although their conceptual pairs differ in several respects, the theories of Meyer, Coker, and Nattiez agree in their being guided by the model of extrinsic meaning.

W. Coker's *Music and Meaning* (1972) is one of the few studies dealing with the issue of musical meaning at length. At the basis of his distinction between internal and external meaning lies the notion of *musical icons* derived from Peirce's theory of semiotics: "The *iconic sign* (or ... the icon) has a property or properties in common with whatever it denotes; hence, an iconic sign in some respects resembles the object it denotes" (p. 30). The distinction between internal and external meaning, in his terms *congeneric* versus *extrageneric* musical meaning, is made as follows:

> *Congeneric musical meanings* are those resultants of a dominantly iconic sign situation in which someone interprets one part of a musical work as a sign of another part of that same work or a diverse musical work. ... *Extrageneric musical meanings* are those resultants of the iconic sign situation in which someone interprets a musical work or some portion of it as a sign of some non-musical object, including sounds not then organized as parts of the musical work. (p. 61)

Clearly, in both congeneric and extrageneric meaning the music in question is a sign of something else, and in that sense extrinsically meaningful. However, Coker's notion of congeneric meaning is dubious. It serves to pick out correspondences between parts of a composition (themes, motifs, etc.). But Coker fails to make a clear case for his use of the term *icon*. For something to be an icon it is not sufficient that it resembles another entity. A car cannot be said to be an icon of another specimen in the same series; nor are similar windows in a building icons of each other. By the same token, variants of musical themes are not icons of one another. Icons are signs of something else, their function is to refer to whatever they stand for. Musical

themes do not refer to other parts of the music in this way. Thematic variants constitute parts of the total musical structure. On the one hand, they derive their meaning from their specific position within the structure as a whole. On the other hand, thematic variants are significant because of their specific form; it is on the basis of their individual qualities that they contribute to the meaning of the work. Thematic variants may call the original shape of the theme to our mind, but they are not a sign or an icon of the original theme. It would be odd to say that the meaning of a thematic variant is the original theme.

When Coker purports to deal with icons, in fact he simply describes formal connections between themes and their variants. His use of semiotic terms like *reference* and *signification* is misleading, because he does not discuss the meaning of themes, motifs (etc.) but structural relations of musical forms. Coker's concept of meaning is confused, because characteristics of meaning and characteristics of form have not been adequately distinguished.

Coker's view is a drop-back as compared to the position of Leonard B. Meyer, whose *Emotion and Meaning in Music* (1956) has been more influential in theorizing about musical meaning than any other work. Meyer does not aim at imposing on music the moulds of icons or of any other type of sign. Yet, like Coker, he draws on an extrinsic model of meaning, and he too tends to conflate meaning and form. Meyer adopts Cohen's view, that "anything acquires meaning if it is connected with, or indicates, or refers to, something beyond itself, so that its full nature points to and is revealed in that connection" (1956, p. 34). Meaning is the resultant of a trilateral relationship:

> Meaning, then, is not either the stimulus, or what it points to, or the observer. Rather it arises out of what both Cohen and Mead have called the 'triadic' relationship between (1) an object stimulus; (2) that to which the stimulus points — that which is its consequent; and (3) the conscious observer. (p. 34)

Starting from this definition of meaning, Meyer arrives at the distinction between external and internal meaning, or, in his terms, *designative* and *embodied* meaning.

> A stimulus may indicate events or consequences which are different from itself in kind, as when a word designates or points to an object or action which is not itself a word. Or a stimulus may indicate or imply events or consequences which are of the same kind as the stimulus itself, as when a dim

> light on the eastern horizon heralds the coming of day. The former type of meaning may be called designative, the latter embodied. (p. 35)

Meyer says that numerous theorists conceptualize musical meaning exclusively as designative meaning, thereby disregarding the much more important aspect of embodied meaning. According to Meyer, embodied musical meaning occurs when parts of a musical work *indicate* or *point to* other parts. Thus, music has autonomous meaning, that is, meaning that is purely musical and does not depend on any reference to extramusical reality. Nevertheless, Meyer's *embodied meaning* clearly differs from Reid's notion of *meaning-embodied*. Both emphasize that music has meaning in itself, but Meyer's internal meaning cannot be called intrinsic in the way Reid's meaning-embodied can. According to Meyer, constituents of a piece of music point to something beyond themselves, namely, to other parts of the work.

Thus, also Meyer fails to see that a piece of music, or a part of it, can be meaningful in itself. According to Meyer, *embodied* musical meaning always involves two parts of a composition: the one that points and the one pointed at. This implies that meaning can be attributed to the whole work only in an indirect way, namely, by virtue of its parts' referring to other parts. This account ignores the properties of the work as a whole, such as its harmonious quality and its form as a totality (cf. Ingarden, 1962, p. 57). Such overall qualities are constitutive not only of the meaning of the musical composition as a whole, but also of its constituent themes and motifs. Meyer (1956, pp. 83 ff.) gives much attention to *Gestalt* laws, but only in relation to the role of expectation in musical experience. His extrinsic conception of meaning ignores the significance of musical Gestalts as such. A classic example is the opening motif of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. It is precisely because of its forceful, *inherently* meaningful Gestalt that this motif can dominate the whole work.

Apart from Gestalt qualities, musical forms have many other properties contributing to their meaning. Melodic curve, rhythmic flow, harmonic progression, timbres, textures: all of them are constitutive of musical meaning, not only because of their pointing to something else but primarily in that they can as such be experienced as meaningful. By focusing exclusively on the constituents' pointing to other parts of the composition, Meyer fails to account for the fact that musical forms can have meaning on the basis of their direct perceptual effect. Here we see again the distracting influence of the linguistic model. The sensuous qualities of musical works are not considered relevant by themselves. In language the specific form of the verbal signs is not per se constitutive of their meaning. The intrinsic meaning of

music, by contrast, arises from the specific qualities of its constituents. An extrinsic conception is unsuitable to account for the full range of musical meaning.

Meyer's discussion of constituents *pointing to* other musical parts seems to be concerned with relations of musical forms rather than with meaning relations between signifiers and signifieds. For the rest, his theory of meaning is more about psychological processes in hearers, centered around the notion of expectation. We will come back to Meyer's psychological ideas in section 4.

The leading semiologist J.-J. Nattiez (1990) defends a position largely similar to Meyer's (pp. 102 ff.). He also takes the referential function of musical items to be constitutive of musical meaning. Whereas Meyer uses diverse terms such as *point to, indicate,* and *imply* to describe the relations between musical elements, Nattiez invariably speaks of *referring* (being the translation of the French *renvoi*). His main distinction is between *extrinsic referring* and *intrinsic referring*. The first has to do with extramusical phenomena, corresponding with what Meyer calls *designative meaning. Intrinsic referring,* on the other hand, is to phenomena within the domain of music, roughly comparable to Meyer's notion of *embodied meaning,* however with a somewhat broader denotation. Following Coker's *Music and Meaning,* Nattiez makes a further distinction here between two kinds of internal reference: *i n t r a musical referring* is used for musical elements referring to other elements within the same composition. In addition, *i n t e r musical referring* is used for musical elements referring not to constituents of the same work but to the "larger musical universe to which it belongs". For example, musical elements can refer to the style they belong to or to other works in which similar elements occur (1990, pp. 116–117).

In our view, this again is rather confusing. The relation between a musical work and the style it belongs to is not usually characterized as reference (or referring), because it is fundamentally different from the relation between a sign and its referent. Compositions normally do not function as a means to direct one's attention to a particular style. Musical works are meant to be listened to for their own sake. Surely understanding different styles is important to playing, writing, and listening to music, but the notion of stylistic reference is only appropriate in the exceptional case when a composer deliberately cites or paraphrases a particular style. Similarly, relations between musical compositions can only be seen as referential in general at the cost of an entirely watered-down notion of reference. When composers use preexistent materials in their compositions, they do not usu-

ally *refer* to the music the material is taken from. The term *reference* seems apposite only if the materials used clearly serve the function of pointing to the original context.

As compared to Meyer's theory of meaning in music, Nattiez's position does not present major new insights. His notion of *intramusical* referring corresponds to Meyer's *meaning embodied*; his added notion of *intermusical referring* concerns a rather peripheral type of musical meaning. In general, the meaning of a musical work is determined only to a limited extent by its relations of reference to other phenomena in the musical domain, and the relations of a musical work to its style can only rarely be regarded as referential.

In order to arrive at a more precise delineation of our notion of intrinsic meaning, we discussed three influential authors, all of whom view (part of) the meaning of a musical work as somehow internal in character. However, according to our definitions, all three of them use an *extrinsic* concept of musical meaning. While Coker's treatment of musical elements as icons is without foundation, the theories of Meyer and Nattiez present interesting attempts to bring internal musical relations to the fore. Nevertheless, the views of Meyer and Nattiez do not provide real alternatives to the concept of intrinsic meaning. Because they concentrate on *relations* — either between particular parts within a musical work or between a musical work and other musical phenomena — they fail to do justice to qualities that are inherent in the musical items as such which typically contribute to their intrinsic musical meaning. In brief, the conception of musical meaning as music-internal reference threatens to put us on the wrong track in three ways. First, relations between musical forms and characteristics of musical meaning are not always sufficiently distinguished. Second, important aspects of meaning, notably intrinsic musical meaning, are systematically neglected. Third, the linguistic model of meaning tends to force a limited and sometimes even misleading set of concepts upon music.

It is clear that the musical structure, characterized by all its specific relations, is crucial to its meaning. However, it is not the only determinant of musical meaning. Musical meaning is determined by the way we can cognitively and feelingfully experience the musical form in all its aspects. We will now turn to the relation of meaning and experience.

2.4 Musical meaning and musical experience

Musical meaning originates in musical experience, that is, in the act of listening to music (including in performing music, composing, or reading a score).

Therefore, musical meaning and musical experience are closely related. However, although music has intrinsic meaning due to its being experienced by us in a cognitive and feelingful way, the meaning of a musical work should not be identified with the psychological processes we go through when listening to it or imagining it. Meaning and psychological processes belong to different categorical frameworks. Psychological processes are causally connected events, while meanings, strictly speaking, are not events at all. Psychological processes occur at a certain moment and they take a certain amount of time. We can differentiate them according to time and place. For instance, when two persons listen to a piece of music, there will be different psychological processes going on in both of them. Meaning cannot be conceptualized along the same lines. It is difficult to define meaning, especially intrinsic musical meaning, but it is clear that we do not think of (musical) meaning as something typically occurring at a certain moment or at a certain place. Meanings cannot be said to require a certain amount of time. When I hear a composition twice within one day and I do not find the piece changed (i.e., the second time I do not experience the piece as different from the first time), then again two different psychological processes are involved, at different times, but its meaning is one and the same. Of course, what a composition means to me may change in the course of time, but the meaning as such is not dependent on the evolving time. Meaning is of a different nature, perhaps we may say it is *sui generis*, or at least it cannot be reduced to other phenomena, even if they are its necessary conditions.

In order to get a clear conception of musical meaning, we carefully have to distinguish it from the psychological processes that occur when we are engaged in musical activities. These notions are often insufficiently kept apart. It is not uncommon to find them simply equated, as, for example, in Coker's *Music and Meaning*: "If he [the interpreter] experiences the musical gesture in an unself-conscious way and responds instinctually, *the meaning of the gesture will be what he feels and undergoes; it will be his instinctual, affective response* [italics added]" (1972, pp. 151–152).

In Meyer's *Emotion and Meaning in Music* the relation between meaning and the psychological processes of listening plays an important role. Sometimes he seems to replace terms from his definition of meaning with psychological terms. Regarding the bearer of meaning the word *object* tends to give way to *stimulus*, while his notion of *embodied meaning* gets a psychological overtone:

> From this point of view what a musical stimulus or a series of stimuli indicate and point to are not extramusical concepts and objects but other musical

> events which are about to happen. That is, one musical event...has meaning because it points to and makes us expect another event.... Embodied musical meaning is, in short, a *product* [italics added] of expectation. If, on the basis of past experience, a present stimulus leads us to expect a more or less definite consequent musical event, then that stimulus has meaning. (1956, p. 35)

However, as we can see, Meyer is careful not to equate meaning and psychological processes. Rather, he explains the one in terms of the other, with the effect that the question *what the meaning is* is answered by *how it is effected*, that is, a description of the psychological processes that cause us to experience music as *meaningful*: "As the later stages of the musical process establish new relationships with the stimulus, new meanings arise. These later meanings coexist in memory with the earlier ones and, combining with them, constitute the meaning of the work as a total experience" (pp. 36–37). In principle, there is nothing wrong with this shift, provided that we keep in mind the difference between the two questions of what the meaning is and how it is brought about and provided that we realize that expectation is not the only determinant of musical meaning. Perhaps this is about as close as we can come, considering that intrinsic musical meaning per se cannot be verbalized.

Defining musical meaning as determined by how we can experience a musical work, implies ascribing a crucial role to the subject, as well as allowing for subjective differences. However, as we cannot describe what this meaning is, we will not be able to establish exactly how it differs for various persons either. In other words, we may have good psychological reasons to expect *that* the intrinsic meaning attributed to a musical work will vary more or less between different persons, or also in one person at different times, even though we are unable to say precisely *what* these differences consist in.

Do we have to give up any claim to objectivity of musical meaning by thus emphasizing the subjective aspects of musical experience? Can we still speak of *the* meaning of a musical work when it may be experienced differently by every individual? On closer examination it will be clear that these interpersonal differences, for example in listening, can only be part of the picture. For, on the other hand, we can only understand the practices of composing, performing, listening, and criticizing at all on the supposition that there are also essential similarities in the musical experiences of different persons. The composer creating a composition has a clear conception of what he wants to convey to the audience. A competent performer is able to pass the essence of this conception on to the listener. However many pos-

sibilities there may be for an interpreter to put his own mark on the work, he can only succeed if he sufficiently complies with the composer's intentions. Moreover, there is substantial agreement, especially among experts, about the characteristics of specific genres and about the qualities of particular works. If this were not the case, then every discourse on music would amount to the mere expression of subjective opinions. In actual fact, we turn out to concur on many points.

This shared understanding of musical meaning can be accounted for by two facts. First, our musical experience is largely determined by the specific *form* of the musical composition in question. The character of its themes, its melodic and dynamic development, the patterns of tension and release, the rhythmic pulse, the timbres, the overall structure of the piece: all these and many other features guide the listener's experience. In other words, our musical experience is structured to a large degree by the form of the musical work. Secondly, many subtle musical norms have been learned and are shared by the members of a social group or society, governing their interpretations of music. For instance, even though within the limits set by the musical form myriads of quite diverging interpretations are still possible, there are often certain specific interpretations that count as authoritative. Shared systems of norms can change in the course of time. Nevertheless, to the extent that the composer, the performer, and the listener are guided by such norms, it is reasonable to accept the possibility of a considerable degree of intersubjectively shared meaning (cf. Van Haaften, 1995).

So far, we have been concentrating on intrinsic musical meaning, first because in our opinion intrinsic meaning is the heart of musical meaning, and second because, surprisingly in view of this, it has received so little attention in the philosophy of music. However, at this point we should add a few remarks concerning the complex nature extrinsic meaning. The distinction we made between intrinsic and extrinsic meaning is a fundamental one, but that does not imply that all extrinsic meaning is just of one and the same kind. On the contrary, it appears that a considerable number of forms and subforms of extrinsic meaning can be distinguished. Theorists from several disciplines have investigated various kinds of meaning contained in the general notion of extrinsic meaning. For instance, analytic philosophers like Kivy (1980, 1984), Levinson (1990, 1996), Goodman (1976), and Davies (1994) have investigated the concepts of expression (or expressiveness), representation, and imitation. Semioticians have examined the role of various types of signs (icon, index, symbol, etc.) in music in a number of studies, the most notable of which is Karbusicky's (1986) book on musical semantics. Further-

more, extrinsic meaning is the focus of musicologists who study program music and other music with — in Finscher's words — *transmusical contents* (Finscher, 1979; Petersen, 1983; Newcomb, 1984).

By concentrating on intrinsic musical meaning we do not want to underestimate the importance nor the potentially intense character of the various kinds of extrinsic meaning that may be attached to music. However, in this article our first aim is to disentangle the different notions of meaning involved in music and to stress the role of intrinsic meaning even though this notion could only be partly clarified by differentiating it from types of meaning that are often more easily recognized.

2.5 The ineffability of intrinsic musical meaning

One of the most problematic characteristics of intrinsic musical meaning is its ineffability. In the above we have seen that the concept of intrinsic meaning is hard to define, but it is even more difficult, if not impossible at all, to describe the intrinsic meaning of concrete musical compositions or of parts of them such as their principal themes or motifs. For example, how could we express in words the intrinsic meaning of Brahms's Fourth Symphony? How could we describe the meaning of the opening motif of Beethoven's Fifth? Intrinsic meaning resists the so-called *Principle of Expressibility* according to which "whatever can be meant, can be said" (cf. Searle, 1969, pp. 19–21, 88; Katz, 1972, pp. 18–24). Or, in a more precise formulation: "for any meaning X and any speaker S whenever S means (intends to convey, wishes to communicate in an utterance, etc.) X then it is possible that there is some expression E such that E is an exact expression of or formulation of X" (Searle, 1969, p. 20).

If this were true, an argument against intrinsic meaning could run as follows: according to the Principle of Expressibility, it is possible to tell precisely what the intrinsic meaning of every composition is; this is clearly not possible; therefore, it cannot be maintained that there is such a thing as intrinsic musical meaning. However, it should first be noted that Searle and other proponents of the principle have failed to provide convincing arguments for it. Secondly, the principle runs counter to both common-sense considerations and basic assumptions of current cognitive-psychological information processing theories. Our knowledge comprises more than what we have expressions for. And insofar as we do have words to express what we might like to communicate, the contents of knowledge that others connect to these expressions most likely will correspond sufficiently but not exactly to what we have in mind ourselves — think for example only of

feelings, of indelible memories, of specific odors, and of particular sound qualities (cf. Van Haaften, 1975).

Intrinsic musical meaning is largely ineffable and unverbalizable. This is problematic in several respects, but it can be no reason to deny this type of meaning altogether. On the other hand, an extrinsic approach to musical meaning based on a linguistic or referential model is undoubtedly easier to deal with, but such an approach is not more suitable for that reason. On the contrary, as we hope to have made clear, it may easily lead to a limited and impoverished view of musical meaning.

The foregoing implies that comparative research in the field of intrinsic musical meaning is hardly possible. However, musical analysis can provide an important *indirect* contribution to our understanding of the intrinsic meaning of musical works, namely, to the extent that it can elucidate their musical form (in the broadest sense of the word) which is to a large degree constitutive of their intrinsic meaning. Therefore, we think the dominant approach to musical analysis, which concentrates on explaining the musical form, is right.

It is also because intrinsic musical meaning resists the Principle of Expressibility, that listening to music, performing music, and composing or improvising should constitute the core of the curriculum in music education. Only through these forms of musical experience can the full richness of the cognitive and feeling aspects of intrinsic musical meaning become manifest to the pupil. Extrinsic meanings surely may add to this experience, even if only as an incentive to attend to the music. Analysis of the multifarious musical forms and of their typical differences surely will support the discovery of musical meaning as well. However, even this type of analysis is subordinate to active listening, performing, and composing, because the intrinsic musical meaning cannot really be grasped through verbal discourse but only in the direct engagement with the music itself.

2.6 Conclusion

In this article we have tried to clarify a central aspect of meaning in music — intrinsic meaning. We have suggested that the meaning of (a part of) a musical work is primarily constituted by the musical form, which has meaning *as such*. Intrinsic meaning should be clearly distinguished from various types of extrinsic meaning, which consists in reference to a reality outside the musical form itself, including "internal" reference to other parts of the same composition or to other musical works. For that reason, the linguistic model is not suitable to clarify the notion of intrinsic meaning; the linguistic model

is rather liable to mislead us when we try to understand the nature of intrinsic musical meaning. On the other hand, we have argued that intrinsic meaning should not be identified with the musical form which is its bearer: intrinsic meaning is supervenient on the musical form. It is what the form means to us in experiencing it. Furthermore, we should also clearly distinguish intrinsic meaning from the psychological processes involved in experiencing the musical form.

The most prominent characteristics of intrinsic musical meaning are the following: It is attributed to the musical object, which can either be a musical work as a whole, or a part of it, such as a theme or a motif. Intrinsic musical meaning is im-mediate: it is not derived from any mediating or referential function of the musical form relating it to something else, whether within the same piece of music (intramusical reference) or in another musical work (intermusical reference) or outside of music (extramusical reference). Intrinsic meaning is uniquely constituted by the specific form of the musical object as it can be experienced. It is determined by the way we can at once cognitively and feelingfully experience the musical form.

Notes

1. A discussion of the diverse meanings of *meaning* can be found in Alston (1964, pp. 10 ff.),
2. Examples of this one-sided treatment can be found in Karbusicky (1986) and Nattiez (1990, chap. 5).

3. Stage theories of musical development

Musical development is a major issue in music education. Music educators' actions are based on ideas about the musical capabilities children possess at various ages and the way these capabilities change. These ideas rest largely on intuition, personal experience, and tradition, and while they should not be dismissed, they are clearly capable of improvement and refinement. It is important, therefore, that music educators inform themselves of the results of research on the musical development of the child. However, the music educator searching for an overall view of the course of musical development will find that theories in this area are scarce. Most researchers limit themselves to collecting data about musical abilities of children at particular moments in childhood. Only a few researchers (e.g., Bamberger, Pflederer, Dowling, Davidson, and Serafine) have until now focused on major qualitative changes.[1] But again, their work concentrates on a limited aspect and a limited period of musical development.

The only comprehensive view is offered by Keith Swanwick and June Tillman's theory in which several stages are distinguished (Swanwick & Tillman, 1986; Swanwick 1988). At this time it is the only substantial stage theory dealing exclusively with music. In addition, two stage theories by Howard Gardner, though covering a broader field, are relevant to musical development (Gardner, 1973; Gardner, Phelps & Wolf, 1990).

The purpose of this article is to elucidate and evaluate these three stage theories. I shall first present a theoretical framework for the analysis of developmental theories (section 1), for any adequate comparison of theories requires a theoretical framework or metatheory that provides relevant criteria for analysis and assessment. After this preparatory work I shall discuss the three theories in sections 2 to 4 and criticize them on a number of points. I shall propose an amended stage model on the basis of Gardner's 1973 theory. In section 5 I shall examine the relations among the theories and after that, in section 6, investigate the possibility of justifying evaluative claims — claims according to which later stages are better than the ones preceding them. Finally, the relevance of the three theories of musical development for music education will be examined.

3.1 The concept of development

The theoretical framework presented in this section is based on the work of Van Haaften (Van Haaften et al., 1986; Van Haaften, 1990; Van Haaften et al., 1997). The word *development* is related to change, of which two types can be differentiated: quantitative change and qualitative change. In everyday language, *development* can refer to quantitative change as well; but here the term is used in a more restricted sense: development as involving qualitative change. The notion of *stages* is closely linked to this view of development. If essential differences can be observed in a developmental process, this amounts to distinguishing two or more stages. We may, then, accept as definitive for development that it (1) involves a process of change which (2) occurs over a certain period of time and in which (3) two or more qualitatively different stages occur, (4) each stage being a precondition for its successor. All three developmental theories discussed here appear to meet the conditions mentioned.[2]

Development always occurs within a specific *domain*. The term domain refers to a clearly circumscribed part of reality, for example, science, morality, religion. Domains may vary with regard to their inclusiveness. It is possible that one domain be included another. Music, for instance, constitutes a part of the aesthetic domain.

Within a domain a number of aspects can be distinguished with respect to which development occurs. In this context, I shall speak of developmental dimensions, or briefly *dimensions*. Examples of developmental dimensions within the musical domain are musical production (composing, improvising) and musical reception (listening).

The dimension most central to the musical domain is the dimension of musical experience. In the aesthetic domain — and hence in music — it is aesthetic experience itself that we pursue. Aesthetic operations do not serve any practical purpose like understanding and controlling the world outside the arts. Although musical experience occupies a central place within the musical domain, no developmental theory has thus far been proposed that concentrates on the dimension of musical experience. The reason for this seems to be the elusiveness of the concept of musical experience, for it is so general a concept that it can be related to many different types of experience — intellectual, affective, motor, synaesthetic, and so forth. One dimension that is easier to pin down and that plays an important part in this paper is the dimension of musical understanding. Musical understanding is closely related to musical experience, because the latter depends to a large extent on the level of musical understanding one has reached.

The concept of musical understanding refers to the insight people have into the various aspects of music. The concept accords with the intuitive realization that certain insights are relevant to various modes of dealing with music. Composing, listening, interpreting, judging: all these actions depend upon musical understanding, which thus overarches several more specific dimensions.

Musical understanding is often implicit. Most people are not aware of their having internalized many properties of the musical system dominant in their culture. Nevertheless, this unconscious understanding underpins all musical operations. Consider, for example, tonality. Anyone who has been surrounded by Western music since his early days and who is not tone-deaf knows from a certain age on how a tonal melody should end. Few persons know explicitly that such a melody should finish with the tonic. However, if they hear a melody that concludes on another tone than the tonic, they will feel that the ending lacks a sense of resolution. And if they improvise a melody, they will automatically end with the tonic.

The concept of dimension helps us to clarify why it is often difficult to relate various results of research in the field of musical development to one another: they deal with different developmental dimensions. Theorists who survey the field generally give the impression that they deal with musical development as a whole; but in fact they are either concentrating on a single dimension or are investigating different dimensions simultaneously. The latter approach often yields an unclear and misleading picture: the author simply sums up a number of phenomena belonging to different dimensions in the belief of having given an adequate account of musical development. He ignores the fact that various aspects of the musical domain often have different courses of development.

To obtain a clear view of musical development, we must make careful distinctions among varying aspects of musical development, a task that involves *horizontal reconstruction*. In horizontal reconstruction the domain is defined and developmental dimensions within this domain are traced. In the subsequent *vertical reconstruction* developmental stages within a dimension are reconstructed.

Logic and *dynamic* are two complementary parts of developmental theory. Logic, which subsumes horizontal and vertical reconstruction, is concerned with the reconstruction of sequential stages of a developmental process. In addition, it examines relations between various dimensions and various stages. The objective of logic is not to trace the actual course of developmental processes but to investigate the characteristics and the sequence

of constitutive aspects of development. Dynamic deals with the actual processes of development as well as with principles that can explain these processes. In this article I shall concentrate on the logical aspects of developmental theories.

The stages reconstructed in the logic part of developmental theory are abstract in nature. They are not necessarily found in concrete form in empirical reality, and they need not correspond to specific ages in human life. Nor does the precise differentiation of one stage from another imply that the actual process of development displays abrupt transitions. A stage indicates a number of characteristics which are essential to a particular kind of development at a certain moment.

Developmental theory allows for several different ways in which stages are related to one another, two common types of which are referred to here. The first one is *inclusion*; if a new stage encompasses its predecessor their relation is one of inclusion. *Substitution* is the opposite of this, that is, major characteristics of a preceding stage are not preserved in the new stage.

Developmental claims are statements based, explicitly or implicitly, on a cohering set of criteria for development. Developmental claims always refer to some *developmental pattern*. Two types of developmental claims can be distinguished. A *descriptive* developmental claim is made when the person asserting it refers, implicitly or explicitly, to certain developmental stages. If, moreover, a certain appraisal is attached to this form of development, an *evaluative* developmental claim is made. Many writers on musical development assume tacitly that later stages are always to be preferred to earlier ones. Theoretically, however, there is no reason whatever to take this for granted. Until now, the problem of justifying evaluative claims about musical development has been underestimated. I shall deal with this issue in section 7.

3.2 Gardner's theory of aesthetic development

Horizontal Reconstruction

In his book *The Arts and Human Development* (1973) the American psychologist Howard Gardner puts forward an ambitious theory of the individual's development in the aesthetic *domain*. Besides music, his theory covers the visual and the literary arts. Gardner understands the arts as forms of communication. Through the effective manipulation of his artistic medium, the artist conveys a subjective message (about feelings, beliefs, thoughts) to

an audience. An art work thus serves a symbolic function: it refers to the artist's subjective experiences.

Gardner does not focus on one specific developmental *dimension*. Although he deals with creation as well as reception, performance, and criticism, his developmental theory is not primarily about these aspects. Gardner is primarily interested in the development of the three systems he defines at the beginning of his book, the making, perceiving, and feeling systems, which constitute the core of a theoretical framework he designed. He claims this framework enables him to treat aesthetic development more adequately than before. However, since Gardner does not consistently approach artistic development in terms of his conceptual framework and most descriptions dispense with theoretical terms, I shall not concentrate on his theoretical framework. In section 6 I shall argue that Gardner's account of musical development may be understood as referring to the developmental dimension of musical understanding. For the time being it is important to keep in mind that Gardner intends his theory to bear primarily on the making, perceiving, and feeling systems and their interactions.

Vertical Reconstruction

Gardner distinguishes two stages in aesthetic development, a presymbolic stage and a stage of symbol use. In the first stage the three developing systems unfold. Differentiation takes place, and the systems begin to interact. In the second stage the child discovers the symbolic function of the arts. Arbitrary elements become symbols as they are linked to content, and the child learns to use these art symbols properly, that is, in accordance with cultural norms and aesthetic codes.

Surprisingly, Gardner's separate treatment of musical development does not not accord with his developmental model. He does not focus at all on the symbolic function of the musical medium. There is no account of the way children discover the opportunities the musical medium offers them to communicate subjective experiences. At the beginning of the section on musical development Gardner reviews research done in this area. After having noted important convergences among researchers, he summarizes the results:

> During the first years of childhood, the child acquires a general familiarity with music and begins to experiment with perceiving and making, imitating songs he has heard, elaborating them, and recognizing pieces and motifs, for instance. By the age of 6 he has already achieved a working relationship with

> musical symbols, playing and performing and perceiving with some accuracy. (1973, p. 196)

About the competence which allow six- or seven-year-old children to have this working relationship, Gardner writes:

> ...a reasonably competent 7-year-old should understand the basic metrical properties of his musical system and the appropriate scales, harmonies, cadences, and groupings, even as he should be able, given some motifs, to combine them into a musical unit that is appropriate for his culture, but not a complete copy of a work previously known. (1973, p. 197)

Gardner portrays musical development as learning to understand and use the dominant musical code. He deals with musical structure only and does not tell anything about the development of music's symbolic function in the child. Therefore, the two stages are more correctly reformulated in terms that reflect their real content: the appropriation of the dominant musical system. The stages may thus be described as (1) exploration of the musical medium: listening, reacting, imitating, babbling, humming, singing; and (2) internalization of the musical system: dealing with music in accordance with the musical code.

Gardner believes aesthetic development is best viewed as encompassing only two stages. As far as major qualitative changes are concerned, aesthetic development ends at about the age of about seven. Although the child can make a lot of progress after that, the changes will be quantitative only. In a strict sense, development is completed. However, Gardner himself supplies us with evidence that undermines this position. In his section on musical development he summarizes reseach done by himself and Donna Bridgeman:

> The pre-adolescents were immersing themselves in the musical selections, noting their affective and kinesthetic effects, making free associations to previous experiences... They were proceeding from the musical event to a final decision. In contrast, the adolescent subjects appeared to approach the task from the perspective of their musical knowledge. They had some familiarity with musical history and terminology, and they looked for examples of prior categories in the music they heard. ...they were proceeding from a structure to the particular musical event being evaluated. These different approaches to music seem consistent with other findings and provide evidence that, with the advent of formal operations and an "abstract attitude", subjects assume a new kind of "distanced" relationship to aesthetic

> works, one which may be less effective in revealing the work than the unmediated relationship younger children have. (1973, p. 195)

Gardner describes two *qualitatively* different approaches to music which may be generalized. According to the first approach, the listener has a direct relationship to the music which is not mediated by thoughts about certain aspects of music. According to the second approach, the listener takes a distanced and abstracted stance to music, which has a significant influence on musical experience.

Composition is similarly affected by a distanced relationship. Gardner writes:

> With the passing of adolescence, the individual who has continued to master his symbolic medium becomes an artist in the full sense — he has become familiar with and is now able to appreciate and to contribute to the tradition in his art form. Earlier, he knew the art as a single form, and such invention as he had done had usually been in one style at a time. Now he becomes intimately aware of the variety of artists and styles that preceeded him. ... With increasing understanding of the world of persons, artists of the past emerge as individuals like himself who responded to the challenges, motifs, and feelings of their epochs and captured information about such elements and about themselves in their own art work. Only at this point does the artist achieve sufficient distance — adequate decentration — so that he can perceive himself as engaged in the same kind of activity as his predecessors and can begin to contribute to the tradition. (1973, p. 263)

This passage shows that a distanced and reflective attitude is not just something added to immersion in the art work but that this attitude leads to a fundamentally different relationship with the arts.

Gardners descriptions lead me to distinguish two qualitatively different ways of relating to music in the second stage, which now splits into two new stages: one in which the individual internalizes the musical code in an unreflective way, and a subsequent one in which he has a more distanced relationship to music. This results in a three-stage developmental model:

1. Exploration of the musical medium: listening, reacting, imitating, babbling, humming, singing;
2. Internalization of the musical system: dealing with music in accordance with the musical code;
3. Distanced and abstracted attitude, growing consciousness of musical experience, reflection.

The relation between stage 1 and 2 is best characterized as inclusion: the second stage builds on the experiences with music the individual had in the preceding stage. The same is the case with stages 2 and 3; stage 3 entirely includes the knowledge of the musical code acquired in stage 2.

3.3 The developmental theory of Gardner, Phelps and Wolf

Horizontal Reconstruction

In a 1990 publication in cooperation with Erin Phelps and Dennie Wolf, Gardner presents a developmental model which bears some resemblance to the three-stage model proposed above. The domain and the dimension, however, are different from those examined in *The Arts and Human Development*.

The *domain* is even more encompassing than in the earlier theory: it encompasses not only the arts, but all symbolic domains, including mathematics and the symbol systems used in science. Although the domain is very large, Gardner et al. pay special attention to music and the other arts in their examples. The *dimension* on which the authors concentrate is the dimension of creativity. As will be seen, the stages put forward have a broader significance than the aspect of creative production within the various symbolic systems.

Vertical Reconstruction

Gardner et al. (1990) outline a developmental model which contains three phases. In terminology borrowed from Kohlberg's theory of moral development, they call them the preconventional, the conventional, and the postconventional stages (p. 93).

In the *preconventional* stage creativity is independent of the culture in which the child grows up. The child explores the symbolic medium in his own way. When he encounters problems, he tries to find solutions on his own (p. 91).

In the *conventional* stage the child becomes sensitive to "cultural dictates", as Gardner et al. call them. His aim now is to produce symbolic products in just the way adults do and to conform to dominant conventions as much as he can (pp. 90–92).

The *postconventional* stage is characterized by a critical attitude toward conventions. The creative person no longer contents himself with imitating the products of his culture but pursues his own ends, and if he feels impeded by conventions he puts them aside. As a result of this critical attitude,

many adolescents give up creative work which they feel unable to produce at an acceptable level. They therefore concentrate on reception (pp. 90, 92).

As Gardner et al. show, it is useful to distinguish a preconventional, a conventional, and a postconventional attitude in areas other than morality. Because they have chosen a vast domain — symbol systems — they cannot help talking about conventions in only a very general sense. We may, however, elaborate the idea for the case of music. I propose the following.

Conventions may be linked to the dominant musical code(s). A person who is in the preconventional stage has no understanding of this code. In the conventional stage, the musical code does not merely guide the person but defines for him what counts as acceptable music. It is important to stress that the conventional stage is not tied to one particular style, for instance, pop, folk, or classical music or jazz. Which musical code a person learns depends on the (sub)culture he belongs to. The point here is that at the conventional stage one is not able to go beyond the types of music one has become accustomed to by enculturation. The postconventional stage represents a different attitude. One distances oneself from musical conventions and is receptive to music which is at variance with one's familiar code, such as avant-garde music or the music of other cultures. For a person hitherto familiar only with pop music, this may be classical music (or vice versa). The postconventional composer, moreover, searches for new means of expressing himself. In short, one's horizon is widened dramatically in the postconventional stage. Although this does not mean that all unfamiliar music will be automatically appreciated, opportunities for musical experience are enlarged systematically. A postconventional attitude does not necessarily entail the rejection of the musical code that set one's musical standard in the conventional stage, but it does imply that this code no longer determines the types of music one is capable of appreciating.

The relation between the preconventional and the conventional stages is best described as one of inclusion. Although stage 2 embodies a totally different way of dealing with music, the knowledge of the symbolic medium acquired in stage 1 is preserved. Similarly, the postconventional stage includes its predecessor, the conventional stage. Conventions, though now having a different status, continue to play an important role.

3.4 Swanwick and Tillman's theory of musical development

Horizontal Reconstruction

The most substantial stage model of musical development currently available is the one put forward by the British music educators Keith Swanwick and June Tillman (Swanwick & Tillman 1986; Swanwick 1988). Since their theory is restricted to music, their *domain* is smaller than Gardner's. At first glance, the *developmental dimension* seems to pose problems. The reconstruction of the stages marked by Swanwick and Tillman reveals a discrepancy between the first three stages and the last: the first three are about musical production, but the fourth bears on reflection about musical experience. This division is present in the theory's grounding, for while the first three stages have been confirmed by an analysis of children's improvisations, the last stage is founded solely on observations by theorists. Swanwick and Tillman's model thus seems to confuse two dimensions. Swanwick claims, however, that the model has implications for musical understanding.[3] The stages represent aspects relevant to all ways of relating to music, whether they be composing, performing, listening, or criticizing. The reason for basing stages 1 to 3 on compositions is that their analysis is the easiest way to gain insight into children's approaches to music. It goes without saying that other ways of dealing with music should also be examined in an effort to substantiate the claim that the stages of the model are about the overarching dimension of musical understanding. It is also clear that the first three stages should be redefined, as their focus is not on musical understanding but on composition.

Vertical Reconstruction

Swanwick and Tillman's developmental model can be schematized as follows:

Stage 1 (0–4 years)	*Mastery*	**Materials**
modes:		sensory
		manipulative
Stage 2 (4–9 years)	*Imitation*	**Expression**
modes:		personal
		vernacular

Stage 3 (10–15 years)	*Imaginative Play*	**Form**
modes:		speculative
		idiomatic
Stage 4 (15+)	*Metacognition*	**Value**
modes:		symbolic
		systematic

Swanwick and Tillman discriminate four stages, each of which is goes under two names. The first designation is general in character (mastery, imitation, imaginative play, metacognition); the second indicates how these general notions should be conceived in the area of music (materials, expression, form, value). The concepts of mastery, imitation, and imaginative play are borrowed from Piaget's theory of play, which Swanwick and identify as a theoretical basis for their own ideas of musical development (1986, pp. 306–308). But the relation between the two theories is not a strong one. The authors connect *mastery* with the mastery of musical materials, *imitation* with musical expression, and *imaginative play* with structural transformations. These connections, however, are not as compelling as they suggest, for other combinations seem just as theoretically possible. For example, it is not clear why the concepts of mastery and imitation could not also be linked to musical structure, or why imaginative play could not be connected with musical materials. Since Piaget's categories are not sufficiently specific, there is no justification for linking them to one particular aspect of music. Piaget's theory may have dubious relevance to Swanwick and Tillman's model of musical development, but the value of their theory is independent on any relation to Piaget's notions on play. The crucial question is whether the theory accords with the various ways individuals relate to music during successive periods of their lives. Therefore, in discussing stages 1 to 3 I shall not refer to the Piagetian concepts in the left column of the table; instead, I shall concentrate on the musical descriptions in the right column.

Within each stage, Swanwick and Tillman distinguish two *modes*. These modes represent two different ways of relating to the aspects of music that dominate the respective stages.

1. The first stage proposed by Swanwick and Tillman is dominated by an interest in musical materials. (a) In the *sensory mode* the child pays attention mainly to the phenomenon of sound, being fascinated especially by timbre

and dynamic levels. The sound sequences produced by the child lack structural organization. (b) The *manipulative mode* is characterized by a concern for getting control of the sound materials. The child discovers technical devices that enable him to achieve greater mastery in handling instruments. Compositions tend to be long and rambling, but the child now organizes a steady pulse.

2. In stage 2 the child's attention shifts toward the expressive properties of music. (a) In the *personal mode* changes in tempo and dynamic levels are used for expressive purposes. Expression has a personal and direct character. Although there are signs of elementary phrases, there is little structural control; one musical invention follows another without coordination. (b) This situation changes in the *vernacular mode*. Compositions are now shorter and begin to meet general musical conventions. Rhythmic and melodic patterns emerge, phrases begin to conform to standard two-, four-, and eight-bar units, compositional techniques like ostinati and sequences become common. Compositions in this phase are often very predictable and absorb musical ideas from existing melodies.

3. In the third stage the emphasis is on musical form. (a) The *speculative mode* is characterized by an experimental stance. The child now tries to deviate from regular patterns established in the vernacular mode. Imaginative deviations, however, are not always fully in accordance with the style and structure of the piece as a whole. While control of pulse and phrase tends to decline, contrast, variation, and other structural possibilities are explored. (b) In the *idiomatic mode* original inventions are integrated into a homogeneous style. Technical, expressive, and structural control is regained and strengthened. Children at this age try to imitate specific styles, frequently popular ones.

4. In stage 4 yet another aspect of musical experience comes to the fore: metacognition. The individual becomes conscious of his thoughts and feelings with respect to music. (a) In the *symbolic mode* the adolescent increasingly becomes aware of the subjective value of music. The adolescent strongly identifies with certain musicians and certain pieces. Besides featuring this affective relationship with music, the symbolic mode is distinguished by the individual's capacity to reflect upon musical experience. Not everyone will reach this advanced mode of musical response. (b) The *systematic mode* is open to even fewer people. Preoccupation with subjective experiences now gives way to an intellectual approach to music. This leads to systematic expansion of the universe of musical discourse. Composers explore new compositional systems and novel organizing principles. In addition to com-

posing, there is much talking and writing about music. Reflection upon and discussion of musical experience can lead to many new insights.

An important characteristic of the developmental model is its spiral form. In the developmental sequence two types of movement can be distinguished: vertical movement, indicating the development to higher stages, and a recurrent movement from left to right and vice versa, indicating a polarity in development. A combination of these two types of movement can be represented as a spiral.[4]

The polarity between the modes to the left (sensory, personal, speculative, and symbolic) and those to the right (manipulative, vernacular, idiomatic, and systematic) is characterized by Swanwick and Tillman as the opposition between egocentric and experimental modes on the one hand, and less original, convention-dominated modes on the other (Swanwick & Tillman 1986, p. 334). The first three stages fit this description, but stage 4 does not: the systematic mode is not conventional at all and is open to new ideas and experimentation. It would be better to characterize the left pole as subjective and the right as objective or intersubjective. The subjective pole represents self-directedness, its opposite represents a dialogical relation with the external world.

Contrary to Gardner, Swanwick does address the issue of the relations between the various stages. Swanwick states that "each one of these 'stages' or perhaps better *transformations*, is swept up into the succeeding developmental thrust. We do not merely pass through one of these modes but carry them forward with us into the next" (Swanwick 1988, pp. 63–64). Earlier stages, then, are in a sense preserved in later ones, making the relation between successive stages one of inclusion (though Swanwick himself uses the term cumulation in this context). The quoted passage makes clear that the modes as well as stages display a relation of inclusion. Later stage preserve not only the various aspects of musical experience that dominated previous stages but also the subjective and objective ways of dealing these aspects.

3.5 A comparison of the three theories

An examination of the relations among the stage models discussed above only makes sense if the domain and dimensions of the three theories can be brought into alignment. This is simple for the *domain*, as all three models deal with music. The fact that Gardner (1973, henceforth Gardner I) and Gardner et al. (1990, henceforth Gardner II) cover a broader field is not relevant here.

But differences are evident in the *dimensions*. Gardner I is about three systems (perceiving, acting, and feeling), Gardner II concentrates on creativity, and Swanwick and Tillman deal with musical understanding. However, both of Gardner's theories can be reinterpreted in such a way that they also relate to musical understanding.

Gardner I describes musical development almost exclusively in cognitive terms and has practically nothing to say about the development of the feeling system. Furthermore, even the notions of perceiving and acting systems do not figure prominently. Gardner is able to deal with musical perception and musical action simultaneously because both activities rest on musical understanding. Therefore, we can interpret Gardner's account of musical development as dealing with the higher-order dimension of musical understanding.

Similarly, although Gardner II is about the developmental dimension of creativity, the terms preconventional, conventional, and postconventional have a broader significance. Primarily they have bearing on the kind of understanding a person has of the domain involved. Whether in the role of composer, listener, performer, or critic, a person can take a preconventional, a conventional, or a postconventional stance.

Although all three theories shed light upon the developmental dimension of musical understanding, they are quite divergent. Each deals with different aspects of musical understanding, and this leads to their using different criteria for delineating stages. In Gardner I-a (i.e., the amended version of Gardner I proposed in section 3), criteria bear on the extent to which musical experience is mediated by implicit or explicit understanding of the musical code. In Gardner II, a person's relation to musical tradition is decisive. The criteria in the developmental model of Swanwick and Tillman are quite different. Here the issue is which aspect (sound, expression, form, metacognition) is dominant in musical experience. Swanwick and Tillman's theory is further differentiated from Gardner I-a and Gardner II by its emphasis on the recurrent alternation between subjective and objective/intersubjective modes. Because of these differences, the three models cannot be equated. Even so, various stages share constitutive characteristics. In the table below the relations between the three stage models are represented.

Since the scheme is largely self-explanatory, comments on a few points may suffice here. Although they resemble each other at first sight, stage III of Gardner I-a and stage 3 of Gardner II do not represent the same level of musical understanding. It is possible for someone to assume a distanced

Development of Musical Understanding

Gardner (1973), amended	Gardner et al. (1990)	Swanwick & Tillman (1986)
I. free exploration	1. preconventional	1a. sensory
II. implicit musical understanding	2. conventional	1b. manipulative
		2a. personal
		2b. vernacular
		3a. speculative
		3b. idiomatic
III. distanced relationship, reflection	3. postconventional	4a. symbolic
		4b. systematic

attitude without thereby taking a postconventional stance. (The status of musical conventions is only one of the many musical topics one can reflect on.) A postconventional stance presupposes a distanced and reflective attitude to music, but a distanced attitude does not necessarily imply that the postconventional stage has been reached. It is for this reason that the postconventional stage is placed lower than the third stage of Gardner I-a, identifying it as a later phase in development. It is not wholly clear from Swanwick and Tillman's account of the systematic mode whether this mode presupposes a postconventional attitude. At any rate, their example of Schoenberg's new compositional techniques accords with the postconventional stage.

The stage models most discrepant are Gardner II on the one side and Swanwick and Tillman on the other. The conventional stage in Gardner II extends over six modes of Swanwick and Tillman's spiral model. Only three of them — 1b, 2b, and 3b — have characteristics that correspond to a conventional attitude. Modes 2a, 3a, and 4a by contrast stress personal invention and subjective experience. Swanwick and Tillman's developmental model therefore is not dominated by the internalization of musical conventions to the extent that Gardner II is.

3.6 Evaluative claims about musical development

Although all three theories contain implicit or explicit evaluative claims about the consecutive stages, none of the authors defines or justifies a criterion for progress. I shall therefore propose a criterion and examine which evaluative claims can be made with respect to the three developmental

models concerned when this criterion is used. Next, I shall point out how these claims relate to those made in the various theories.

In section 2 I remarked that the aesthetic domain differs from other domains because of its self-sufficiency: aesthetic experience does not serve any practical purpose but it is an end in itself. Given this specific character of the aesthetic domain, it is not surprising that authoritative evaluative criteria used in other domains are not wholly suitable for judging musical development. J. R. Rest (1983, p. 575) gives three lines of argument in defense of the superiority of later stages: (1) each stage in the sequence is progressively more differentiated and integrated; (2) with development, each new stage employs cognitive operations that are more reversible and equilibrated; (3) with development, each stage has a more encompassing perspective on society.

Starting with the last argument: this is at variance with the disinterested character of musical experience. Although musical development may have the effect of a broadening of our perspective on other matters, music is not aimed at the acquisition of knowledge about social or physical reality. The Piagetian notions of reversibility and equilibration bear on logical operations. To musical experience, which is characterized by concreteness, these abstract operations seem less relevant. On the other hand, while the concepts of differentiation and integration are applicable to musical development, they are not sufficient. In cognitive domains differentiation and integration lead to a more adequate understanding of these domains. In the aesthetic domain they constitute only one aspect of what seems to me to be the central evaluative criterion, namely, the *richness* of aesthetic experience. This criterion can be linked to musical understanding. As noted earlier, the way a person experiences music depends to a large degree on the level of musical understanding he has reached. A higher level of musical understanding makes possible a richer musical experience. Therefore, the level of musical understanding can be taken as a measure in deciding whether a stage is an advance on its predecessor.

What is the consequence of using this criterion for the three developmental models? All stages in all three models include their predecessors (unless there is none). This means that all musical understanding acquired in a previous stage is present in its successor. Since each new stage involves musical understanding of a novel kind, the level of musical understanding is higher than in the preceeding stage. This implies that in all three models each new stage is to be preferred to its predecessor in terms of richness of musical experience.

Swanwick does not explicitly put forward a criterion for evaluative claims, but his ideas seem to be congruent to the ideas set down here. He writes:

> The extent to which a person is able to respond to music depends significantly on the range of developmental modes that are open to him or her. ... It is a great limitation to be aware *only* of the sonorous surface of music... Nor is it enough to admire the manipulative fluency of the performers.... Even recognition of expressive character is insufficient to help us find music cohesive or interesting... Ultimately, music educators are keen that people come to value music and this valuing is built, as it must be, on the activity of mind across all the other levels. (1988, p. 82)

According to Swanwick, richness of musical experience depends on the range of developmental modes a person has at his disposal. And because each new mode of his developmental model includes all preceeding modes (as we have seen in section 5), we may conclude that later modes are superior to earlier ones.

Gardner (1973) uses the extent to which a person is able to participate in the artistic process as an implicit criterion for evaluating development. This criterion, however, is insufficient. The artistic process Gardner speaks of refers to adult culture. Although it may be the case that the child is unable to participate fully in the artistic process as defined by adult standards, the child may be totally immersed in music in his own way. A complete argumentation requires reasons for preferring adult musical culture is to the way young children deal with sound.

Gardner advances considerations that may seem incompatible with the position taken here, namely, that stage III of Gardner I-a is to be preferred to its predecessor, for he argues that the distanced, abstracted attitude characteristic of the third stage may have negative effects:

> Formal operations may even at times serve to hinder artistic development since the tendency to focus on underlying content, to abstract out meaning, to be sensitive to the explicit demands of a task, to proceed in a systematic and exhaustive manner, and, above all, to translate problems and questions into logical-propositional terms may all militate against the sensitivity to detail and nuance and the faithfulness to the particular properties of object and medium that are so vital for the artist. (1973, p. 308)

It should be noted that Gardner expresses himself cautiously, using "may". It is not the case that formal operations or other actions resulting from a distanced attitude are necessarily damaging. Problems arise only if a person

has been rendered unable to experience music in a direct manner. Metacognition is not, of course, a substitute for direct musical experience; it merely contributes to musical experience as a whole. If difficulties arise, these are not attributable to the new kind of musical understanding typical of the third stage but to the way one deals with this new knowledge. The position taken is not that the new stage guarantees the person a richer musical experience in every instance but that this later stage offers a richer *potential* for musical experience. I think Gardner's argument does not affect this position.

By exposing negative as well as positive aspects of the three stages they define, Gardner et al. (1990) suggest that these stages are not equally preferable. Since these positive and negative points are not, however, concerned with matters central to the preconventional, conventional and postconventional stages, they will not be taken into account here.

The conclusion of this section is that evaluative claims can be substantiated with respect to all three stage models. Each stage is an improvement on its predecessor in the sense that it offers the possibility for richer musical experience.

3.7 Musical development and music education

Theories of musical development can be of great benefit to music education because they open up opportunities for systematic curriculum construction. A developmental model offers a sequence of stages that represent qualitatively different ways of relating to music. If one succeeds in linking these different approaches to music to specific chronological ages — a job belonging to the dynamic part of developmental theory — one obtains a coherent picture of the musical capabilities one may expect at various periods of childhood. Such an overview makes it possible to decide which curriculum materials are suitable for a particular age.

Two types of suitable curriculum materials can be dinstinguished: materials that correspond to the individual's current stage of development and materials that anticipate the next stage (Van Haaften et al., 1986, p. 191). Curriculum materials corresponding to the child's current stage are intended to reinforce the kind of musical understanding the child possesses at the moment. We may, for example, acquaint a child who acts in accordance with the second stage of Swanwick and Tillman's model with all sorts of expressive opportunities available in the musical medium. This is *quantitative* learning; it leads to an augmentation of musical understanding of the type characteristic of the child's current stage.

Curriculum materials that anticipate the next stage are actually just beyond the child's scope and serve the purpose of directing the child's attention toward a new type of musical understanding. To take Swanwick and Tillman's second stage once more as an example, children who focus primarily on the expressive opportunities of sound materials may be introduced to formal principles of music like phrasing, thematic recurrences, and so on. The objective is gradually to make children sensitive to the contribution such properties make to the effectiveness of a composition and to let them realize that they can use these properties in their own compositions. These anticipatory curriculum materials aim at *qualitative* learning: the kind of musical understanding intended is qualitatively different from what the child has acquired so far.

An educator whose teaching anticipates the forthcoming stage exercises a stimulating influence on the students' musical development. The preceding section showed that in all three developmental models each new stage offers the possibility of richer musical experience. This means that stimulation of musical development can be justified. But it is another question how far stimulation should go. Assuming that accelleration of the pace of development is feasible, is it also desirable? I do not wish to condem any degree of accelaration, no matter how modest. However, an approach directed toward maximum acceleration must be decidedly rejected for two reasons. Firstly, if we require children constantly to operate at the limit of their capabilities, we risk causing them to loose their enthusiasm for music. If they are barely able, or unable, to cope with the tasks assigned them, they may come to think of music as something very difficult that yields only small satisfaction. As a result, children may begin to avoid musical activities. Secondly, maximum accellaration of musical development would occur at the expense of quantitative learning processes. There is little point in passing on to a new stage if the sort of musical understanding typical of the one preceding it has not been thoroughly mastered. A child in Swanwick's second stage, for example, who has acquired sufficient insight into the expressive properties of the music can in the third stage learn to employ the principles of form in such a way as to enhance the expressive effect of a composition. The situation is different for a child who has had scant opportunity to explore the expressive opportunities offered by sound. Such a child may be taught to obey formal principles but forms will remain empty, that is, without musical impact.

Music education should contribute to the stabilization and reinforcement of the various kinds of musical understanding. Efforts to speed up the dev-

elopmental can subvert this aim. Stimulating musical development therefore can best be understood as an attempt to ensure (a) the avoidance of stagnation and the facilitation of students' progress to the later stages in which they will be better off than in their current ones; (b) the students' acquiring new types of musical development as smoothly as possible by introducing them gradually to curriculum materials designed to promote learning in the next stage of development.

Notes

1. For a review of the work of these researchers, see Hargreaves (1986) and Hargreaves & Zimmerman (1992).
2. The fourth stage of Swanwick and Tillman's theory is an exception in this respect. It must be doubted whether an individual reaching this stage has to have passed through all previous stages. The theory therefore does not seem to satisfy the fifth condition.
3. I owe this insight to personal communication with professor Swanwick.
4. Swanwick and Tillman's representation of the model differs from ours in that later stages are placed higher instead of lower. This results in a rising spiral.

4. Aims in music education: a conceptual study

In music education we find many statements about aims. Naturally so. If music education is to be a rational practice, those in charge of it should have at least a global idea of its intended results. Curricular frameworks, curriculum guides, methods, text books about music teaching, policy statements of associations of music educators, et cetera cannot keep silent about the goals of music education.

Until the present, almost all writing about the aims of music education has been prescriptive. Generally, those considering the issue of aims are concerned with the question what music education should strive for. This is not only the case with practical literature but also with writings in the philosophy of music education. What has virtually been absent up to now is investigations into the concept of aims in music education.[1]

In this article I take up this subject matter. The first section offers an orientation on the concept of educational aims. I will present the views of two leading philosophers of education on the issue: Wolfgang Brezinka and Richard S. Peters. Two distinctions emerge from this discussion: (1) between internal and external aims of education; and (2) between empirical means-ends connections and logical connections between various aspects of aims. In the second section I will analyze the conceptions of aims expressed in the philosophies of Bennett Reimer and David Elliott. I will point out that each of these philosophies features internal as well as external aims but that the relationship between these two notions of aims remains obscure in both of them. In the next sections I will discuss empirical and logical aspects of aims, starting from a survey of basic "musical behaviors" as Reimer defines them in *A Philosophy of Music Education*. I will illustrate how empirical and logical questions can easily run together and how this leads to misunderstandings. Besides, I will try to clarify the conceptual relations between various musical behaviors. I conclude by making some brief remarks about the relevance of conceptual inquiry for music education.

4.1 The concept of aims in education

Brezinka

The most systematic treatment of the concept of aims in education has been presented by the German author Wolfgang Brezinka (1993, pp. 161–186, 218–258; 1994, pp. 101–163). After a thorough analysis of the concept he ar-

rives at the following definition: "An educational aim is a norm, describing the psychic dispositions (or a dispositional structure) set as an ideal for educands; it calls on educators to so act that as far as possible educands are enabled to realize this ideal" (1994, p. 163). This definition brings together the following characteristics:

1. An educational aim is a norm set by some norm setter or norm authority for specific persons.
2. This norm has a double content, that is, it consists of a combination of two norms for two different persons: (a) an ideal for the educand; (b) a prescription for the educator.

Brezinka emphasizes that educational aims always refer to norms that relate to psychological dispositions. Behaviors or experiences are, in his view, often erroneously viewed as aims of education. What the educator really aims at are dispositions to behave or to have experiences, rather than behaviors and experiences themselves (1994, pp. 118-122).

According to Brezinka, aims can only be meaningfully approached by thinking in terms of means and ends. The means-ends framework is an indispensable pattern of thinking in practical life. It enables the individual to get a grip on the complexity of reality by simplifying it. It allows us to concentrate our perception, thinking, volition, and action on those parts of the world that we consider to be important to realizing what we desire. Using the concept of an end we can focus on one particular goal that prevails at the moment. This concept also serves as a guideline for discovering means. With the concept of a means we can delimit from the host of operative causal relations precisely those, which appear to be vital to the attainment of the end we have envisaged (1993, pp. 227–228). In Brezinka's view, the means-ends framework presupposes causality; the end we want to attain is seen as an effect, and in defining our means, we look for the causes by which this end can be achieved (1993, pp. 223, 228).

As Brezinka sees it, in practical life we cannot help complying with the means-ends framework. This holds both for our own actions and for our understanding the actions of others. In grasping the concept of action, we grasp at the same time both the concepts of end and means. Education being a form of action, no theory of education can be imagined that would dispense with the categories of ends and means (1993, p. 256).

Peters

R. S. Peters' concept of aims in education is fundamentally different from Brezinka's. He uses the term *aim* only reluctantly. In contrast to other au-

thors, Peters distinguishes the concept *aim* from related concepts like *purpose* and *ideal*.[2] He makes the following points about the concept of an aim:

1. We tend to ask about aims in contexts where we think it important to get people to specify more precisely what they are trying to do.
2. Aims suggest the concentration on and the direction of effort towards an objective that is not too palpable or close to hand.
3. Aims suggest the possibility of failure or falling short. (1973a, p. 14)

It is the second characteristic that accounts for Peters' reservations against using the term *aims* in education, because it is not compatible with his view of education. If education is the initiation of people into a worthwhile form of life, he asks, "how could there ever be any end of value beyond this which it would be possible to bring about?" (1973a, p. 16). Peters opposes to positing ends that allegedly are external to education, like self-realization. The concept of self-realization, in his view, can be clarified only by reference to the worthwhile activities that constitute education (1959, pp. 94–95). Value is to be found in the educational activities themselves.

Hence, Peters criticizes the use in education of conceptions of aims in terms of premeditated ends to be attained via means (1959, pp. 85–87). A means-ends conception is apposite in cases where people are aiming at something concrete, which can be attained in a clearly defined way, but it is not correctly applied to education. In education what is valuable is not defined by precise ends; rather, value resides in the activities that constitute education.

How, then, should all discourse about aims be explained? In Peters' work we find various answers to this question. First, requests for aims are often requests to specify the norms inherent in education. Second, discourse about aims concerns the question which aspects of these norms should be emphasized at what time (1973a, p. 20). Furthermore, discussions about aims can also refer to the principles of procedure education should adopt — for example, the use of authority, teaching by example and rational explanation, awakening the child's interest (1959, pp. 87, 94–95; 1973a, pp. 22–23) — as well as to valuations of content — for instance, the merits of the arts as distinct from those of science (1959, p. 95).

Clearly, Peters' and Brezinka's views of the role of aims in education are radically different. These views result from their divergent conceptions of education. Peters adheres to an evaluative concept of education based on the idea of the educated man: education has norms (though indeterminate ones) built into it, which generate the aims which educators strive to develop

(1973a, p. 17). *Education* does not pick out particular activities or processes but lays down criteria to which a family of activities such as instructing, teaching, and training must conform (1966, pp. 24-25, 40; 1973a, p. 17).

Whereas Peters thinks that an encompassing definition cannot be given, Brezinka comes up with the following one: "By education is understood actions through which people attempt to improve one or more persons' psychic dispositional structures in some respect, preserve the components viewed as valuable or prevent the development of dispositions judged to be bad" (1994, p. 96). Brezinka's concept of education is instrumental: education is a means to the end of furthering desirable dispositions of human beings. Whereas Peters holds that *education* picks out criteria for activities, according to Brezinka education is constituted by these very activities.

It is not the purpose of this article to elaborate the differences between Brezinka's and Peters' views of aims in education. I will focus here on two major issues that can be related to the work of leading philosophers of music education. These issues concern the distinction between internal and external views of aims and the distinction between empirical and logical aspects of aims.

4.2 Internal and external aims of music education

One of the most salient differences between Brezinka's and Peters' conception of aims concerns the relation between aims and educational activities. In Brezinka's view, aims are external to educational processes; education is not an end in itself but a means to improving the psychic dispositions of human beings. Peters, on the other hand, holds that education has no external aims. Education involves the initiation of others into worthwhile activities (1966, p. 144). Although he is aware that the term *worthwhile* is often used to raise questions of extrinsic value (1973b, p. 247), Peters takes worthwhile activities to mean intrinsically valuable activities. Becoming initiated into activities like science, mathematics, history, and art is, in his view, an end in itself. The educational processes through which people are being initiated have, therefore, no external goals; instead, the aims of education are internal to it. How should the aims of music education be viewed in this context? Are the aims of music education to be seen as primarily internal or external? In other words, is becoming a musically educated person to be viewed as an end in itself or as serving some further end?

The way music education theorists generally formulate aims seems to be most in accordance with Peters' position; primary aims of music education are usually stated in terms of enhancing musical competence: perceptivity,

sensitivity, performance skills, musicianship, et cetera. The aims of music education, then, appear to be primarily internal to it. However, if we look at the philosophies of Bennett Reimer and David Elliott, we see that neither author takes such a straightforward view. At first glance, the position Reimer takes completely fits in with Peters' conception of aims. According to Reimer (1989), the overall aim of music education is to develop, to the fullest extent possible, every student's capacity to experience and create what he calls intrinsically expressive qualities of sounds. An alternative way of stating this is that music education should help students to develop their aesthetic sensitivity (pp. 153, 185). Reimer sees musical experience as a subspecies of aesthetic experience and its value as deriving from this aesthetic nature. He refers to this value as *intrinsicality*. The value of aesthetic experience derives from its own self-sufficient nature. Instead of being a means toward some non-aesthetic experience or serving some utilitarian purpose, it is experience for the sake of the experience in and of itself. It is free from practical concerns and is to be enjoyed for itself (1989, p. 103).

Elliott (1995) opposes to this view, holding that engaging in music does serve a practical purpose: achieving self-growth, self-understanding, and enjoyment (p. 124). In Elliott's view we can achieve the values of self-growth, self-understanding, and enjoyment by engaging in musical practices that offer progressive cognitive challenges. Rather than as aesthetic experience, Elliott sees music as the activity of knowing-in-action and understanding-in-action. He relates this viewpoint to Csikszentmihalyi's theory of self-growth and optimal experience. According to Csikszentmihalyi, human beings have a fundamental drive to order and strengthen the self, to gain self-knowledge. How can this be attained? By taking up challenges that match and extend our powers of consciousness. When we deal successfully with cognitive challenges, information we receive from outside is congruent with our self-goals and this leads to an experience of intense enjoyment. Csikszentmihalyi calls such experience *optimal experience* or *flow* (Elliott, 1995, pp. 113-114). According to Elliott, music is a unique and major way of achieving the values of self-growth, self-understanding, and the concomitant values of optimal experience (enjoyment) and self-esteem. Dynamic musical practices offer us the two necessary conditions for achieving continuous self-growth: multidimensional musical challenges of increasing complexity and the possibility of increasing levels of musicianship required to meet these challenges (1995, p. 121). Accordingly, Elliott defines the aims of music education as follows:

> The aims of music education, and the primary goals of every music teaching-learning situation, are to enable students to achieve self-growth, self-knowledge, and musical enjoyment by educating their musicianship in balanced relation to musical challenges within selected musical practices. It follows from this that musicianship is also a unique and major source of self-esteem. (p. 129)

At this place I do not intend to evaluate Reimer's and Elliott's (seemingly) opposed views of the nature and the particular values of music. My purpose here is to assess the notions of aims put forward by Elliott and Reimer. From Elliott's definition it would seem that music is not an end in itself. The aims he has in mind surpass musical experience: self-growth, self-knowledge, ordering consciousness. Indeed, according to Elliott, these values can be attained not only by engaging in music but also by pursuing a large class of other activities. For Elliott, music education appears to have an external rather than an internal aim: rather than self-sufficient activities, music making and listening are practical activities for the purpose of self-enhancement.

However, Elliott does not consistently hold to this line. Actually, he wavers between an internal and an external perspective: "In this praxial view, music making is inherently valuable. Performing, improvising, composing, arranging, conducting — all are worth doing for the doing itself, meaning 'for the sake of the self'" (1995, p. 121).

Elliott suggests that formulations like "doing something for its own sake" or "doing something for the doing itself" are equivalent to "doing something for the sake of self". But this will not do. If one takes the internal perspective — doing something for its own sake — , the value of music is assessed in terms of the specific richness of musical activities. If, however, one takes the external view — music for the sake of self — music's value is assessed in terms of its contribution to some independent goal, that is, something that has not necessarily to do with music itself: self-growth, self-understanding, self-esteem. By simply equating internal and external perspectives Elliott offers us a hybrid view of musical aims, leaving unexplained how the two perspectives are related.

Another point is that, because Elliott adheres to an internal view, his position is much closer to Reimer's than he wants to admit. What is the difference between saying that engaging in music is a self-sufficient experience and saying that we do musical activities for their own sake? Elliott's attack on Reimer's view of the intrinsic nature of musical value boils down

to an unfriendly interpretation of Reimer's statement that aesthetic experience serves no practical purpose.

Moreover, not only do Reimer and Elliott agree on the view that we engage in music for its own sake, but they also concur in that they both combine such an internal view of musical aims with an external one. For on closer reading of Reimer's philosophy it turns out that he does not consistently adhere to the view that musical experience is self-sufficient either. He also appeals to a broader interest he takes music to serve — self-understanding: "Because experiences of art yield insights into human subjectivity the arts may be conceived as a *means* [italics added] of self-understanding, a way by which our sense of our human nature can be explored and clarified and grasped" (1989, p. 53).

We see then that, in contrast to Brezinka's and Peters' relatively clear views of the nature of aims in education, the pictures presented by two leading philosophers of music education are less univocal. Although Reimer and Elliott share Peters' view that music is a worthwhile activity per se, the view they take on aims is only partly in keeping with Peters. On the one hand, they define aims that are internal to music education. For Reimer, the aim of music education is to develop students' capacity to experience music aesthetically; for Elliott, it is the development of musicianship. On the other hand, they both hold that music education is a major way or means of attaining values that go beyond music as such: self-understanding, insight into human subjectivity (Reimer); self-growth, self-knowledge (Elliott).

Neither Reimer, nor Elliott undertakes to relate the internal and the external perspectives they take on the aims of music education. It seems, in fact, that they do not appreciate that they are taking two qualitatively different views on the issue. Nevertheless, there are important questions to be asked here. How do the internal and external perspectives of aims presented by Elliott and Reimer cohere? Does the difference between the two perspectives derive from two ways of describing the same value of musical activities, or do they appeal to different values of these? Can the hitherto unanalyzed notions of self-growth, self-knowledge, self-understanding really be specified independently of specific activities (like musical activities) or are such general aims but "high-sounding ways of talking about doing some things rather than others and doing them in a certain manner" (1959, p. 86)? Aren't external aims like enjoyment, self-growth, and self-understanding in fact hypostatized features of musical activities? If philosophy of education is really to be a foundational discipline, such questions about aims cannot remain unaddressed.

4.3 Conceptual and empirical questions

Besides in their external and internal perspectives of educational aims, the theories of Brezinka and Peters also differ in focusing on two different types of questions. Brezinka focuses on means-ends relations. These are questions of *empirical* fact. The envisaged means-ends relations are causal connections that can in principle be investigated by empirical research. This kind of research is very important, because its outcomes can provide a stronger basis for designing music curricula. How can the goals of music education be furthered most effectively? Up to now, this question is largely left to the intuition of music educators.

Peters frames the issue of aims in education as a *conceptual*, rather than an empirical one. For him, conceptual questions concern the meaning of the pivotal terms in the discussion. Major questions in the context of aims are: What is it we are talking about, when raising the issue of aims in (music) education? What do such aims consist in? How are the various components of aims related? Conceptual questions about aims are the domain of philosophers of education. Peters starts from the question: what do we say, when we call someone an *educated person*? In the case of music we could ask: which criteria should be met if we are to say that someone has received a good music education?

In educational practice empirical and conceptual questions are intertwined. However, when thinking systematically about aims in music education we should distinguish them carefully; otherwise, our understanding of aims issues is likely to be hampered. An example of how empirical and conceptual questions can easily be run together is the survey of "musical behaviors" presented by Bennett Reimer (1989, p. 167). Discussing the objectives of the general music program, Reimer offers the following schema of the relations among seven basic musical behaviors:[3]

Ends behaviors:		Perceiving	Reacting		[Experiencing]
Means behaviors:	Creating	Conceptualizing	Analyzing	Evaluating	
Outcome behavior:		Valuing			

Clearly, Reimer adopts the means-ends framework here. In his view the "end or goal or point" of interacting with music is to experience it aesthetically, the two components of aesthetic experience being perceiving and reacting aesthetically (1989, p. 168). Four other musical behaviors — creating, conceptualizing, analyzing, and evaluating — are referred to as means. These behaviors should be pursued in order to further musical experience.

Thus, the four behaviors on the second line are means to the end of musical experience. Finally, there is the behavior of valuing, which is seen as the desired outcome of engaging in musical activities.

Though this survey may appear to yield a plausible and univocal picture at first sight, on closer examination it turns out to be ambiguous and misleading. It is ambiguous in that it deals at once with conceptual and empirical aspects of aims, and it is misleading in suggesting that various aspects of musical activities can straightforwardly be forced into categories like *ends, means,* or *outcomes.*

To begin with, Reimer's schema does not offer a convincing picture of the status of the three main ways of dealing with music — listening, performing, and composing. Listening is entirely missing in the schema and Reimer does not make clear how it would fit into his classification. On the one hand, he suggests that listening can be equated with perceiving: "It should go without saying that the primary objective of music should be to improve every student's capacity for musical listening, *that is* [italics added], their capacity to perceive all the ways sounds become expressive in contexts that encourage feelingful reactions to what is being perceived" (1989, p. 168). On the other hand, he suggests that listening is a means to aesthetic experience when he says that "[t]here are four basic means for achieving heightened aesthetic experiences of music in addition to listening to it" (p. 169).

Now, to conceptualize listening as a means for perceiving and responding aesthetically to music raises logical problems. Listening can, according to Reimer, only be called truly musical listening if we perceive and react aesthetically. In other words, the notions of aesthetic perception and aesthetic reaction — that is, the notion of aesthetic experience — are implied in the concept of listening to music. But this being the case, perceiving and reacting cannot be ends to which listening is a means. Instead, perceiving and reacting are at the heart of listening to music musically.

Reimer's view of the role of performing and composing, which he subsumes in his schema under the term *creating* can be criticized along the same lines. Since the notions of perceiving and reacting aesthetically are incorporated in these activities, performing and composing are not correctly seen as means to perceiving and reacting. Creating is not a means to perceiving and reacting; it means perceiving and reacting.

These confusions arise from the fact that conceptual relations are presented as empirical ones. As becomes clear from the rest of his book, Reimer intends to argue that aesthetic perception and aesthetic reaction are the core

of musical experience. This may be agreed, but from this it does not follow that creating and listening can be reduced to "means behaviors".

The means-ends connection is to be found elsewhere: between musical experience and enhanced musical experience. The point Reimer intends to make seems to be that we learn music by doing. If we want to enhance our musical perception and reaction we should engage in these very activities. Creating and listening involve perceiving and reacting to music. We can thus analyze the envisaged connections as follows: (1) engaging in creating or listening *means* engaging in perceiving and reacting aesthetically; (2) careful and attentive perceiving and reacting *effects* heightened capacities of perceiving and reacting; (3) this in turn may *effect* enhanced musico-aesthetic experience, (4) which *means* enhanced listening or creating. Note that this schema contains conceptual connections (1 and 4) as well as empirical ones (2 and 3). There are various ways of formulating this insight more succinctly: careful aesthetic perception and reaction may lead to enhanced musical experience; creating and listening lead to enhanced creating and listening; creating and listening lead to enhanced perception and reaction; and so on. In the last formulation the conceptual connection between perceiving/reacting and creating/listening has become obscured. Reimer takes this formulation two steps further. First, by saying that creating is a *means* to enhanced perception. Second, by categorizing creating as a means behavior and perceiving and reacting as ends behaviors. It is this last step that creates a misleading picture. It is now suggested that these activities belong to either the category of means or the category of ends. What has got out of sight is that the relationship between creating (and listening) on the one hand and perceiving and reacting on the other hand is a conceptual one of inclusion, rather than an empirical one of means and ends. Perceiving and reacting are included in the notions of creating and listening (connections 1 and 4). A second insight that has got lost is that the actual means-ends connection concerns *levels* of musical engagement, rather than aspects of musical engagement; by seriously involving themselves in musical activities educands enhance their musical capacities (connection 2) so that they can experience music at a higher level (connection 3).

Apart from means and ends behaviors Reimer defines the category of "outcome behavior", to which valuing belongs. This suggests that valuing is of a still different category. To what extent is this correct? To answer this question let us look at the relations between valuing and other musical behaviors.

First, note that valuing can both refer (1) to all valuations (whether positive or negative) and (2) to only the positive ones. Reimer uses the term in its restrictive meaning: the desired outcome of music education is that people come to hold music in positive esteem. Furthermore, it is important to note that Reimer makes a distinction between valuing and evaluating. While evaluating is a verbal behavior — the making of judgments about the quality of musical works and their performance (1989, p. 170) — valuing apparently refers to tacitly appreciating music.

How are valuing and aesthetic experience related? Is there an empirical or a logical connection? We can only answer this question, if we further look at the notion of aesthetic experience. For this notion can also be used both in a neutral and in an exclusively positive sense. In a neutral sense aesthetic experience is the experience we have when we sensitively attend to the sensuous and structural properties of an art work. If we understand aesthetic experience in this way, the relationship between aesthetic experience and valuing (in its restrictive, positive sense) is contingent. We may be disappointed as well as delighted, when concentratedly perceiving and reacting to a musical work. There is no guarantee that we will like a piece we attend to sensitively: the work may just be too bleak or it may not accord to our taste. So, whether students value the aesthetic experiences (in the neutral sense) they have, is an empirical question.

However, if aesthetic experience is taken in its positive sense, it logically entails valuing. In this view for an experience to be called aesthetic it is not sufficient that we perceive and react to the sensuous and structural qualities of an art work. Only if our response has some positive quality — for instance, enjoyment, "shared expressiveness" or "experience of the vitality of life" (Reimer, 1989, pp. 86, 102), "felt freedom" or a feeling of "wholeness" (Beardsley, 1982, pp. 288-289) — an experience can truly be called aesthetic. This means that only a subset of our experiences with music qualifies as being aesthetic.

Reimer does not make the distinction between the neutral and the evaluative uses, when explaining the notion of aesthetic experience. But for the most part he adheres to the evaluative notion. He claims, for example, that aesthetic experience is intrinsically valuable; it can be enjoyed for itself (1989, p. 103). Furthermore, in his view, experiencing aesthetically is the delight of experiencing more fully the potentials of human subjectivity (p. 115). Given the logical connection between Reimer's (evaluative) use of aesthetic experience and valuing, it is surprising that Reimer sets valuing apart from other musical behaviors:

> Teachers cannot require that their students value music as a whole, or this or that kind or type or style of music, or this or that musical activity. What people choose to value is their own business. Our obligation as music educators is not to require or even expect that everyone will value music, or value the music we value, or value the kinds of involvements with music we think they should value. ... We are not directly responsible for peoples' valuing of music. We *are* directly responsible for representing music authentically and teaching it systematically, which means fulfilling our objectives of developing the musical behaviors enumerated earlier. (1989, p. 171)

In Reimer's description valuing appears to be a relatively distant target: first the other behaviors should be taken care of, and if these are met, the student may in the end come to value music intrinsically. On the basis of his aesthetic experiences he *chooses* to value music or not to do so. This view is one-sided in that it neglects the role valuing plays within the musical activities themselves. Valuing is not to be separated from the continuous practice of engaging in music. It constitutes an indispensable component of fruitful musical practices. It grows directly and continuously in relation to satisfying musical experiences. Every musical activity we enjoy contributes to our enhanced appreciation of music. And the sum of our positive experiences determines how highly we rank certain types of music.

If we take this perspective, valuing *is* a direct concern for the teacher. It is a fundamental presupposition of music education that every child is in principle able to enjoy — and thus to more or less positively value — musical experiences and that her valuing can grow. It is hard to see how music education could be justified, if it does not to some extent lead to children's valuing music. Moreover, it may be questioned whether without valuing musical learning can subsist. If, then, a teacher does not manage to organize musical experiences which his pupils find valuable, something seems to be fundamentally wrong and the question becomes urgent whether he practises his profession appropriately.

In my view, Reimer's classification of four of the seven basic behaviors in music — creating, perceiving aesthetically, reacting aesthetically, and valuing — yields a distorted picture of how they cohere. Rather than having a different status as means behaviors, ends behaviors, or outcome behaviors, they are all *aspects* of one and the same practice: satisfying engagement in musical activities. These activities can in the first place be seen as ends in themselves. And so their various aspects can. Creating music or listening to music can be said to be an end as much as aesthetic experience or valuing can. On the other hand, musical engagement can also be seen as a means: as

a means, that is, to a still higher level of musical engagement. Thus, we can see not only creating but also aesthetic perception and reaction as means to enhanced musical experience; perceiving and reacting aesthetically to complex musical works can lead to an enhanced capacity to have even deeper aesthetic experiences. Valuing can also be conceived of as a means, namely, as an incentive to ongoing musical experience.

So we see that thinking about aims is not solely a question of setting off means behaviors from ends behaviors (or outcome behaviors). Apart from establishing empirical relations, thinking about aims is largely a question of elucidating the content of education. This is what we do if we try to establish the relationship between creating, listening, perceiving, reacting, and valuing. Creating and listening entail perceiving and reacting. And aesthetic experience, in the evaluative sense used by Reimer, in its turn implies valuing.

4.4 Conceptualizing and music

Up to now, we have considered only four of Reimer's basic behaviors. I took them together, because they constitute various aspects of direct engagement in musical works, which are connected to each other by relations of logical implication. We now come to the three remaining behaviors: conceptualizing, analyzing, and evaluating.

These three behaviors are fundamentally different in that they are forms of discourse about music. They can proceed independently from direct musical experience through singing, performing, listening, or composing. As forms of discourse, conceptualizing, analyzing, and evaluating do not constitute a part of direct musical engagement. Because of this different status, the question whether these three behaviors are means behaviors in relation to the end behavior of aesthetic experience (perceiving and reacting) makes more sense than the question whether creating is a means to aesthetic experience.

Indeed, Reimer's view that conceptualizing, analyzing, and evaluating can lead to heightened musical experience belongs, I think, to the common sense views of music educators. These activities enhance our understanding of the various parameters involved in music, of how sound forms are organized, and of what characteristics contribute to the quality of the work. And these insights are believed to lead to enhanced experience and valuing of musical works. But how? In what follows I will argue that philosophy of music education has failed so far to explain the connection between conceptualizing and the furthering of musical experience. I will concentrate

on the encompassing notion of conceptualizing, instead of dealing separately with analyzing and evaluating, which — as Reimer remarks — are specific modes of conceptualizing.

First, however, I want to make two caveats in relation to the view that conceptualizing, analyzing, and evaluating are means behaviors. My first point is that, even if we can show that these behaviors lead to enhanced musical experience, calling them this way is too exclusive. There are no behaviors that can invariantly be called means. Whether an activity is a means, an intermediary end, or an end in itself depends on the context. In particular, it would be a mistake to view the various kinds of conceptualizing with respect to music invariantly as means. There is no doubt that musical discourse can be valued as an activity of its own. The fact that numerous people take interest in music theory, music history, aesthetics, the psychology of music, and ethnomusicology testifies this. To be sure, I agree with the main stream view that in general music education our efforts should be primarily directed at enhancing direct musical experience. It should be avoided that learning music gets the character of a theoretical study. But few would deny that educands, especially those at higher levels, should acquire some broad understanding of music. An important aim of education is that the pupils develop a view of important phenomena in human life. Music being one of these, an educated person should be able to engage in serious reflection upon and discourse about music, both as a phenomenon of its own and in relation to the other arts, society, and human existence as a whole. The activity of conceptualizing can be an intellectual pleasure of its own which is often of greater value than the insights that result from it. It should be the concern of the music teacher to maximize the possibility of his pupils' coming to share this pleasure.

My second remark is that in spite of the wide agreement among music educators that conceptualizing is a major means for enhancing musical experience, this view is not as uncontroversial as it might seem. We are dealing here with an empirical claim which, as so many empirical claims in the field, has not been strongly supported by scientific research. Indeed, a number of studies Nicholas Cook discusses in his *Music, Imagination and Culture* apparently indicate a negative effect of teaching conceptual abilities (Cook, 1990, pp. 173-178). For instance, Steele found that instructional activities leading to significant improvement in factual knowledge and stylistic identification skills did not yield any attitudinal gains. Similarly, an experiment carried out by Flowers showed that students who had been taught a basic musical vocabulary of forty-four technical terms did not show

greater powers of observation after instruction than before it. However, the significance of the outcomes of such experiments can be questioned. In a review of Cook's book Kivy (1992) raises serious doubts about the quality of the instruction the students received in these experiments. He points out that *teaching* and *instruction* are normative concepts; when talking about teaching music, we mean teaching music at a certain level of excellence. According to Kivy, the experiments only measure the effects of "pedantic, artificially contrived, unimaginative, spiritless instruction".

An even more fundamental problem of the research is that these experimenters do not seem to have a clear conception of how conceptualizing could possibly lead to enhanced musical experience. They simply measure the correlation between the possession of a certain body of conceptual knowledge or certain cognitive skills and something that is seen as indicative of the quality of someone's musical experience — for example, perceptivity or attitude. What is lacking is an understanding of how conceptualizing and musical experience might be related.

However, the same observation applies to philosophy of music education. Here, the opposite claims are made about the relevance of conceptualizing to musical experience. In fact, up to now the discipline has done little to clarify the relations between the two. Worse still, the way the most prominent author in the field contrasts aesthetic experience with conceptualizing is more likely to impede our understanding of these relations than to further it.

Reimer (1989, pp. 80 ff.) emphasizes the fundamental differences between "aesthetic perceptual structuring" and conceptualization. Conceptualization deals with the general and abstract. A concept, in the view he adopts, is a triadic relation between a commonality, a sign, and a stable response. In the first place, there is a common feature of a range of events. Concepts always apply to something that is manifested more than once, for example *fruit, round, edible.* A singular instance of something cannot be a concept. Particular things or particular persons (e.g., Ludwig van Beethoven) are not concepts, Reimer says. Second, this common feature is denoted by a sign (alternative terms Reimer uses are *symbol, signal, marker,* and *counter*). A sign is a vehicle for calling attention to the commonality at hand; signs are names given to a certain type of phenomenon. Third, the common feature and the sign vehicle are wedded to each other by a stable use of the latter to indicate the former (p. 81).

Aesthetic perceptual structuring, the mode of cognition that, according to Reimer, is most prominent in the arts, is of a completely different nature. It does not employ sign vehicles, and it deals with the particular, the concrete, rather than with the general and abstract. In experiencing an art work we grasp its particular structure immediately, without the use of intervening symbols (p. 82).

An important difference between conceptualization and aesthetic perceptual structuring is, according to Reimer, captured by the distinction between discursive and presentational forms. Language, the most prominent form of conceptualization, consists of "strung-out" symbols: meaning accumulates as words are combined to sentences and sentences in turn to arguments. This feature is called discursiveness. In art, on the contrary, meaning does not derive from the addition of discrete, abstract bits of information. Rather, it is grasped immediately and totally in the experience of the expressive form. Reimer uses the term *presentational form* to designate this all-at-once quality of art.

In total, Reimer discusses eight points on which conceptualization and aesthetic perceptual structuring differ fundamentally. But if, as Reimer sees it, the domains of discourse (conceptualization) and musico-aesthetic experience (aesthetic perceptual structuring) are two opposed modes of cognition, how can conceptualizing ever be useful to musical experience? How can what deals with the abstract and the general become relevant for the concrete and the particular? How can discourse about music become relevant to what must be apprehended immediately in conceptless musical experience?

Reimer's strategy of radically separating the domains of aesthetic perceptual structuring and conceptualization is not conducive to our understanding how the latter can lead to enhancing aesthetic experience. It cannot be my purpose here to work out a theory of the role of concepts in music, but I will make a few points which lead to a different view of how concepts are involved in musico-aesthetic experience.[4]

A first point is that, in contrast to what Reimer suggests, we do employ concepts when experiencing music. For Peter Kivy (1990) there is no question about this: "when someone is enjoying music, he or she is...enjoying some sonic quality of a piece of music perceived under a certain description as doing something the listener enjoys, as doing something beautifully" (p. 78). He gives the example of polyphonic music:

> One of the pleasures we take in such imitative contrapuntal music as the ricercar and the fugue lies in the search: in the seeking and finding. But,

> needless to say, in order to seek and to find, the music must be an object of cognition for me. I must understand it under the description 'fugue'; I must know what the 'theme' is; I must be able to 'perceive that' the theme has appeared; and 'perceiving that' is a kind of 'knowing' (or 'believing') that. (p. 73)

Kivy's position is radically opposed to Reimer's; whereas in Reimer's view musical experience is to be characterized as conceptless aesthetic perceptual structuring, according to Kivy, we can understand and appreciate music only to the extent that we subsume it under concepts. Now, even though Kivy's position is contestable, his argument makes us aware that when listening to music, we do indeed make use of concepts. Of course, we do not normally describe the music to ourselves self-consciously — this is not the point Kivy intends to make. But we do notice that a theme is presented repeatedly, that there is imitation between the parts, that the theme is being varied in the middle section, that the pace slows down at the end, and so on. And thus we use the concepts of a theme, imitation, a part, variation, a middle section, an end, slowing down, et cetera.

A second point is that concepts are involved in the musical experience of any listener, the laymen as well as the expert. It is a misunderstanding to believe that in order to employ concepts in music one must have knowledge of the terms that are used in music theory. Theories of music education that emphasize learning concepts sometimes suggest that pupils can come to understand music only if they learn to apply the terms of music theory. Wrongly so. For, as Kivy and also Davies (1994, chap. 6) convincingly argue, people who have no knowledge of music theory can have a good understanding of many aspects of a composition. If asked to give a description of the music, they will find this a hard job. Nevertheless, with a enough patience and a little help most of them will be able to describe relevant aspects of the work. Of course, their descriptions will not exhibit musicological terms. But they have alternative terms for naming relevant concepts. For instance, they will use expressions like *tune* instead of *theme*, *getting louder* instead of *crescendo*, *jerky movement* instead of *punctuated rhythm*, or *hasty succession of entries of the melody* instead of *fugato*.[5] The ordinary language terms they use testify that they do have concepts enabling them to understand the work in many of its aspects.

Although Kivy's view is valuable because of its illuminating the role concepts can play in musical experience, it is extreme. In order to see this, we need to make a twofold distinction: (1) between cognition depending on verbal concepts and cognition depending on *non*verbal concepts; (2) be-

tween cognitive representations depending on concepts (whether verbal or nonverbal) and cognitive representations that do not involve the exercise of a conceptual faculty at all. By implying that to cognize something means to understand it under a particular description, Kivy suggests that all musical cognition depends on verbal concepts. Thus, his position can be contested for two reasons: for neglecting the important role nonverbal concepts play in musical cognition (see my third point below) and for excluding from the outset any musical cognition that is nonconceptual.

To begin with the latter point, in his *Music and Conceptualization* Mark DeBellis argues that we can mentally represent aspects of music — like absolute pitch locations, specific intervals, specific chords — without using any concepts (DeBellis, 1995, chap. 3). For instance, the average listener represents instances of the pitch f^1 in the same way every time they occur but this does not entail that these are unified under a single concept. That this is not the case is testified by the fact the listener cannot reliably distinguish instances of f^1 from non-instances; he has no capacity for selective uniform action toward all (and only) instances of f^1. DeBellis suspects that many kinds of mental representations of music are nonconceptual (1995, p. 66). Whether DeBellis' arguments hold, is a matter for discussion. But anyhow it is important to take into consideration the possibility that besides conceptual musical cognitions there may also be nonconceptual ones.

A third point that needs to be made now is that concepts can be nonverbal as well as verbal. As Hospers (1967, pp. 108-110) points out, in order to have a concept it is not necessary to be acquainted with a word (or some other kind of sign). A person may have something in mind for which he has as yet no word or for which there is as yet no word in the language. According to Hospers, having a concept of X is testified by someone's ability to distinguish X's from Y's and Z's. Having a concept of X can then be understood as having some *criterion-in-mind*, that is, a particular mental content which allows us to distinguish X's from non-X's.

Other, more psychologically oriented definitions of concepts have been given by DeBellis and Elliott. DeBellis (1995), like Hospers, indicates that concepts enable us to pick out particular phenomena: "concepts are general abilities to entertain a given mode of presentation and to recognize and reidentify things under the latter" (p. 65). Elliott emphatically points out that the view that concepts are necessarily linked with words or other kinds of signs has been superseded by a much wider notion of the concept. He presents a definition underlining that concepts may operate in the context of concrete action as well as in abstract thought: "a concept is a cognitive unit

that can be manipulated as though it were a mental object, or embodied in action" (1991a, p. 56).

These non-semiotic definitions of concepts allow us to further remove the ostensible barrier between musical experience and concepts. Concepts do not exclusively belong to the domain of language but also figure in wordless action, in imagery, or in other forms of nonverbal representation. An example of a nonverbal concept in music is the concept we can have of a specific quality of sound. Listening to Elgar's *Enigma Variations*, we may notice at a certain moment that the strings combined with the wood winds make up for a particular sound we also find in the orchestral works of Brahms. In this case it turns out that I have a nonverbal concept of a particular sound quality. I have never given a name to this sound quality, but nevertheless I am able to recognize it in the works of Brahms, Elgar, as well as in the works of other contemporaneous composers.

Music is an outstanding example of a domain where such nonverbal concepts figure prominently. When listening to a piece of music, we form concepts of numerous aspects of the work: for instance, of various individual themes, pregnant rhythms, prominent harmonic sequences, special sound effects. After we have attended a couple of times to these themes, rhythms, et cetera, a capacity to recognize them, that is, a concept, has emerged. We may give a name to these concepts but we need not, and mostly we don't.

This leads us to the fourth and last point: we can have concepts of the most singular and concrete things. Reimer holds that concepts have to do with the abstract rather than with the concrete and with the general rather than the particular. However these oppositions between the general and the particular, between the abstract and the concrete, are misleading. Concepts can be formed of entirely individual phenomena (like a particular theme or a wonderful modulation), of unique exemplars (e.g., the concept of God), even of something that does not exist at all (e.g., the unicorn). But once we have formed such a concept, it becomes a type, even if the class to which it applies counts only one instance, or no instance at all. Therefore, even if a concept itself is abstract and general, it can bear on things of the greatest concreteness and particularity.

We may now acknowledge that musical experience is conceptual through and through. When attending to music, people employ general concepts like melody, rhythm, harmony, timbre, motif, dissonance, and crescendo, whether or not they know them by terms from music theory. They also employ more specific concepts like song theme, strophic form, punctuated rhythm, cadence. Even more particularly, when engaging in an

individual musical work, they form (mostly nonverbal) concepts of particular themes, rhythms, chord progressions, timbre combinations, and textures that feature in it. In following how the work develops, they use the concepts of variation, repetition, balance, and contrast. Furthermore, they relate what they hear to the concepts they have formed of various types of form, particular styles, traditions, and standards of performance.

This does not mean that music is just another form of thinking in concepts. In fact, I agree with Reimer that what is central to music is the experience of the uniqueness of musical forms, of the particular constellations of sensuous and structural properties. However, before we can appreciate a work in its uniqueness, we should get a grasp on the work. And we can get a grasp on the work only, it seems, by subsuming its various aspects under the musical concepts we have.

I have tried to demonstrate that the gap between conceptualizing and musical experience is not so large as Reimer suggests. However, this is only a small step forward on the way to clarifying the logical and empirical relations between conceptualizing and musical experience. Returning to this issue, we can conclude two things. First, though the relationship between conceptualizing as a form of discourse and musico-aesthetic experience may be conceived as one of means and end, there is also a form of conceptualizing that is an intrinsic part of musical experience itself. If we understand conceptualizing as the employment of concepts, there can be no doubt that this takes place also in direct musical engagement — albeit in a predominantly nondiscursive form.

This point can been illustrated by the distinction Swanwick (1994) makes between two types of analysis:

> *Primary* or intrinsic analysis exists as an essential element of musical comprehension, a symbol-making and symbol-sharing activity involving the processes of selection, interpretation and reconstitution of intuitive data. *Secondary* or extrinsic analysis consists of reflective discourse about particular music — the more usually understood definition. ... Primary analysis is wordlessly implicit in all musical experience; secondary analysis involves extramusical ways of pointing to these insights. (p. 43)

Swanwick's specific formulation may be questioned in several respects: In what sense can music be viewed as a "symbol making and symbol-sharing activity"? Can the analytic activity that belongs to musical experience be said to be entirely wordless? Is discursive analysis merely a matter of point-

ing to what is already known through direct experience? Nevertheless, his distinction between these two modes of conceptualizing is illuminating. We can generalize the distinction between primary and secondary analysis into *primary* and *secondary conceptualization*: primary conceptualization refers to conceptualizing (including primary analysis) taking place in our direct engagement in music; secondary conceptualization occurs in discourse about music.

The second conclusion is that a considerable amount of conceptual analysis remains to be done before we can make hypotheses about the precise nature of the empirical relation between conceptualizing — in the sense of secondary conceptualization — and musical experience. First, we should have a clear view of what concepts are and the role they play or can play in musical experience. Second, we should analyze the relationship between secondary conceptualization and primary conceptualization. Third, we should investigate how secondary conceptualization can become relevant to primary conceptualization and how this might result in enhanced musical experience.

In this way we can arrive at a clearer view of how the means-ends connection between conceptualizing and enhanced musical experience might be envisaged. Only then meaningful empirical research becomes possible, showing which of the hypothesized connections hold true. A next step would be to investigate in which form and under which conditions the means serve best their ends.

4.5 Conclusion

In the preceding sections I have discussed two major issues with respect to the conceptualization of aims in music education. First, I investigated internal and external conceptions of aims. I argued that Reimer as well as Elliott provide both internal and external views of the aims of music education. Neither of them clearly distinguishes these two perspectives of aims, let alone that they adequately relate them. However, a comprehensive view is not only a theoretical desideratum but also a practical one. When building music curricula, one should know to what extent our considerations should be led by values that are unique to music or by values that transcend musical practice as such. Can we merely concentrate on aims internal to musical practice and assume that, in pursuing these, external aims are automatically served as well? Or do external aims call for specific constraints on the activities and contents featuring in the curricula? Furthermore, it is of

vital importance that we can offer a unified picture of what music education is to bring about.

Second, I have discussed conceptual and empirical (means-ends) aspects of aims and their interrelations. In order to clarify the conceptual and empirical relations between the various components of musical activities distinguished by Reimer, I have separated aspects of direct engagement in music — creating, listening, perceiving, reacting, valuing — from activities relating to discourse about music — conceptualizing, analyzing, evaluating. Though I do not object in principle to Reimer's conceiving the latter activities as means behaviors toward the end of aesthetic experience, I have made three caveats with respect to this view. First, dubbing conceptualizing as a means behavior is too exclusive, since discourse about music can also be viewed as an end. Second, besides *secondary conceptualization*, there is also a primary form of employing concepts that is a component of, rather than a means to, musical experience. Third, I noted that we are far from substantiating the empirical claim that conceptualizing leads to enhanced musical experience. A good deal of conceptual work remains to be done before we can establish how conceptualizing can strengthen musical experience.

Whereas talking of means behaviors and ends behaviors may be appropriate to characterizing the relation between secondary conceptualization and aesthetic experience, this kind of classification is not suitable for characterizing the relations between the nondiscursive behaviors of creating, listening, perceiving, and reacting. Reimer's unfortunate attempt to do so can be seen as the result of his failing to distinguish conceptual and means-ends questions. Reimer observes that creating and listening can lead to enhanced aesthetic experience. By itself this is correct, but it does not render creating and listening typical means behaviors and perceiving and reacting aesthetically typical ends behaviors. Creating, listening, perceiving, reacting, valuing: all are aspects of the point of musical practices: intrinsically valuable musical experience. They are connected by logical relations, rather than by means-ends relations. Creating and listening are just as much the objective of musical practices as perceiving, reacting, and valuing.

However, these musical behaviors — or, better, dimensions of direct musical engagement — can in the context of musical growth be seen, not only as ends, but also as means toward higher levels of musical experience. Musical activities in music education can be viewed under two perspectives: (1) as intrinsically valuable ends; (2) as means to the attainment of a higher level of musical engagement. Musical activities are both means and ends.

Dubbing some aspects of them means and others as ends or outcomes obscures this insight.

In this article I have taken a metatheoretic approach to the issue of aims in music education. Rather than arguing for a specific view of aims, I have tried to clarify some of the conceptual issues involved in the subject. Conceptual clarification of discourse about music education is an important task of philosophy of music education. As in other domains, discourse in our field is often obscured by conceptual confusions: terms are used in different ways by various participants or even by one author, aspects of central notions fail to be distinguished, relations between key concepts remain unclear, arguments are based on incompatible conceptual frameworks. Philosophers of education can point out the nature of such conceptual confusions and how these may be resolved. By elucidating key concepts that figure in educational theory and practice and the relations between these they can provide a basis for a better understanding of the field.

Furthermore, besides clarifying conceptual frameworks philosophers of music education can also question their adequacy. Conceptual frameworks are constitutive of the way we experience the world and the way we think about it. On the one hand they create and open up the possible space of our experience and thinking, whereas on the other hand they structure and restrict these. Philosophers of music education can point out the limitations of conceptual frameworks and the way they direct or even hinder our understanding. Going one step further, they can make suggestions for enriching conceptual frameworks or even radically modifying them.

Thus, though a metatheoretical, conceptual approach may appear to be somewhat aloof from educational practice at first sight, it can make a vital contribution to them. It can bring about a clearer and deeper understanding, leading to more adequate action; it can even lead to a new conceptualization and hence to a new design of educational practice.

Notes

1. This assessment does not apply to the situation in Germany where Sigrid Abel-Struth's impressive overview of the field appeared already two decades ago (Abel-Struth, 1978).
2. A variety of terms is used to address the issue of aims: *goals, objectives, purposes, ends, (intended) outcomes, tasks, ideals,* et cetera. Garforth (1985, pp. 33–34) and Bar-

row and Milburn (1990, p. 18) doubt the utility of carefully distinguishing these terms, arguing that in ordinary usage these various terms are largely used interchangeably. In this article I use *aim* as an overarching term, encompassing the whole spectrum of objectives in education.

3. One might question Reimer's use of the term *behavior* in this context, but this is not really an important point. Reimer makes it clear that he conceives the notion of behavior in a broad, non-behavioristic sense. The seven behaviors refer to the major aspects of human functioning in the aesthetic realm (Reimer, 1971, pp. 70–76). My purpose is to examine how these aspects of musical activities are related.
4. Some of the following points, notably the first and the third ones, also emerge from Elliott's critique of Reimer's view of concepts (Elliott, 1991a, pp. 55–57).
5. With respect to the concepts used by laymen Kivy's example of hearing a fugue is not illuminating. For to hear something under the concept of a fugue one must indeed have a certain amount of knowledge of music theory. It requires that one knows about the components of a fugue — like dux and comes, divertimento, re-exposition, stretto — as well as the way they are combined into the whole we call a fugue.

5. Music education: aesthetic or praxial?

Since a couple of years we have witnessed a flowering of the philosophy of music education. The number of publications in this discipline is growing steadily and there is even a periodical entirely devoted to it — the *Philosophy of Music Education Review*. More important than this quantitative growth of the discipline is the fact that traditional views have been challenged by new ones. For a long time the philosophy of music education has been completely dominated by the aesthetic approach. The exponent of this approach of music and music education is Bennett Reimer, whose *A Philosophy of Music Education* (1970, 1989) was the only systematic treatment of the discipline for some 25 years. In recent years the aesthetic view of music and music education has faced severe criticisms by authors like Elliott (1991a, 1991b), Bowman (1991a), and Alperson (1991). The opposition to traditional views of music education has culminated in the publication of a completely new philosophy of music education, David Elliott's *Music Matters* (1995). Elliott presents a novel conceptual framework for understanding music, which centers around the notion of music as a practice.

In this article I will examine the differences between the aesthetic approach and Elliott's alternative conception. To what extent is Elliott's criticism of *music education as aesthetic education* justified? How convincing is his own perspective, and should it lead us to abandon an aesthetic approach to music education? These are the main questions addressed in this article. In the first two sections I will give a broad outline of Elliott's objections to the aesthetic approach to music eduation and the alternative view of music education he defends. Next, I will discuss two main issues that emerge from Elliott's attack on the aesthetic approach to music education (sections 5.3 and 5.4). Finally, I will argue for an intermediate position which retains both the idea of music as aesthetic and that of music as a practice.

5.1 Elliott's objections against MEAE

Elliott raises a large number of objections against what he calls *music education as aesthetic education* (hence MEAE). Three major clusters of objections indicated by Elliott in Chapter 2 of *Music Matters* concern: the conception of music as an object, the concept of musical perception, and the concept of musical experience.

Music as object

According to Elliott, MEAE onesidedly focuses on musical works, that is on autonomous objects that exist independent of concrete performances. He opposes this view, arguing that an explanation of musical works is not likely to yield a comprehensive understanding of the nature and value of music. Concentrating on the concept of the musical work as object leads to a narrow and implausible concept of music and, consequently, a narrow and implausible philosophy of music education (Elliott, 1995, p. 30).

Related to Elliott's critique on the narrowness of the view of music as object is his complaint that by focusing on musical works MEAE has failed to offer a critically reasoned account of the nature of music making in general and performing in particular and that it has tended to neglect the process dimension of music (p. 30). A third objection is that MEAE's emphasis on musical works results in a curriculum that strongly emphasizes listening at the cost of music making.

Musical perception

Elliott holds that by focusing on aesthetic perception the aesthetic concept of music tends to narrow our musical understanding and experiences. The aesthetic doctrine urges us to concentrate exclusively on the design of musical works (p. 33). In his book Elliott argues that musical works have at least four, but often as many as six dimensions, only one of which is their design. He summarizes his view in the following formula: A musical work is (1) a performance-interpretation of (2) a musical design that evinces: (3) standards and traditions of practice, (4) expressions of emotion, (5) musical representations, (6) cultural-ideological information (p. 199).

Elliott's criticizes MEAE for being narrow, not only because it neglects several dimensions of musical works, but also because it fails to take into account that music can have functions other than enjoying works as such. People around the world have various purposes and motivations to engage in one of many different musical practices: social, political, religious, moral, and so forth. Elliott says that teaching pupils to perceive and respond aesthetically amounts to imposing on them an ethnocentric ideology that, moreover, belongs to the past. MEAE leads to homogenizing the great diversity of musical activities and musical products around the world because first, it imputes a single purpose to all of them, second, it postulates a single mode of response for all their listeners, and third it ascribes a single motivation to all participants in musical practices everywhere (p. 33).

Musical experience

At various places in his book Elliott criticizes the notion of aesthetic experience. This criticism runs along several lines. In the first place, he attacks the explanation of aesthetic experience provided by prominent philosophers of music education, notably Reimer and Leonhard (pp. 36–38). These educators adopt the view, developed by Susanne K. Langer, that music — like other fine arts — is the source of a special kind of knowledge. According to Langer (1953, 1957a), music is a unique kind of *unconsummated symbol* that yields insight into the forms of feeling. Elliott launches a twofold attack on this view. First, he points out that Langer's theory is in contradiction with another central tenet of aesthetics, namely that aesthetic experience is self-sufficient, disinterested, and impractical.

Second, he casts doubt on the special value of getting insight into the forms of feeling. According to Langer, music represents the morphology of feeling only and not their complete nature. It seems, however, that these general forms have nothing that distinguish them from patterns exhibited by other natural and artificial phenomena.

Elliott further argues that Leonhard and Reimer are confused about the relationship between music and feeling. On the one hand, they endorse the view of Langer who denies that music arouses affect; rather music *symbolizes* feeling. On the other hand, they hold to L. B. Meyer's theory, which tries to explain how musical sound patterns actually do arouse affect in listeners.

5.2 Elliott's alternative philosophy of music education

Two types of criticism can be distinguished in Elliott's objections to MEAE. First, he thinks that the aesthetic approach to music education is too narrow: the core notions of MEAE, those of the musical work, aesthetic perception and aesthetic experience, are too limited as to offer an encompassing view of the musical domain. Second, and more seriously, Elliott questions the aesthetic concept of music itself. Particularly, he opposes to the notion of aesthetic experience; he finds the account given by Reimer *cum suis* unconvincing. Therefore, according to Elliott, not only is MEAE's conception too limited, it is also mistaken about what constitutes the core of musical experience.

As a way out of these problems Elliott puts forward an entirely new view of music and music education. In the first place, he proposes to conceptualize music as a practice. Referring to authors like Dahlhaus, Sparshott, and Wolterstorff he holds that music is, at root, a human activity (1995, p. 39). Several dimensions are involved in this activity. To begin with, Elliott inter-

prets music as a four-dimensional concept involving (1) a doer — a *musicer*, (2) some kind of doing — *musicing*, (3) something done — *music* (in the sense of audible musical achievements), and (4) the complete context in which musicers operate. Each one of these four aspects can in turn be approached from four viewpoints: (1) head-on, as the outcome of systematic action on its own; (2) in back, in terms of motivated action; (3) in front, as goal-directed action; and (4) around, as action in a context of similar actions (pp. 40–41).

The activity of *musicing* is complemented by that of listening which also has four dimensions: listeners, listening, listenables (i.e., "sounds to listen for"), and the context of listening. Naturally, these four dimensions can also be considered from the four viewpoints mentioned (head-on, in back, in front, and around). Elliott's analysis thus results in a view of music as a multidimensional phenomenon involving two interlocking forms of human activity: music making and music listening. The domain constituted by this interlocking relationship he names *musical practice* (p. 42). Although the concept of a practice takes a central position in Elliott's account, he does not offer an exact definition of it. All he says is the following:

> A human practice is something a group of people organizes toward some kind of practical end. Human practices pivot on shared ways of thinking and shared traditions and standards of effort. A human practice, says Sparshott, is 'something that people do, and know they do, and are known to do'. (pp. 42–43)

Besides *practice* Elliott often uses the terms *praxis* en *praxial*. (Elliott dubs his philosophy of music education *praxial*.) These are used in a somewhat more specific sense than *practice*, though it is not clear whether Elliott intends them to have a distinctive meaning. Basing himself on Aristotle, Elliott describes praxis as "informed and deliberative 'doing-action' in which doers (as ethical practitioners) are not merely concerned with completing tasks correctly (*techné*), but with 'right action': enlightened, critical, and 'situated' action. *Praxis* means action committed to achieving goals (*telos*) in relation to standards, traditions, images, and purposes (*eidos*) viewed as Ideals that are themselves open to renewal, reformulations, and improvement" (p. 69).

Elliott admits that, in fact, his analysis of *musicing* and listening is not a substantial theory of music in itself but a conceptual framework for developing a comprehensive view of music (p. 40). According to him, musical practices should be conceived as essentially cognitive. Musicianship, for example, he describes as a multipartite form of working understanding (p. 70). In Elliott's view, both *musicing* and listening are essentially forms of think-

ing-in-action and knowing-in-action, a crucial difference between the two being that in *musicing* the thinking-in-action is overt, whereas in listening it is covert.

This emphasis on music as cognition is reflected by Elliott's account of the values of music and hence of music education (chap. 5). According to Elliott, music is a unique and major source of self-growth, self-knowledge, and enjoyment. Following Csikszentmihalyi, he holds that these values are attained if we manage to meet significant cognitive challenges; successful engagement in demanding activities results in the extension of our powers of consciousness and experiences of buoyant satisfaction called optimal experience, autotelic experience, or *flow*. Such self-strengthening pursuits also provide self-knowledge. Dynamic musical practices offer excellent opportunities to attain these values of self-growth, enjoyment, and self-knowledge because they involve the progressive matching of increasingly complex musical challenges (p. 121). Elliott summarizes his view as follows:

> MUSIC is the diverse human practice of overtly and covertly constructing aural-temporal patterns for the primary (but not necessarily the exclusive) values of enjoyment, self-growth, and self-knowledge. These values arise when musicianship is sufficient to balance or match the cognitive challenges involved in making and/or listening for aural patterns regarded significantly, but never exclusively, as audible designs. (p. 128)

Elliott's view of music as a praxis leads him to the conception of the *music curriculum-as-practicum*. Though musical *practicums* at school are not the same as real-life musical practices, their purpose is to incorporate the latter's essential characteristics. In Elliott's view this can be achieved by simulating the ways *musicing* and listening are carried out by artistic musical practitioners (p. 270). This *praxial* view of music education focuses on music making, especially performing. Music listening is not viewed as an end in itself but is taught and learned in conjunction with artistic music making.

5.3 Aesthetic and cognitive conceptions of music

Now I will discuss two main issues with regard to the disagreement between MEAE and Elliott's philosophy of music education: (1) what concepts are most suited to describe the nature of music? and (2) what range should a philosophy of music education have? I will now examine these issues, the former in this section, the latter in the following.

Proponents of MEAE and Elliott have different conceptions of what is most fundamental to music. Proponents of MEAE consider aesthetic experience to

be the heart of music, whereas, according to Elliott, music should primarily be viewed as a cognitive activity resulting in *flow* or optimal experience.

In section 2 we saw Elliott's objections against the aesthetic-experience view held by leading proponents of MEAE like Leonhard and Reimer. Central to this view is the idea that musico-aesthetic experience reveals and gives insight into the life of feeling. Elliott's criticism on this Langerian idea of musico-aesthetic experience may be accepted. He rightly points out that it is incompatible both with the aesthetic notion of self-sufficiency and with Meyer's arousal theory of musical emotion. By themselves these points do not demonstrate the implausibility of a Langerian view of musical experience. Reimer and Leonhard could save their position by giving up the idea that musical experience is self-sufficient and by dropping Meyer's theory of emotion in music. However, more serious objections have been raised against Langerian views of aesthetic experience. First, there is the argument borrowed by Elliott from Budd (1985b, p. 114), questioning whether Langer's position can possibly account for the special nature of music. For it would seem that the general forms of feeling "revealed" by music are not crucially different from patterns exhibited by other natural and artificial phenomena. Furthermore, a number of other authors (e.g., Alperson, 1991; Davies, 1994; Koopman, 1996) have called attention to serious weaknesses, three of which I will mention here. First, Langer's very notion of form has been criticized for being elusive or even incoherent. For example, Langer does not explain to what extent and at which level musical forms can be said to correspond to the forms of feeling. Second, Langer unwarrantedly moves from the idea that the forms of music and the forms of feeling are isomorphous to the conclusion that the former yield deeper insight into the latter. She provides no arguments whatsoever for this conclusion. Third, the status of the knowledge of the forms of feeling one is believed to attain is not clear. Alperson, for example, wonders whether claims of truth and falseness can be usefully applied to this kind of nonconceptual knowledge and how, in view of the asserted ineffability of this knowledge, we would be able to support such claims (1991, p. 229).

I think it is justified to conclude from these objections that Langer's aesthetic theory is a dubious basis for building a philosophy of music education. However, in rejecting Langer's idea of aesthetic experience we need not go so far as to reject the concept of aesthetic experience altogether. A major shortcoming of Elliott's attack on the aesthetic concept of music is that he views aesthetic theory as one coherent body of theory that, in spite of "countless variations", has "remained largely intact" since the eighteenth

century (1995, p. 26). This one-sided view leads him to make unwarranted generalizations. Elliott questions the idea of the musical work as an ideal aesthetic object, but this idea is absent from most contemporaneous aesthetics (see section 4). Likewise, he tries to discredit the concept of aesthetic experience by showing the dubiousness of the epistemological claim that underlies MEAE. However, the claim that aesthetic experience provides unique insight into the life of feeling is an idiosyncrasy of only one particular aesthetic theory: Langer's. It does not underlie the work of prominent aestheticians like John Dewey (1934/1980), Louis Arnaud Reid (1969), or Monroe C. Beardsley (1981, 1982).

Beardsley (1982) proposes a set of five criteria for aesthetic experience: (1) object directedness, (2) felt freedom, (3) detached affect, (4) active discovery, and (5) wholeness (pp. 288–289). According to him, these criteria are to be applied as a family except for the first one, which is necessary. An experience has aesthetic character if it has the first and at least three of the other features. There are remarkable correspondences between Beardsley's idea of aesthetic experience and Csikszentmihalyi's concept of optimal experience, which Elliott introduces as an alternative explanation of musical experience. Features like felt freedom (i.e., lift of spirit, absence of distracting thoughts and feelings), actively exercising constructive powers of mind, integration and strengthening of the self, enjoyment, and intrinsic value are common to both concepts. In view of these shared characteristics between *flow* and aesthetic experience one wonders why Elliott should be so negative about the latter concept. These characteristics are present (explicitly or implicitly) in many writings about aesthetic experience and several of them can also be found in Reimer's account of aesthetic experience.

On the other hand, these correspondences between the notions of aesthetic experience and *flow* should not divert our attention from crucial differences between Elliott's account of musical experience and aesthetic ones. Although Elliott's view opens new perspectives on music, as a view about the nature of music it has important disadvantages as compared to an aesthetic concept. First, the idea of *flow* is a very general one; it applies to countless activities, such as mountain climbing, dancing, sailing, playing chess, and so on. Thus the concept of optimal experience cannot explain what distinguishes music from all these other activities. What is so special about cognitively constructing musical patterns? Elliott's account is too general to provide insight into the distinctness of the musical domain. This lack of specificity is not only problematic in defining music externally, that is, in distinguishing music from other disciplines, but also in defining it

internally. What activities are most central to music? In Elliott's view, all cognitive operations related to music seem to be equally important in principle. The only decisive question is whether they provide challenges to the *musicer* or listener. For example, memorizing a complex composition and enjoying a beautiful performance appear to be equally important if only they are equally challenging.

An aesthetic concept of music, on the other hand, is much more specific. Central to aesthetics is the idea that concentration on the properties of a perceptual field leads to a kind of experience of that is significantly different from rewarding experiences involved in other activities. This central idea can be fruitfully applied to music. The aesthetic concept of music focuses exactly on what is most important in music: the inner happening that we undergo when we attend to the sensuous and structural properties of sound forms. This is the core experience of music; all other cognitive activities — sight reading, coordination of the hands, mastering technical difficulties, learning musical concepts, acquiring information about the social, historical and cultural context of music, and so on — are secondary to it. They may be vital or indispensable for music making or listening, but in themselves they do not constitute the heart of music. The core experience of music is that of dwelling in an alternative world, that is, the world of structured sound. Sparshott (1987) puts it as follows:

> The world of music is more clearly separate from the everyday world, and more internally coherent, than painting or literature. It may be thought of as our only true alternative reality. If that is a fact, it is perhaps the most important fact about music. (p. 71)

Besides its lack of specificity, a second problematic aspect of Elliott's explanation of music is its dependence on the notion of cognitive challenges. The relationship Elliott establishes between musical enjoyment and cognitive challenges is highly dubious. There is no reason to believe that the enjoyment one derives from musical activities is exclusively a function of the magnitude of the cognitive challenge they involve. We may, for example, be utterly delighted when listening to a work that we have already listened to many times before. Or a choir may enjoy repeating a well-known canon time and again. The cognitive tasks involved in these activities are relatively modest. It appears, then, that the presence of significant cognitive challenges is not a necessary condition for enjoying music making or listening. At any rate there is no evidence for there being a proportional relation between the cognitive demands of musical activities and the enjoyment they give us. To

make the best of some mediocre work in a difficult idiom may present a musician with a formidable challenge, but is there any guarantee that a successful performance of it will give him more satisfaction than a new rendition of an absolute masterpiece he has had on his repertoire for many years? The delight that a musical work gives us is determined by the appeal of its sensuous and structural properties. This appeal cannot be explained exclusively in terms of cognitive challenges. Other aspects of the work are also constitutive of the interest we take in it, for example its sensuous attractiveness, *Gestalt* qualities of musical ideas, good proportions, and nuances of feeling.

This last feature leads us to a third drawback of Elliott's cognitive account of music, namely that he fails to do justice to the role of feeling in musical experience. L.A. Reid (1969, 1980) describes aesthetic experience as an unified response in which cognition and feeling cannot be separated:

> Although in looking at a picture or listening to music with great care, attention and discrimination, we are perceiving a complexity of formed content, up to a point (but never completely) describable in factual terms — yet we are perceiving it in a feelingful way. We are cognising it with intense feelingful interest; we are apprehending it with what can fairly be called 'cognitive feeling'. We are cognitively feeling, or feeling cognitively, the art as yielding valuable meaning. (1980, p. 11)

According to Reid, aesthetic experience is a holistic response in which cognition and feeling are completely intertwined. While cognition and feeling can be conceptually be distinguished they are fused in actual experience.

This view, according to which feeling is as vital to our engagement with music as cognition, strongly contrasts with Elliott's account of musical experience. Elliott takes *musicing* and listening to be essentially cognitive activities, that is *thinking-in-action* or *knowledge-in-action*. Feeling is in his view only a secondary response, that results from the primary action of musical cognition. Moreover, in this view the range of feeling in music is reduced to a general feeling of enjoyment, because this feeling is the invariant outcome of successful musical cognition. Elliott has no explanation for the endless many shades of feeling we experience when attending to the development of a musical work. If we follow Reid's aesthetic view of musical experience on the other hand, we can easily account for the rich variety of feeling in music: every part of the musical work is felt as much as cognized.

My conclusion is that Elliott's fails to establish the superiority of his cognitive account of music to an aesthetic concept of musical experience. Elliott does succeed in questioning the fundamental presupposition underlying the Langerian conception of aesthetic experience dominant in MEAE, namely the presupposition that aesthetic experience yields unique insight into the life of feeling. However, he is too soon in abandoning the notion of aesthetic experience altogether. Moreover, his alternative view of the nature of music has limitations not found in aesthetic accounts of musical experience: it lacks specificity, thereby failing to indicate what aspect of involvement in music it is precisely that makes musical experience so special; it incorrectly assumes that musical enjoyment can be explained completely in terms of cognitive challenges; it discounts the role of feeling in musical experience.

However, these shortcomings do not alter the fact that Elliott's cognitive conception has important merits as well. In his book Elliott analyzes various forms of thinking and knowing in music. Thereby his approach has a focus that differs from the one taken by MEAE. While MEAE tends to concentrate on a phenomenological explanation of musical experience, Elliott focuses on the cognitive operations that underlie musical experience. Both approaches are valid and they should be viewed as supplementing, rather than contradicting each other.

5.4 The range of the conception of music

Elliott's objections to MEAE are not limited to the aesthetic concept of music itself. Even if he had to give up his claim that the aesthetic concept of music as such is inadequate, Elliott would maintain that an aesthetic approach leads to an undue restriction of the scope of what is involved in music in general and music education in particular. In this section we will deal with this second strand of critique. As we have seen in section 2, Elliott holds that the aesthetic concept of music (1) onesidedly focuses on musical works as objects and (2) leaves no room for other uses of music than the contemplation of musical design.

The first point misses the mark. His criticism is inspired by Lydia Goehr's analysis of traditional aesthetic views of music that focus their attention on musical works as fixed objects (1995, pp. 24–25, 34–35). However, this criticism cannot be transferred simply to MEAE for MEAE builds on theories — notably those of Dewey and Langer — that focus on an explanation of aesthetic experience rather than of aesthetic objects. Actually, the very reason for Dewey to put the idea of aesthetic experience in the heart of his theory was to provide an alternative for approaches that focus on the

museum concept of art (cf. Shusterman, 1992, p. 26). Likewise, the notion of the musical work plays a peripheral role in Reimer's philosophy of music education. Although Elliott 1995, p. 28) suggests that his theory strongly depends on it, Reimer is not at all concerned with analyzing what musical works are; instead, he concentrates on elucidating musical experience.

Elliott's criticism that MEAE inevitably results in a curriculum in which listening is strongly favored over music making cannot be substantiated either. First, theoretically there is nothing wrong with the idea of a curriculum that is both aesthetically oriented and focused on music making. An emphasis on making music rather than listening can, for example, be justified by arguing that aesthetic experience is usually more intense in music making than in listening. Second, the curriculum actually outlined by Reimer, the most prominent representative of MEAE, cannot be said to be dominated by listening activities; there is ample room for making music.

However, another objection Elliott makes in this context is more to the point, namely the objection that MEAE has failed to provide critically reasoned explanations of the nature of making music. Elliott touches on a significant problem of MEAE here; the concepts provided by an aesthetic approach appear to be too limited to provide a satisfactory explanation of musical activities like composing, improvising, performing, and even listening. Surely aesthetic theory yields important insights in a number of principles of music making and listening. But many of the thinking processes constitutive of music making and listening cannot be clarified by drawing on these concepts. Aesthetic concepts are suitable for elucidating the phenomenological side of musical experience, but they were not designed for analyzing the intelligent actions that underlie music making and listening. Elliott's philosophy must be credited for offering a new understanding of the nature of musical action.

Elliott's second point was that by concentrating exclusively on aesthetic perception, that is, the perception of music's design, the aesthetic concept of music overlooks alternative dimensions of musical works and other functions of engaging in music. He argues that music education should pay attention also to the aspects of performance-interpretation, the standards and traditions of practice, expression, musical representation, and cultural-ideological information. Basically, his objection here is sound. Indeed, the aspects mentioned have been neglected by MEAE. And as they seem to embody interesting ways of approaching musical works, there is no reason to see why they should not constitute serious additional points of attention in mu-

sic education. However, Elliott tends to overstate his point. First, his conception of aesthetic perception, as concerning the design only, is apt to mislead us. The term *design* may suggest that aesthetic perception is concerned merely with structures at a global level. However, even if narrowly conceived, aesthetic evaluation involves all sensuous and structural properties of a work of art at all levels (Kivy, 1980, pp. 115–116). Thus, the aesthetic approach has a broader scope than is suggested by Elliott's formulation that it concentrates exclusively on the musical design. In the following I will use the more familiar term *form* rather than *design*, meaning thereby the whole of a musical work's sensuous and structural properties.

Second, speaking of five alternative *dimensions*, Elliott suggests that these aspects of the musical work are all of the same order and the same importance as musical form. However, this is not the case. The aesthetic concept of music education may be too narrow, but the proponents of MEAE are right in emphasizing the centrality of musical form. It is by attending to the sensuous and structural properties of musical works that musico-aesthetic experience can be achieved. Thus, sensuous form is directly related to the core experience of music.

The aspect of *performance-interpretation* is also closely connected with musico-aesthetic experience. The aesthetic approach is concerned with form as concretely lived through, not with abstract structural relations that can be read-off from a score. It is only through interpretation that musico-aesthetic experience comes to life. The quality of musical performances determines how we can experience musical forms. Moreover, in improvisations musical form comes into being only via performances. Therefore, though Elliott rightly observes that performance as such does not figure prominently in the aesthetic approach, the suggestion that performance-interpretation is entirely absent from it is not correct; this aspect is implicitly included in the conception of musical experience.

The four other so-called dimensions — standards and traditions of practice, expression, musical representation, and cultural-ideological information — can be said to be secondary to the experience of musical form in two senses. First, these dimensions depend on the appreciation of musical form; and second, the value involved in dealing with these dimensions are less prominent than the value of attending to musical form as such. The first point does not seem to be controversial. The dependence of the other four dimensions is clearly indicated by Elliott himself, when he states that musical design (i.e., musical form) *evinces* standards of traditions of practice,

expressions of emotion, musical representations, and cultural-ideological information.

It is also clear that the value of studying standards of performance and practice and cultural-ideological information are of secondary importance. These two dimensions can yield a lot of interesting information and meanings, as Elliott calls them, but what they offer cannot compare to the delight of experience of musical form as such. Moreover, they are derivative: acquiring knowledge about aspects of musical performance, standards of practice, and cultural-ideological context is only rewarding if the practice at hand features powerful musical forms.

The dimensions of musical representation and expression have received a great deal of attention in musical aesthetics. Therefore, though particular versions of MEAE have largely neglected these aspects, it is not correct to say that any aesthetic conception of music education cannot adequately deal with them. Alperson (1991) clarifies this point by distinguishing a strict version and an enhanced version of the aesthetic concept of music; the former version concentrates only on the properties of musical form, the latter also takes into consideration expressive and representative meaning (pp. 220–225). We cannot at this place review the extensive debates about musical representation and musical expression. But there is a wide agreement that the value of representation in music is secondary to that the experience of musical form as such. Splendid representation in itself is not decisive for a musical work's success. Likewise, though it plays an important part in many musical achievements, musical expression is subordinate to musical form. Expressive properties can be effective, only if they contribute to a satisfactory musical form. Kivy (1990), whose account of musical expression is endorsed by Elliott, puts it as follows:

> Some expressive properties serve to highlight musical structure, as color might be used by the painter to emphasize contour or mass. Other expressive properties serve as structural properties in their own right....Of course, a composition may possess expressive properties for which there seem to be no real musical functions — properties that obtrude but seem to lack for a musical reason. However, these are cases not of musical meaning, but of musical failure. (p. 196)

In sum, while Elliott rightly emphasizes the importance of expression and several other aspects of musical works this should not lead us to abandon musical form (or design) as a central notion in the philosophy of music education. Contrary to what Elliott suggests, form is not just one of a series

of aspects of the musical work, but it is the central feature on which the other dimensions build.

So far, we have considered musical works regardless of their function in society. Implicit in this treatment was that music is valuable as such. However, one of Elliott's objections is that the aesthetic concept of music ignores the many alternative functions music may have besides aesthetic experience for its own sake. On the one hand, this complaint is justified. While it has been clearly established in the past decades that music serves many functions, not only in other cultures but also in Western society, there has been little reflection on this fact in MEAE. It has, perhaps, too easily been assumed that there are no alternatives to the aesthetic purpose of music. If we want to build a strong philosophy of music education, we should seriously take into account the multifunctional status of music.

On the other hand, the fact that besides aesthetic experience for its own sake there are many other purposes music can serve, should not lead us to dispense with aesthetic concepts as key notions in the philosophy of music education. In the first place, the ideas of the aesthetic approach are also relevant to "nonaesthetic" functions of music; basic characteristics of aesthetic experience (e.g., object directedness, wholeness, enjoyment, rapture) are present in many situations in which music is not appreciated for its own sake. As an example we may take its religious function; it is the rapturous quality of aesthetic experience that enables music to play such an important part in religious ceremonies. A second example is the social function of music. Music can strengthen group identity just because of the fact that group members share the joyful and integrating experience of attending to and responding to the sensuous and structural qualities of musical works. Analogous points can be made for other functions of music like political, moral, and therapeutic ones; these functions do not exist independently from musico-aesthetic experience, but they build on it.

In the second place, we should distinguish between two tasks of a philosophy of music education: reflection on the nature of music and reflection on general guidelines for music curricula. When considering the nature of music, the philosopher should take into account all functions music can possibly have. However, when it comes to formulating guidelines for music curricula, he takes a selective stance; he has to decide which ones of the many possible uses qualify for being included in the music curriculum and what the relative importance of the various uses selected is. Whatever the precise outcomes of such a selective procedure may be, it is clear that the

development of aesthetic sensitivity will remain a central goal in music education. First, the aesthetic use of music is very important in Western society. People sing, play instruments, go to concerts, and listen to records because they love to be immersed in music. Even when nonaesthetic functions prevail, the aesthetic enjoyment is seldom absent or irrelevant. Second, whereas the aesthetic function fits the school context well, it is by no means clear how many other functions should be incorporated into the music curriculum. When taught in a classroom situation, music is isolated from its real-life context. For an aesthetic approach to music this is no problem; concentrating on the sensuous and structural qualities of musical sound can be done in the classroom as well as in many other places. However, other functions like social and religious ones cannot be separated from their original contexts. Religious music can only have its original function in religious ceremonies. Likewise, party music fails to serve its intended purpose, if it is played in the classroom (without having a party).

These facts also point to an apparent inconsistency of Elliott's philosophy, namely that his conception of music curriculum is at odds with his views about the contextual nature of music. Though Elliott's *praxial* view entails that musical practices cannot be understood apart from their specific context, he promotes a curriculum in which music is separated from its social and (sub)cultural context. The classroom practicums he has in mind are not only divorced from real-world practices but do not even intend to approximate these as closely as possible. His argument for decontextualizing music is that the purpose of music education is not to educate all pupils for careers as professional musicians (1995, p. 270). However, only a limited number of musical practices are carried out by professional musicians. It turns out that Elliott bases his view of music education on a narrow idea of musical practices. By recommending musical practicums in the classroom, Elliott implicitly adopts an autonomous view of music; music can be isolated from its real-life context, while retaining its essence. Indeed, this is a honorable view but it is not in line with Elliott's basic assumption that musical practices can be appreciated only in their total context; it is a view that belongs to aesthetic theory, rather than to a *praxial* approach. If Elliott's idea of music as a context-dependent practice is consistently pursued this can, I suspect, only lead to the conclusion that music should be expelled from the curriculum. Music should in such a view be learned in or near to the context of real-life practices, rather than in surrogate classroom practicums.

Clearly, much more reflection is needed on the several functions of music and the question which ones can and should play a significant role in the music curriculum. However, I think that we can conclude from the above considerations that, granted even the perspective of the many functions music can perform, the aesthetic concept of music stands up as central. First, basic features of aesthetic experience are also characteristic of "nonaesthetic" functions of music; second, the aesthetic use of music (i.e., aesthetic experience for its own sake) is dominant in Western society; third, as yet it is not clear which alternative functions music in the classroom should focus on.

5.5 Conclusion. Music education: aesthetic *and* praxial

Throughout his book Elliott suggests that an aesthetic approach to music education and his own *praxial* philosophy constitute diametrically opposed positions, the former being mistaken and obsolete, the latter attractive and up to date. I hope to have demonstrated that this view cannot be uphold. Although Elliott rightly casts doubt on the Langerian theory of aesthetic experience dominant in MEAE, he is too quick in completely dismissing aesthetic theory. The aesthetic concept of music is useful for philosophy of music education, because it focuses on the heart of music: the experience of attending and responding to the properties of structured sound. An aesthetic approach to music has several advantages over Elliott's cognitive view of music: it more specifically indicates what is central to music, and what is less important; it does not try to explain the value of music completely in terms of mastering cognitive challenges; it allows a more comprehensive view in which the role of feeling in musical experience is given its full due.

More successful is Elliott's attempt to show that the aesthetic concept of music is too narrow. Elliott makes three important points: First, many aspects of the complex activity of music making and listening are not accounted for by the aesthetic concept of music. Second, by concentrating exclusively on form it pays too little attention to various alternative aspects of musical works. Third, it fails to seriously take into account the many nonaesthetic uses of music. At the same time, I have argued that the need for broadening the concept of music does not mean that aesthetic experience should be given up as a central notion in the philosophy of music education. Basic features of aesthetic experience are involved in almost every musical activity, and the intrinsic value of aesthetic experience constitutes the most prominent value of music in Western society.

We can now see that an aesthetic approach to music education and Elliott's conception of music as a practice are compatible rather than mutually

exclusive. Central to Elliott's conception is the idea that a philosophy of music education needs a view of musical reality in which the various types of knowledge constitutive of musical activities and their social and historical contexts are accounted for. With a *praxial* approach we can develop a very broad view of music. It seems that every aspect of the musical domain can be assigned a place within the conceptual framework of a practice. However, it does not establish the relative importance of the many activities, products, and experiences belonging to musical practices. It is with regard to these issues that aesthetics makes its indispensable contribution to a theory of music. Musical aesthetics offers the core concepts with which an adequate account can be given of what is central to and most valuable in most musical practices: the wonderful experience we have, when we concentrate on the sensuous and structural properties of sound.

I suggest that we stop polarizing into *praxial* views of music and music education and aesthetic ones. Both types of view can offer useful insights into the nature of music. While *praxial* views can increase our understanding of the many dimensions that are relevant to musical activities, aesthetic views can enhance our insight into what underlies all musical activities: the special kind of inner experience that comes over us when we attend to the properties of sound forms. The relationship between practice and *aesthesis* can be summarized as follows: musico-aesthetic experience constitutes the core of musical practices; and musical practices are the social realities in which musico-aesthetic experience can come to life. We can conclude, therefore, that we are not forced to make a choice between an aesthetic or a *praxial* view of music education. Music education should be inspired by the best ideas that originate from both.

Epilogue: Agenda for the philosophy of music education

In the preceding studies I have discussed a number of basic issues in the philosophy of music education. Some four years separate the beginning of the earliest article — the one about musical development — from the latest one — about aims. Naturally, as a result of my ongoing explorations of the field during these years, my views on a number of issues have changed. The most important change is that I have become aware of the limitations of the aesthetic view of music. Under the influence of Reimer's views, in my article on development I tend to equate musical experience with aesthetic experience. The writings of Alperson, Bowman, Elliott, and others have made it clear to me that a situation in which the aesthetic view of music monopolizes the philosophy of music education is undesirable. Nevertheless, I am still convinced that aesthetic theories (in the narrow sense) are a powerful source of insight into the way we experience music.

Though my views on the various subjects I have dealt with have evolved, I think that the main points made in the earlier studies are still valid. Therefore, rather than enumerating various minor points on which I have come to think differently, I want to conclude this book with indicating and situating a number of what seem to me the most important lines of investigation in the philosophy of music education.

Issues from the philosophy of music

Questions about the nature of music constitute one of the principal areas of study, also for philosophers of music education. In fact, philosophy of music education has been philosophy of music to a large extent up to now. This is not surprising given the fact that the philosophy of music (musical aesthetics) — just as philosophy of music education — is an underdeveloped discipline. Until recently, philosophy of music was the concern of isolated scholars separated from each other by time, place, subject matter, background, and approach. Interesting publications were scarce and many years could pass by before a new book on musico-philosophical issues would appear. It is only since two or three decades that philosophy of music has become a field in which a considerable number of authors operate and lively discussions are going on.

1. Basic views of music

A first issue in the philosophy of music concerns the nature and the merits of the various basic approaches that can be taken to the phenomenon of music. As I described in the introduction and in chapter 5, Reimer takes a specific aesthetic view of music, which he calls absolute expressionism. Instead of seriously discussing the alternative views of formalism and referentialism, he puts up straw-man versions. Presenting caricatures of alternative views of music is common practice in Elliott's *Music Matters*. He does not distinguish between formalism and absolute expressionism. Indeed, he even goes so far as to suggest that the aesthetic theory is one homogeneous body of ideas that has not undergone any important changes since the eighteenth century. In my view, our understanding of music is better served with seriously studying the strengths and weaknesses of the various views of music, than with extolling the virtues of one view and simply putting the others aside. An excellent article in this respect is Wayne Bowman's study "The Values of Musical 'Formalism'" (Bowman, 1991b). Even Reimer has recently become more willing to acknowledge the contribution formalism and referentialism can make to our understanding of music (Reimer, 1996). He argues that four positions on the nature and value of music need to be included in a universal philosophy of music education: formalism, praxialism, referentialism, and contextualism. After having briefly discussed the strong points and the limitations of these views, he discusses the position that, according to him, gives us the deepest insight into the nature and value of music. In this view, defended by the anthropologist Robert Plant Armstrong, art works are forms that incarnate human affect. Art works capture the ways cultures allow people to experience and feel. Adapting this view to music, Reimer propounds the thesis that music is sonic form incarnating feeling. With this view Reimer seems in fact to hold on to his old position, because this view is essentially the same as the absolute expressionism he has defended the last 30 years or so. The most important difference seems to be that the anthropologist Armstrong has replaced Langer as the most important source of inspiration, which lends the philosophy more credibility as a universal, rather than a typical Western, philosophy. However, this cannot be more than a tentative judgment of Reimer's new position, which has not yet been further elaborated.

We should investigate the diverse views of the nature and value of music much more deeply and try to establish how they relate to each other — for instance, whether they are compatible and, if so, whether they can be combined into a more encompassing view. Philosophy of music education

should be cautious not to be led astray by general categories like formalism, expressionism, contextualism, and praxialism. Up to now theorists in the field have been too much concerned with pigeonholing; they have tended to assimilate theories to one of these categories. We need to overcome the simple oppositions they suggest. It may be expected that the more interesting positions do not neatly fit into one single category.

2. Musical cognition

A second major field of study in the philosophy of music education is musical cognition. Basic notions in this field are knowledge, understanding, concepts, and meaning.

2.a. Musical knowledge

Three leading philosophers of education have taken up the issue of knowledge in music: Reimer, Swanwick, and Elliott. Each has come up with his own classification. Reimer (1992) distinguishes four kinds of knowledge (or knowing) in music and the other arts: (1) *knowing of* or *knowing within*; (2) *knowing how*; (3) *knowing about* or *knowing that*; (4) *knowing why*. Although Reimer does not refer to it, he seems to be inspired by three kinds of knowledge commonly distinguished in epistemology, namely, *knowledge that*, *knowledge how* and *knowledge by acquaintance* (or *knowledge of*). This leaves one wondering, however, what the status of knowing why is, which, according to Reimer, concerns "general understanding about art as a cultural psychological phenomenon" (1992, p. 44). It would appear that this is just another kind of knowledge that, though relating to another subject than what Reimer has in mind with this category: the analytical knowledge of the form, the content, and the historical and cultural contexts of musical works.

In his *Musical Knowledge: Intuition, Analysis, and Music Education* (1994) Swanwick also departs from the three-part division of knowledge that, knowledge how, and acquaintance knowledge, but he defines an additional category: *attitudinal knowledge* (pp. 14 ff.). This fourth kind of knowledge, which he also calls "knowledge of what's what", is not satisfactorily explained. Swanwick relates it to commitment, valuing, and feeling. I wonder whether what he aims at isn't in fact either (1) knowledge *of* one's attitudes, feelings, et cetera; or (2) knowledge *about* these; or (3) attitudes, feelings themselves, which are not knowledge at all. Anyhow, it may be questioned whether Swanwick is justified in positing this fourth kind of knowledge.

Swanwick goes on to introduce another distinction: between *analytical* knowledge and *intuitive* knowledge. The polarity between these two kinds

of knowledge — which he does not relate to the earlier fourfold distinction — is the main theme of his book. He links up a number of "key concepts" with either side (1994, pp. 42):

Intuition	**Analysis**
Aesthetic	Artistic
Imagination	Intellect
Impressions	Conceptions
Individual things	Relationships
"Romantic"	"Classical"
Subjective	Objective
Appearance	Underlying form
Integration	Separation
Creation	Tradition

However, interesting as these relations may be, they are based on association, rather than on thorough conceptual analysis.

Elliott is a third theorist who categorizes various kinds of knowledge in music (1995, pp. 53 ff., pp. 96 ff.). In his view, musical knowledge is essentially procedural knowledge. Besides this, he describes four other kinds of knowledge which "contribute to the procedural essence" of music making and listening (1995, p. 53): (1) *formal knowledge*, that is, knowledge that; (2) *informal knowledge* — the savvy or practical common sense developed by people who know "how to do things well in specific domains of practice"; (3) *impressionistic knowledge* — a kind of intuitional knowledge of what counts in a particular musical situation; and (4) *supervisory knowledge* — metaknowledge that allows us to regulate our musical thinking. It appears that in Elliott's classification two things run together; a distinction between basic forms of knowledge like procedural knowledge (knowledge how) versus formal knowledge (knowledge that) and an explanation of various important subclasses of knowledge belonging to one or more of the basic forms of knowledge. Informal knowledge and supervisory knowledge seem to be two subclasses of knowledge how and impressionistic knowledge seems to be largely knowledge of.

It is clear that, rather than being accepted uncritically, the classifications proposed by Reimer, Swanwick, and Elliott — or other authors — should be critically examined. First of all, the various forms of knowledge should be further analyzed. Which ones are most basic? By what criteria are they distinguished from other forms of knowledge, and how are they related?

An important question also to be addressed is what role the various kinds of knowledge play in different musical activities. Reimer, Swanwick, and Elliott agree that knowledge that occupies only a subordinate place in music. Reimer (1992, p. 42) holds that knowing of and knowing how are ends of aesthetic education, whereas knowing that is only a means. Swanwick takes knowledge by acquaintance (knowledge of) to be the core of musical cognition. And for Elliott musical knowledge is essentially procedural knowledge. Surprisingly, the views of philosophers of music like Kivy and Davies run counter to those of these leading theorists of music education. Kivy (1990, p. 73, pp. 77–78) stresses that knowledge that is essential to appreciating a musical work; we are only able to enjoy a work to the extent that we perceive that — and hence know that — many things are happening in it. Davies (1994, pp. 337–338) argues explicitly against the view that a person who understands music has knowledge how, rather than knowledge that. He agrees with Kivy that the ultimate test of someone's musical knowledge is his ability to describe relevant features of the work.

Thus we see that many divergent claims are made about the nature of musical knowledge as well as about the classification of various forms of musical knowledge and their relations. Clearly, musical knowledge is one of the hot issues not only in the philosophy of music but also in the philosophy of music education.

2.b. Musical understanding

Up to now, only a limited number of short studies have been devoted to the subject of musical understanding (notably Scruton, 1983, chap. 8; Tanner, 1985; Budd, 1985a; Davies, 1994, chap. 7). They present valuable investigations into various interesting aspects of the "nebulous and polymorphous concept of understanding music" (Budd, 1985a, p. 233); but, again, the issues they explore call for further elaboration and many other questions await to be tackled.

First, how can musical understanding be defined and how precisely does it relate to musical knowledge? Tanner posits that to understand music is to grasp why it is as it is (1985, p. 227). But what is this question taken to mean? Many why-questions can be asked about musical compositions. Furthermore, it seems that we can understand a good deal of a work, or of some part of a work, without knowing why it is composed as it is. I may not understand why Bartók incorporates a Tchaikovsky-like tune in the fourth movement of his *Concerto for Orchestra*, but I can clearly understand *what* he

is doing, and *how* this relates to his own musical idiom and to that of Tchaikovsky.

Clearly, there are many sides to understanding music. Budd distinguishes four different dimensions: deepness, accuracy, extensiveness, and subtlety (1985a, pp. 233–234). Elliott also defines dimensions of what he calls listening intelligently, but clearly he has different aspects of musical works in mind: performance/interpretation, design, standards, and traditions of practice, representation, expression, and cultural-ideological information (1995, pp. 198–199). Tanner, in turn, defines three levels with respect to understanding musical form (1985, pp. 227–231). Analyzing, ordering, and relating these various aspects of musical understanding is, in my view, an important job for philosophers of music education.

We should clearly distinguish theoretical understanding of music and implicit musical understanding. The first refers to the propositional understanding one may have of disciplines like music theory, analysis, musical aesthetics, and psychology of music. By the second category I mean the tacit knowledge we employ when we experience music with musical understanding. How are these two kinds of understanding related? Which types of theoretical musical understanding can become relevant to direct musical experience? The music education profession would well be served by more insight into the question to what extent various types of theoretical understanding can enhance our direct "experiential" understanding.

2.c. Concepts

To what extent is musical understanding conceptual? This question is undecidable at all, unless we have made clear what we mean by *concepts*. In my article on aims in music education I observed that, though many theorists suppose that learning to apply verbal concepts to music plays an important role in music education, philosophy of music education has developed only little insight into how conceptualizing might strengthen musical experience. More particularly, I have argued that Reimer's view that direct aesthetic experience is in sharp contrast with cognition based on concepts is unhelpful and partly even incorrect. Understanding music does to a large extent rely on employing concepts, both verbal and nonverbal ones. I made a number of distinctions between types of concepts that can be employed in music: between concepts of music theory and concepts belonging to ordinary language; between verbal concepts and nonverbal concepts; between concepts of particulars and concepts of general things. It is only when such distinc-

tions are taken into account that we can develop a nuanced view of the role the various types of concepts in musical understanding and experience.

2.d. Musical meaning

A last key term in relation to musical cognition is that of musical meaning. The purpose of my second article was to clarify this notion by making the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic meaning. Distinguishing these two types of meaning is, in my view, necessary to avoid at least some of the confusions that are so common in discourse about musical meaning. However, the distinction relates to a fundamental level; it does not differentiate between various kinds of extrinsic and intrinsic meaning. Tracing and elucidating these various kinds of meaning and explaining their role in musical experience and music education is another important subject of investigation in the philosophy of music education.

3. Feeling and emotion in music

The role of feeling, that other side of musical experience, stands in need of clarification just as much as musical cognition. Few will deny that somehow feeling is central to our engagement in music. However, the nature of feeling in music and the various functions it can perform have been insufficiently understood up to now.

The issue that has been studied most deeply is that of musical expression or musical expressiveness. A number of authors have contributed to a highly sophisticated debate about what we mean by saying that a piece of music is expressive of, say, sadness (Kivy, 1980; Davies, 1994, chaps. 4–6; Levinson, 1990, chaps. 13–14, 1996, chap. 6). However, although this is an intriguing problem, studying it yields little insight into the role of feeling in music. First, it seems that many compositions do not express specific emotions. Second, music can be expressive of only a limited number of emotions, the so-called "garden-variety emotions", to which, for example, anger, grief, and joy belong (cf. Kivy, 1990, p. 175). Moreover, feeling responses to music tend to be played down in writings on expressiveness. For instance, they are considered irrelevant (Kivy, 1989, p. 34) or as merely ingredients of emotion (Levinson, 1996, pp. 112–115). Levinson speaks of "subemotional responses", and "microfeelings", reactions that do not amount to a full experiential component of standard emotions.

A completely opposed view that does much more justice to the centrality of feeling in music is taken by Reimer (1989, pp. 45 ff.; 1992, p. 36) and McMurray (1991, pp. 50–53). For these authors, feeling is the key term, while

emotion is viewed either as a category term (Reimer) or as relevant only to a limited class of feeling situations in music (McMurray). In his schematic outline of feeling Reimer highlights characteristics that have hardly been taken up in the literature about the subject. He emphasizes the endless variety of feelings, the enormous range in breadth, depth, and intensity. He is also one of the few who take a dynamic view of feeling. Feelings change, they develop, they wax and wane, they continuously move towards new climaxes. Reimer's sketch deserves to be worked out further, because these dynamics of musical feeling, these ever-changing subjective responses, seem to account largely for the excitement of musical experience.

Whereas in the past feeling has been considered as a passive aspect of consciousness, more recently the insight has gained ground that, particularly in the arts, feeling plays an active role. This is another issue that should be further elucidated. In my articles on justification and intrinsic meaning I have referred to the work of L. A. Reid (1969, 1980, 1986). He opposes to the artificial division between feeling, cognition and volition. The term *cognitively feeling* is introduced by him in order to emphasize that feeling and cognition are fused in apprehending music. Stokes (1994) points to the views of various theorists who try to overcome the dichotomy between feeling or emotion on the one side and cognition on the other. She argues that (at least) eleven cognitive processes operate in art on the basis of feeling.

Stokes's article is very valuable for giving a survey of various approaches to the issue of feeling in music. However, it is also evident from her contribution that we are only at the beginning of uncovering the complex field of feeling and emotion in music. First, the concepts of feeling and emotion should be defined more clearly. Various authors use *feeling* and *emotion* in different senses, and some do not even consistently distinguish between the two terms. Second, we should examine the diverse claims that have been made about the relation between music and feeling (or emotion), for instance, music as expressing concrete emotions, music as expressing "the forms of feeling" (Langer, 1953, 1957a; Reimer, 1989), music as painting or representing feelings/emotions, music as evoking feeling/emotion, feeling as contributing to musical cognition, feeling as being fused or united with musical cognition, et cetera. We should thoroughly analyze these diverse claims and assess the relevance of the alleged functions of feeling to music.

4. Modes of musical engagement

Another interesting area of research is constituted by the various modes of engaging in music: listening, singing, performing on instruments, conduct-

ing, composing, improvising, arranging, reflecting. The common view is that listening, performing and composing are the most important ways of dealing with music and that in music education our attention should be evenly spread over these three activities. Elliott (1995) attacks this view vigorously. In his view, listening is not to be seen as an independent aim of music education. Rather than being an end in itself, it should be taught and learned in conjunction with artistic music making in general, and performing in particular. Furthering listening as an independent goal leads to the educands becoming passive and distanced consumers of musical objects (1995, p. 99, p. 102). According to Elliott, music is essentially a performing art (p. 57, p. 102). However, Elliott's view is open to several objections. First, the belief that listening as an independent activity inevitably leads to passive and distanced engagement in music is unwarranted. Second, the idea that there is an essence to all musical practices and that this essence is music making, rather than listening, is not argued for. Third, Elliott neglects the advantages of "mere" listening to music. As listeners of music we have a much wider scope than as performers: we can deal with musical works that we will never be able to play; in complex music with many parts (e.g., symphonies) we can enjoy the piece as a whole, whereas as performers we would have to concentrate on a single part; we can come to appreciate a wide range of styles and traditions, whereas we can become competent performers in only a small number of musical traditions.

Nevertheless, Elliott's attack on listening as an independent activity is interesting, because it challenges us to reflect on the relative merits of the various ways of dealing with music. It turns out that little work has been done in investigating the differences and relations between these various activities. The reason for this is, I think, the dominance of the aesthetic view of music. In this view, because listening, composition, and performing are alternative ways of having aesthetic experience, they are fundamentally equal. All of them share the characteristic of concentrating on and responding to the sensuous and structural properties of musical forms. This is an important insight, of course, but it should not divert our attention from the large differences between these and other modes of engaging in music. What are the idiosyncrasies of performing, composing, improvising, listening, and so on? Morever, can we content ourselves with speaking about performing in general? Leading philosophers of music education have neglected the specific status of singing. Neither Reimer, nor Elliott, nor Swanwick has very much to say about singing; in fact, they tend to make no distinction at all between vocal and instrumental forms of performance. In

this respect philosophy of music education can better turn to more practically oriented music educators like Zoltán Kodály (1974, 1983) who have pointed out the virtues of singing, especially with respect to establishing basic musical abilities.

Besides taking account of the differences between various modes of performing, we also have to distinguish between different kinds of listening: between listening as an independent behavior, listening as a part of performing, listening as a part of composing, et cetera. Elliott (1995) suggests that engaging in listening as an independent activity is unnecessary because it can be exercised in conjunction with music making. But listening while performing is very different from listening to music performed by others. In pure listening we can completely devote ourselves to what the music offers us. In performing, on the contrary, listening is not a self-sufficient activity. In this case, listening has a controlling as well as a propelling function. It gives us feed-back about the quality of what we have just performed and provides us with cues as to how to go on. In performance listening is not an independent component but it is intricately related to a number of other subactivities.

Analyzing the specific characteristics and merits of the various modes of dealing with music is a major task for the philosophy of music education. Only when we have a clear conception of the relative merits of these various forms of musical activity, both as such and with respect to their educational potential, it will be possible to create well-balanced music curricula.

Educational issues

Up to now, philosophers of music education have been concerned mainly with explaining music. However, it is only when insights in music are related to insights in education that philosophy of music education can be rightly called a distinct discipline. Besides philosophy of music, philosophy of education is the second pillar of philosophy of music education. However, since philosophers of music education — myself included — generally have a musical background, rather than a background in the philosophy of education, they have relatively little engaged in issues that typically feature in the educational context so far.

1. Education

To begin with, philosophy of music education ought to reflect on the notion of education itself. It seems that philosophers of music education use the

term *education* in a very broad sense, broader than, for instance, the British philosopher R. S. Peters for whom, at least in his earlier work, education mainly concerned the acquisition of propositional knowledge and understanding for its own sake, or the German philosopher of education Wolfgang Brezinka who adheres to a purely instrumental concept of education (see chapter 4). The notion of education as it functions in the philosophy of music education is not restricted in advance to either internal and external aims, nor is it restricted to one specific domain (e.g., the cognitive domain), nor does it pick out particular kinds or procedures of teaching and learning.

On the other hand, there is a sense in which *education* tends to be used in a restrictive way. When talking about *education* philosophers of music education often have in mind only institutionalized music education, that is, situations in which educands are entrusted to the care of professional teachers. But, of course, educational practices are not restricted to music lessons. It seems that parents and other people involved in the upbringing of children can do a lot to further the musical growth of their children. But the nature and potential of informal music education has hardly been clarified up to now. What kinds of non-institutionalized music education are there and how do they differ from institutionalized education?

Another important area to be investigated concerns the conceptual relations between education and notions like training, teaching, instructing, and drilling in music education. Though studies of the relations between these key concepts by philosophers of education (e.g., Kleinig, 1982; Barrow & Milburn, 1990) constitute important sources, their results should not uncritically be applied to music education. For instance, Peters (1966, pp. 33–34) makes a strict distinction between education and training. Whereas education refers to the development of a broad cognitive perspective, training applies to the acquisition of limited skills in relation to a specific end or function. In music education this distinction does not seem to be very helpful. It would suggest that music is to be viewed either as a domain of propositional knowledge *about* music or as a skill. Neither qualification does justice to the nature of music as explained by Elliott (1995, pp. 53 ff.). Engagement in music, Elliott convincingly argues, is a matter knowledge-in-action. Listening and music making are highly intelligent activities but the knowledge employed in them differs from *knowledge that*. The knowledge is in our actions, it cannot be separated from the activity itself. But if the distinction Peters makes between education and training is not suitable for music education, how then should we conceive the difference between the

notions of education and training? To what extent is music education a matter of training?

2. Learning and teaching

Two important notions philosophers of music education need to elaborate are those of learning and teaching. First, we need more insight into the various forms of teaching and learning. Which types of teaching and learning can be distinguished in music education and which are most typical? Which methods are appropriate for which type of musical learning?

Another question is about the sphere of power of the music educator. What precisely can the music educator teach and what is beyond his reach? For example, to what extent can one teach children to become sensitive listeners? Isn't the degree of refinement a child will be able to reach largely a matter of talent? Perhaps the most important abilities cannot be taught but can be stimulated only indirectly by creating favorable conditions. But this is something that should be investigated rather than left to common-sense belief. To be sure, only the conceptual aspects of such questions about teaching and learning music can be meaningfully addressed by philosophical investigation. Philosophers of music education should be cautious not to address empirical questions that are beyond their competence.

3. Indoctrination

What should teachers try to influence and what should they leave to the pupils themselves? Reimer (1989) holds that music educators should concentrate on the objective part of aesthetic experience, that is, perception; they should not try to influence the subjective realm of aesthetic reaction (pp. 109–110). Can such a strict division be defended? Can it really be maintained that any talk suggestive of reactions that might be appropriate to a certain piece of music is objectionable? Isn't it possible to expand the possible range of pupils's reactions to music without forcing these into a specific direction? These questions call for an examination of the concept of indoctrination in relation to music education. (For an introduction into the concept of indoctrination see: Kleinig, 1982, pp. 54–68; and Barrow & Milburn, 1990, pp. 148–151.) Which kinds of interferences by the music educator must count as indoctrinatory and which ones are, on the contrary, desirable or even necessary in order to stimulate musical growth?

4. The curriculum

This is also a major area of investigation. Which model of the curriculum is most suitable for teaching and learning music? Elliott has made a beginning with investigating this question. He opposes to adopting the structure-of-the-discipline approach in music education (1995, pp. 243 ff.). According to Elliott, this approach reduces disciplines to complexes of conceptual relations. It results in a conception of music as a domain of conceptual knowledge about music instead of a conception which centers on musical practices. The approach Elliott opts for is that of the curriculum-as-practicum (1995, pp. 269 ff.). The practicum is set up as an approximation of authentic music cultures. It tries to simulate the ways in which listening and making music are carried out by artistic musical practitioners. In this way, Elliott holds, learning is contextualized and situated. The curriculum-as-practice is modelled on the mentor-apprentice model of teaching and learning.

Aspin (1996, pp. 53–54) criticizes this conception. He objects that the transactions and interactions involved in teaching are much more complex that those accounted for by the trade-craft model implied by the apprenticeship model. According to him, the trade-craft model relates to a set of relatively closed skills and envisages a finite *terminus ad quem*, whereas in education and schooling the way forward is much less constrained and endings hardly ever are so relatively closed. Aspin believes that approaches like learning how to learn, learning how to research and collaborative learning are alternatives for Elliott's apprenticeship model, but he does not elaborate on this. This beginning of a debate about conceptions of music curricula deserves to be continued, expanded, and refined. The specific characteristics of the various models of the music curriculum need to be elucidated and their pros and cons evaluated.

5. The musically educated person

Perhaps, the pivotal question to be asked in the philosophy of music education is: What is it to be a musically educated person? However, this question has not occupied a place as central as one might expect in the discipline. The philosophies of Reimer (1989) and Elliott (1995) do not directly address it. Departing from the question what music is, both of them try to explain what they see as full engagement in music. For Reimer full engagement means aesthetic experience, for Elliott it means being a "reflective practitioner". Music education in their view should enhance the quality of this engagement. However, it seems that being a musically educated person entails

more than being capable of having musico-aesthetic experiences or being a competent practitioner in one or more musical practices, however crucial these features may be. Other dimensions include being able to judge openly and critically various musical achievements, having a keen eye for the uses and misuses of music in our society, having developed a personal view of music and having integrated this in a broader view of the arts, society, and human life as a whole. Thus, the various characteristics of the musically educated person is a further topic of inquiry.

6. Aims

The subject of the educated person naturally leads us the question of aims in music education. Much clarification remains to be done in this field. Discourse about aims often lacks transparency because of the differences in terminology used and the absence of distinctions between various kinds of aims — intermediary goals (e.g., reading skills and solfeggio) and final goals (musicianship, listenership), global and more specific aims, internal and external aims. By analyzing and categorizing aims philosophers of music education can do much to elucidate discussions about this subject. Furthermore, they can point out tensions and conflicts between various aims set in educational practices and discourse. At a deeper level, uncovering the fundamental presuppositions underlying aims statements is also typically a task for the philosopher of music education. For instance, he can analyze and evaluate the conceptions of the good involved.

7. Justification

Issues of justification are closely related to those of aims; answers to both types of questions presuppose a view of the value of music. In my article on the justification of a place for music in general education I could not possibly discuss all the arguments that have been given in favour of music education. Much further work with respect to tracing, clarifying, and evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the many arguments can be done. In view of the poor quality of much argumentation I doubt, though, whether treating this subject matter exhaustively is worthwhile. Concentrating on the most promising arguments seems to be the most efficient way to deal with this area.

The more fundamental philosophical questions concern the nature of the considerations that can possibly qualify as reasons and what arguments can qualify as sufficient justification for including music education in the school

curriculum. If we look at the various attempts to justify music education, it becomes clear that authors conceive their tasks in different ways. Some theorists try to give as many reasons as possible. They come up with heterogeneous lists of values furthered by music education, many of which are by no means specifically related to music (e.g., social skills, self-esteem, relaxation). Another group of theorists concentrates on what they see as the essence of engaging in music. For them, the value of musical engagement is to be found here, and other, minor reasons seem to be irrelevant. But within this group there are also large differences in what authors set out to do. Some go rather long ways to demonstrate that music has the envisaged value. Thus, for instance, Reimer (1989) argues that music yields a special kind of insight. Others content themselves with pointing out that music is in accordance with general goals in life like happiness or self-realization. Still others simply refer to the intrinsic value of musical experience. Thus, the question to be asked here is what criteria should be met for an argumentation to be a sufficient justification.

8. Development

Besides educational aims and justification, development is a third topic from the philosophy of education I have dealt with in my dissertation. I have concentrated on development in its more specific sense of qualitative (rather than quantitative) development. This type of musical development, which is most markedly addressed by stage theories, calls for much more investigation. The theories I have discussed give a limited understanding of musical development. They cover only a few aspects and do not offer insights into the differences between various dimensions, like singing, listening, composing, and judging. Can further developmental patterns be reconstructed offering novel insights into the complex phenomenon of musical development?

Another question is whether musical development constitutes improvement. Can the transition from earlier to later stages as delineated in developmental theories be said to constitute progress in an evaluative sense? In chapter 3 I have argued that the development of musical understanding as envisaged by the three theories under discussion is favorable in that it makes possible richer (in the sense of more profound) experience. However, as Gardner et al. (1990, pp. 89–93) point out, there are also developments that are not to be judged positively. For example, when children proceed from a preconventional to a conventional level of understanding much of the charm, the originality and the flair children display in their musical com-

positions gets lost. And when they go over to the postconventional stage they become self-critical, which can lead to their stopping to compose or improvise altogether. Some of such developments, for instance, the loss of spontaneity, may appear inevitable and beyond the control of educators. Other developments, such as an over-critical stance towards one's own musical products, may be countered, however. Music education, then, is not merely a matter of following and conforming to — let alone, simply furthering — the course of musical development. Some developments should be stimulated and enhanced, but other ones should be curbed or even blocked. Studying the positive and negative characteristics of developments in the musical domains and reflecting on the ways music educators can deal with these are another important area of investigation for philosophers of music education.

A further interesting issue concerns the relation between musical development and developments in other domains. Are there, for instance, developments in the cognitive domain that also determine the course of musical development? In the sixties and the seventies a number of studies were carried out in order to find out whether the pre-operational and the concrete-operational stages defined by Jean Piaget could also be traced in the musical domain. Marilyn Pflederer and others designed tasks which they held to be musical equivalents of the Piagetian conservation tasks and examined how children of various ages performed on them. (For a review and a critical evaluation of this research, see Hargreaves, 1986, pp. 43–48.) More interesting than these studies is the comparison David Hargreaves and Maurice Galton (1992) have made between drawing, writing, and various dimensions of musical engagement. Though their attempt remains sketchy, this is an intriguing field of investigation that might be elaborated and deepened much more. For example, it would be interesting to inquire into the relations between Swanwick's theory of musical development and Michael Parsons' theory of development in the arts (Parsons, 1987). Both Swanwick and Parsons define stages in which successively sensuous properties (sound, color), expression, form, and metacognition play a dominant role.

However, a glance at the theories of Swanwick and Parsons suffices to see how much more elaborated the latter's work is. Whereas Swanwick's descriptions of the characteristics of his stages cover only a few paragraphs, Parsons devotes a whole book to elucidating the aesthetic and psychological dimensions of the various stages of the development of artistic judgment. Musical development and its implications for music education stand in need

of much more philosophical reflection, but as long as well-elaborated developmental theories are lacking in the musical domain, our opportunities for this must remain limited.

Further issues

1. Music and the other arts

Should music be taught as a separate subject at school or in conjunction with the other arts? With respect to this question Reimer and Elliott have again taken opposed positions. Reimer (1989, pp. 226–240) argues for a multi-arts approach. First, in his view, an alliance between music and its sister arts is necessary in order to strengthen the position of music education. He holds that it cannot be argued that music is more valuable or more appropriate for education than the other arts. If the music education profession is to rise above a special interest group, it should form a coalition with the other arts. As an isolated subject music holds a vulnerable position, but the importance of the arts as a whole cannot be neglected. Reimer thinks that there will be more time for music when it is taught as a part of a solid multi-arts curriculum than when it tries to survive as a separate curriculum subject.

Besides giving strategic reasons for organizing music education as a part of arts education, Reimer also believes that multi-arts education leads to the educand's acquiring a better understanding of music and the other arts. It can (1) make each art clearer by showing its uniqueness as contrasted with the others, (2) clarify the underlying principles which make all the arts members of the same family, and (3) give a broad view of each art as an individual in a family and of the family of art as one among many.

However, Reimer does not advocate integrating the arts. On the contrary, he emphasizes that each art should be taken as autonomous in relation to the others. Educands should become sensitive to the differences between the various art forms. Coming to experience the specific nature of the diverse arts is for Reimer an indispensable condition for arriving at a deeper understanding both of the uniqueness the various arts and of their fundamental kinship.

Elliott (1995, pp. 248–250) criticizes multi-arts education on various grounds. In contrast to Reimer he believes it seriously weakens the position of music education. Music educators will be replaced by multi-arts educators and music education will be removed from the program as an independent part of the curriculum.

Elliott also rejects the philosophical assumptions underlying multi-arts approaches. He seriously doubts whether there is any such general capacity as aesthetic sensitivity, which is seen as crucial to engagement in all the arts. Furthermore, he argues that merely becoming aware of the elements of one kind of artistic product does not yield an understanding of other kinds of artistic products, let alone an understanding of other artistic practices. The reason for this is, according to Elliott, that each art is a specific kind of human practice that rests upon an independent form of situated thinking and knowing. Hence, each kind of artistic cognition needs to be taught in its own context.

Several questions emerge from these opposed views that call for further inquiry. First, there are strategic questions. Is music education viable if taught as a separate subject? Does music education have a stronger position as a part of arts education than as a separate subject? Next, there are questions about how arts education is most efficiently taught. Is the educand's understanding of the various arts best furthered by teaching them in combination or as separate subjects? If one takes the first option, should the arts be opposed to each other or should they be integrated? Do so-called "hybrid" art forms — art forms that combine materials from more than one art (e.g., opera) — call for a different approach than pure art forms?

Underlying these questions are issues belonging to the philosophy of art. How do the arts relate? What are — in the context of music education — the most significant correspondences and differences? Can our understanding of one art further our understanding of other ones and, if so, in what sense? How are the various hybrid art forms to be conceptualized: (1) as mixtures in which the various components are juxtaposed, (2) as syntheses in which the combined arts loose their original identities, or (3) as transformations in which one "host art" retains its primary character but the others are modified (cf. Levinson, 1990, pp. 26–36; Davies, 1994, pp. 114–120; Reimer, 1989, p. 231)?

2. *The content of music education*

In my dissertation I have not dealt with questions about the content of music education. Which modes of engaging in music (see above) should be dominant in music education? Which musical traditions should feature in it? Which genres should be included? Which aspects of musical works should be emphasized? All these are important questions that can be approached from a philosophical angle. In particular, the question which musical traditions to include in the curriculum is a difficult one.

A few decades ago the question which music to teach at school seemed a relatively easy one. When Kodály (1974, pp. 119–125, 141–142, 149) urged that children be introduced to good music, there was no doubt what he meant: traditional folk music and classical music — including contemporary serious music. Like other music educators of his time, he believed popular music (in the broad sense of the term) would have a damaging influence on the human soul. Today we are less confident in making distinctions between good and bad types of music. Jazz and popular genres have been admitted to the music curriculum and in many classrooms classical traditions have been completely overshadowed by pop music. Bowman suggests that the judgement that popular music is inferior is arrived at in an invalid way, namely, by assessing its quality in terms of criteria belonging to the domain of classical music. "Art music's musical superiority is maintained by declaring its particular values universal and ultimate and by expropriating 'serious' music's perspective to all musical styles" (Bowman, 1994, pp. 57–58). Moreover, Vulliamy (mentioned in Bowman, 1994, pp. 56–57) points out that pop music is not one homogeneous field. There are many kinds of pop music; some of these may be simple or dictated by commercial principles, but others are much more subtle and original.

The picture, then, would seem to be that there are various types of music, each with their own criteria for quality. How is music education to cope with this situation? Can music educators do no more than trying to incorporate as much of the dominating musical traditions as they can, intuitively striking a balance in the attention given to each of them? Or is it possible to formulate more or less objective metacriteria (e.g., complexity, durability) that allow us to argue that particular traditions should have priority in music education?

3. Multicultural music education

Questions about the content of music education become even more complex from a multicultural perspective. It turns out that the choice to be made between musical traditions is much greater than between folk traditions, serious music, jazz, and popular music that form the main threads of contemporary Western culture. What about the music of minority groups in our society? Moreover, what role should the music of peoples from other continents play in contemporary music education?

The issue of multiculturalism goes much deeper than the question which kinds of music one should select for teaching. Multicultural music education is not a matter of simply including a variety of world musics into the cur-

riculum. It urges us to rethink the status, the aims, and the design of music education in contemporary society. First of all, what perspective of multiculturalism in general and multiculturalism in music does one take? What position does one choose between the extremes of trying completely to preserve the unicity of various cultural traditions and promoting full integration of these into a common culture (cf. Schippers, 1996, pp. 19–20)? Should every member of a multicultural society thoroughly study other cultural groups? Or would it suffice if one learns to respect and be tolerant towards other traditions? These issues have important implications for educational practice, because they lead to the question whether a general program of music education can be uphold any longer in our schools. Why, for instance, should someone of Arab origin who is entirely satisfied with the music of his own culture participate in a music program in which Western music occupies a major place? Shouldn't we allow each cultural group to focus on its own musical traditions?

The question is, in other words: do we mean by multiculturalism that each cultural group should be given full opportunity to promote its own musical practices or that everyone should study a broad variety of musical traditions? Even if one takes the latter view, one cannot help giving precedence to some musical traditions over others. Apart from the fact that it is simply impossible to include every tradition in music education, we have to face the dilemma between breadth and depth. Although some authors are optimistic about "polymusicality", that is, the ability to perform, appreciate, and listen intelligently to many types of music (cf. Anderson & Shehan Campbell, 1989, p. 4), it seems clear that most people can at best attain a deep understanding of only a few musical traditions. Arriving at a deep understanding as a performer, a listener, or a composer takes a lot of practice and experience. Therefore, in order to avoid shallowness, it is desirable that educands concentrate on one or a few musical traditions. The ideal of polymusicality notwithstanding, choices with regard to the breadth and the depth of musical understanding and musical competence cannot be avoided. Can we formulate criteria for such choices? For instance, are there rational grounds for deciding which musical traditions to include into the curriculum and which to leave out? Should we pay less attention to those cultural traditions that are not present in our multicultural society? Or should we formulate purely musical criteria for deciding which traditions deserve most attention? If so, what could these criteria be?

The answers depend on the view one takes of music as a multicultural practice. There seem to be two basic views: According to one, music can be a

means of coming to understand and respect people of other cultures. By getting acquainted to musics of other cultures we develop an understanding of and sensitivity towards peoples from a broad spectrum of ethnic backgrounds (Anderson & Shehan Campbell, 1989, p. 1). The second view focusses on the quality of musical activities themselves. According to this view, teaching music of other cultures can enhance the pupils' engagement with music in several ways. First, it is seen as expanding the pupils' possibilities to have rich musical experiences. Second, multicultural music education enhances our understanding of music as a manifold practice; by coming to know musics of other cultures we develop "the understanding that there are many different but equally valid forms of musical and artistic expression" (Anderson & Shehan Campbell, 1989, p. 1). Third, teaching musics of many traditions is claimed to reinforce our knowledge of the musical elements — melody, rhythm, form, and so on (Anderson & Shehan Campbell, 1989, p. ix).

With these distinctions I only mean to give an indication of how philosophers of music education might proceed if they want to disentangle the jumble of arguments that have been given for multicultural music education. Again, the task of philosophy of music education is to distinguish, analyze, and evaluate the different positions taken on the various issues and to investigate criteria or procedures that can help decide questions, such as, which musical traditions to include into music curricula. We will also have to critically examine the foundations, or fundamental presuppositions, underlying the various views. For instance, it may be asked whether views that promote multicultural music education as a way of enriching our opportunities for musical experience aren't in fact guided by an idea that typically belongs to Western culture: the idea that the musical domain can be separated from other domains of life and that music is to be pursued for its own sake?

Multicultural perspectives of music — as well as historical ones — make the philosopher of music education aware of the dangers of making general claims. When statements are made about *the* nature of musical experience or *the* characteristics of musical learning, we should always ask which musical practices are meant. For instance, many views of *the* nature of musical form are based upon investigations of classical music. To be sure, we should continue intensively to study particular traditions. This seems to me to be the only way towards acquiring a deep understanding of the phenomenon of music. A next step should be, however, to see whether the findings can be applied to other musical traditions. Too often this second step is ignored.

It is our duty to do justice to the differences between musical traditions, but even so the questions which universals there are in music and whether these may lead to a universal basis for music education remain intriguing. Moreover, they seem crucial in relation to the question raised above — whether a general program of music education can be uphold in a multicultural society. Reimer (1996) tries to develop a view of music that is valid for all cultures. But even if such a universal view of all musics can be upheld, this does not automatically provide us with a sufficient basis for a multicultural practice of music education; from the (alleged) fact that all musics are in some fundamental respects the same it does not follow that we should teach a broad variety of them. Additional reasons should be given, if we want to justify a music education practice in which children are introduced into various musical cultures, rather than profoundly initiated into one.

In the foregoing I have reviewed a number of major themes in the philosophy of music education. No doubt, this is a personal selection. The survey could be extended in many directions, but even so it indicates that philosophy of music education has a large agenda. It is a young discipline in which immature or rudimentary views exist with respect to many basic issues. However, this disadvantage can also be seen as a plus-point: the field offers the philosopher numerous challenging topics for inquiry into which many new insights are to be gained. In contrast to other branches of philosophy in which the main issues have been exhaustively discussed, philosophy of music education offers us a large array of captivating questions calling for further and more profound investigation.

Samenvatting

Dit proefschrift behandelt een aantal kernthema's op het nog jonge onderzoeksgebied dat in Noord-Amerika wordt aangeduid als *philosophy of music education*. Hoewel deze benaming in principe zowel betrekking kan hebben op de filosofie van de muzikale opvoeding als op de filosofie van het muziekonderwijs, heeft men zich tot nog toe hoofdzakelijk bezig gehouden met het laatste. Dat *philosophy of music education* een zelfstandige discipline is geworden, is vooral te danken aan Bennett Reimer. In *A Philosophy of Music Education* (1970) werkt hij een specifieke muziekfilosofische positie uit, welke hij zelf *Absolute Expressionism* noemt. Op grond hiervan bepaalt hij vervolgens de doelen en opzet van het muziekonderwijs. Terwijl Reimers gedachtengoed jarenlang het rijk alleen had, zijn de laatste jaren diverse auteurs op de voorgrond getreden die zijn opvattingen bekritiseren en pleiten voor alternatieve zienswijzen en benaderingen. Dit culmineerde in 1995 in het verschijnen van David Elliotts *Music Matters: A New Philosophy of Music Education*. Elliott zet zich radicaal af tegen Reimers esthetische opvatting van muziek en muziekonderwijs, en zet er een visie tegenover die uitgaat van muziek als praktijk.

Tot dusver is *philosophy of music education* vooral opgevat als het ontwikkelen van inhoudelijke visies op de aard en waarde van muziek en, van hier uit, op de doelen en de inrichting van het muziekonderwijs. In deze dissertatie is daarentegen gekozen voor een analytische benadering. In plaats van het uitdragen van een specifieke inhoudelijke visie, streeft deze benadering naar een verheldering van verscheidene facetten van de muziekpedagogiek: diverse praktijken van muzikale opvoeding en muziekonderwijs, praktische theorieën dienaangaande, wetenschappelijke theorieën en inhoudelijke filosofische visies. Zo'n verheldering kan op twee niveaus plaatsvinden: (1) het materiële niveau van concrete opvattingen, claims, argumenten, etcetera, die in pedagogische praktijken en theorieën vigeren; en (2) het niveau van de grondslagen, dat betrekking heeft op de conceptuele kaders en de fundamentele vooronderstellingen die ten grondslag liggen aan dit denken en handelen. Verheldering kan bestaan in (a) het analyseren van, (b) het evalueren van, en (c) het aandragen van alternatieven voor de opvattingen, argumenten, conceptualiseringen en fundamentele presupposities in kwestie.

In de eerste studie komt de rechtvaardiging van muziekonderwijs aan de orde. Op welke gronden kan men een plaats voor muziek in het algemene onderwijs claimen? Eerst maak ik een onderscheid tussen twee categorieën van argumenten. Argumenten behorende tot de eerste categorie baseren zich op aspecten die constitutief zijn voor muziek; de waarde van muzikale activiteiten is direct verbonden met wat men ziet als de kern van de muziek. Argumenten van de tweede categorie richten zich niet op de aard van de muziek maar op de positieve externe gevolgen van muziekonderwijs, onder meer voor de ontwikkeling van de cognitie, senso-motorische vaardigheden, persoonlijkheid, houding en fysieke vaardigheden. Argumenten van deze categorie leggen slechts een beperkt gewicht in de schaal. Weinig van de vermoede positieve gevolgen zijn aangetoond, en de vraag in hoeverre muziek vergeleken met andere bezigheden daadwerkelijk een efficiënt middel is om de beoogde effecten te bereiken is nauwelijks aan de orde geweest. Belangrijker nog is het principiële argument dat "niet-muzikale" argumenten niet leiden tot de rechtvaardiging van een muziekcurriculum dat volwaardig is vanuit een muzikaal oogpunt. Ze kunnen immers enkel die activiteiten rechtvaardigen welke leiden tot het muziekexterne effect in kwestie.

Vervolgens worden drie typen van argumenten behandeld die tot de eerste categorie behoren. Het eerste type argument appelleert aan het ideaal van de alzijdig ontwikkelde persoon. Muziek wordt opgevat als een apart deel van de werkelijkheid. Een opvoeding waarin men geen aandacht schenkt aan dit speciale domein laat specifieke capaciteiten van de mens onbenut. Een opvoeding die streeft naar een zo volledig mogelijke ontplooiing van het individu dient ook de voor muziek kenmerkende vermogens tot ontwikkeling te brengen. Binnen dit type argumentatie zijn een viertal versies te onderscheiden naar gelang van datgene wat men als constitutief voor het muzikale domein beschouwt: een specifieke houding, een unieke vorm van cognitie, een speciale cultivering van het gevoel of een specifieke holistische ervaring. Dit eerste type argument schiet tekort: het enkele feit dat een domein een aparte plaats inneemt in het menselijk bestaan, kan nooit een voldoende reden zijn het te cultiveren. Het is pas wenselijk zo'n domein te ontplooien, als het een duidelijke positieve waarde heeft. Het argument is onvoldoende, omdat niet wordt aangegeven waarin deze specifieke waarde is gelegen.

Volgens het tweede type argument brengt de omgang met muziek een specifiek soort inzicht met zich mee. De meest uitgewerkte en invloedrijke positie die deze claim verdedigt, is die van S.K. Langer (1953, 1957a, 1957b).

Volgens Langer onthult muziek de *forms of feeling*. Aangezien muzikale vormen meer congruent zijn met de structuren van de gevoelens dan die van de taal, kan muziek een meer gedetailleerd en waarachtig inzicht geven in de aard van gevoelens dan de taal. Deze opvatting levert echter verschillende problemen op: het is niet duidelijk wat precies muziek geacht wordt te verhelderen (het gevoelsleven in het algemeen, specifieke gevoelens of bepaalde principes die eraan ten grondslag liggen); welke aspecten van muzikale vormen zouden kunnen corresponderen met gevoelsvormen wordt niet uitgelegd; en het is twijfelachtig of men een dieper inzicht kan krijgen in de aard van gevoelens indien men enkel wordt geconfronteerd met hun dynamische vormen. Het belangrijkste bezwaar is echter dat Langer uit het inzicht dat er een gelijkenis bestaat tussen vormen van muzikale werken en gevoelsvormen meent te kunnen afleiden dat de eerste de laatste verhelderen. Deze conclusie volgt uiteraard niet en wordt ook verder niet aannemelijk gemaakt.

Het derde type argument beroept zich op de intrinsieke waarde van de muzikale ervaring. Hoewel dit type argument op het eerste gezicht een grote plausibiliteit lijkt te hebben, kent het ook een probleem: men zou aannemelijk moeten maken dat de intrinsieke waarde van muziek uitstijgt boven die van andere bezigheden. Het blijkt echter principieel onmogelijk dit te doen langs discursieve weg. De intrinsieke waarde van de muzikale ervaring laat zich niet in woorden vatten maar is slechts gegeven in de ervaring zelf. Daarom laat de vraag of de intrinsieke waarde van de muzikale ervaring voldoende groot is om muziek op te nemen in het curriculum zich niet via een sluitende argumentatie beslissen maar slechts via intersubjectieve overeenstemming op basis van onze ervaringen met muziek. Een interessant gegeven in dit verband is dat goed muziekonderwijs bijdraagt aan zijn eigen legitimatie: door zorg te dragen voor een verbreding en een verdieping van de muzikale ervaring bewerkstelligt het dat mensen doordrongen raken van de intrinsieke waarde van muziek, waardoor ze weer eerder de wenselijkheid van muziekonderwijs zullen beamen.

De conclusie is dat geen van de drie besproken typen argumenten een sluitende argumentatie levert voor het belang van muziek, maar dat elk type om een verschillende reden faalt. Het eerste type schiet tekort omdat men verzuimt de bijzondere waarde van muziek te identificeren en te beargumenteren. Het tweede type blijft in gebreke daar men er niet in slaagt de claim dat muziek een dieper inzicht in ons bestaan bewerkstelligt, aannemelijk te maken. Het derde type argument slaagt daarentegen niet, omdat de intrinsieke waarde van de muzikale ervaring zich principieel niet laat

beredeneren. In dit laatste geval is in tegenstelling tot de eerste twee typen argumenten geen sprake van onzorgvuldig argumenteren. Daarom is het verdedigbaar als we de kwestie of de intrinsieke waarde van de muzikale ervaring van een zodanige aard is dat muziek in aanmerking zou moeten komen voor een plaats in het curriculum, laten afhangen van intersubjectieve consensus.

De tweede studie handelt over betekenis in de muziek. Muzikale betekenis wordt in de literatuur vrijwel altijd gekenmerkt aan de hand van het model van betekenis dat typerend is voor taal. Kenmerkend voor dit type betekenis, hier aangeduid met de term *extrinsieke betekenis*, is dat (1) de betekenis tot stand komt doordat de betekenisdrager de aandacht vestigt op iets buiten zichzelf en (2) de betekenis niet afhangt van de precieze vorm van de betekenisdrager. De betekenisvorm die het meest karakteristiek is voor muziek is echter van een geheel andere aard: deze zogenaamde *intrinsieke betekenis* (1) is inherent aan de betekenisdrager en (2) hangt op cruciale wijze af van de specifieke vorm ervan. Muziek heeft primair betekenis in zichzelf; de muzikale vorm in al zijn aspecten en details is constitutief voor de betekenis die een muzikaal werk voor ons heeft. Naast deze intrinsieke betekenis kan muziek ook extrinsieke betekenis hebben, maar deze is secundair.

Intrinsieke betekenis kan nader worden verhelderd via het werk van L.A. Reid (1969, 1980), wiens notie van *meaning-embodied* op belangrijke punten overeenkomt met die van intrinsieke betekenis. Hij licht kenmerken toe als onmiddellijkheid, het uniek verbonden zijn van de betekenis met de vorm, en de gebrekkige verwoordbaarheid. Belangrijker nog is dat Reid duidelijk maakt dat *feeling* een cruciale factor is in het vatten van de muzikale betekenis. In aansluiting op Reid kan worden gesteld dat de intrinsieke betekenis van een muzikaal werk bepaald wordt door de wijze waarop we de zijn vorm cognitief en gevoelsmatig kunnen beleven.

Theoretici als Coker (1972), Meyer (1956) en Nattiez (1990) erkennen ook het bestaan van betekenis die verbonden is met de specifieke vorm van de muziek, maar houden daarbij vast aan het extrinsieke model van betekenis. Hun concepties van deze vormgebonden betekenis zijn echter geen adequaat alternatief voor de idee van intrinsieke betekenis, aangezien ze onvoldoende duidelijk aspecten van de muzikale vorm onderscheiden van aspecten van muzikale betekenis en ze cruciale aspecten van de muzikale betekenis negeren.

Hoewel intrinsieke muzikale betekenis nauw verbonden is met de muzikale beleving, dient zij zorgvuldig te worden onderscheiden van de psychologische processen die zich in ons voordoen bij de omgang met muziek. Betekenis en psychologische processen behoren tot verschillende categorieën, en kunnen derhalve niet worden gelijkgesteld. Evenmin kan uit de verbondenheid tussen muzikale betekenis en muzikale ervaring worden geconcludeerd dat muzikale betekenis louter subjectief is. De specifieke muzikale vorm van een werk in combinatie met het bestaan van gedeelde systemen van normen voor het interpreteren ervan waarborgt een aanzienlijke mate van collectief gedeelde betekenis, waarover discussie op grond van intersubjectieve criteria mogelijk is.

Een laatste kenmerk van intrinsieke muzikale betekenis is dat zij inhoudelijk grotendeels onzegbaar is. Dit kan echter geen reden zijn deze vorm van betekenis te negeren. Een consequentie van de *ineffability* van intrinsieke muzikale betekenis is dat de directe muzikale ervaring (en niet het spreken over muziek) centraal moet staan in het muziekonderwijs. Alleen op deze wijze kan de opvoedeling de volle rijkdom van deze betekenis deelachtig worden. Verder kan vormanalyse indirect bijdragen aan het ontdekken van intrinsieke betekenis.

De derde studie behandelt stadiumtheorieën over muzikale ontwikkeling. Allereerst zet ik, mij baserend op het werk van Van Haaften e.a. (1986, 1997), een theoretisch kader uiteen voor de verheldering van ontwikkelingstheorieën. Het ontwikkelingsbegrip en de verschillende aspecten van theorievorming over ontwikkeling worden aldus uiteengezet.

Vervolgens analyseer ik drie theorieën die verschillende stadia onderscheiden in de muzikale ontwikkeling. Gardner (1973) onderscheidt twee stadia in de ontwikkeling van de *making, perceiving* en *feeling systems* in de kunsten: een "pre-symbolisch" een "symbolisch" stadium. Aangezien in de door Gardner geschetste muzikale ontwikkeling geen sprake is van een symbolische functie kunnen de stadia beter worden geherformuleerd als gekenmerkt door respectievelijk (1) vrije exploratie van het medium; (2) internalisatie van het muzikale systeem. Voorts geven Gardners beschrijvingen aanleiding tot het definiëren van een derde stadium: na het ongereflecteerde internaliseren van het muzikale systeem volgt een periode van bewustwording en het aannemen van een meer afstandelijke, abstraherende houding.

Het tweede ontwikkelingsmodel, naar voren gebracht door Gardner, Phelps en Wolf (1990), kent eveneens drie stadia. Deze drie stadia betreffen

de ontwikkeling van de creativiteit in "symbolische domeinen", waartoe ook het muzikale domein wordt gerekend. De stadiumopeenvolging bestaat uit een preconventioneel, een conventioneel en een postconventioneel stadium.

De derde ontwikkelingstheorie richt zich uitsluitend op het muzikale domein. Swanwick en Tillman (1986, 1988) onderscheiden vier stadia in de ontwikkeling van het muzikaal begrip, waarin achtereenvolgens het muzikale materiaal, de expressie, de vorm en metacognitie centraal staan. Elk stadium kent twee modi, die respectievelijk voor een meer subjectieve en een meer objectieve (of intersubjectieve) benadering staan. Aldus vatten Swanwick en Tillman de ontwikkeling op als een spiraalbeweging die een verticale beweging naar hogere stadia combineert met een horizontale pendelbeweging tussen subjectieve en objectieve modi.

Alle drie de stadiumtheorieën kunnen worden opgevat als handelend over de ontwikkeling van het muzikaal begrip, maar dit betekent niet dat ze eenvoudigweg naast elkaar kunnen worden gelegd. Elke theorie behandelt een ander aspect van het muzikaal begrip. Niettemin vertonen de drie theorieën interessante overeenkomsten die schematisch kunnen worden weergegeven.

Evaluatieve claims — claims dat latere stadia een verbetering inhouden ten opzichte van hun voorgangers — kunnen met betrekking tot alle drie de ontwikkelingsmodellen worden verdedigd. Voor alle drie de modellen geldt dat een later stadium een hoger niveau van muzikaal begrip vertegenwoordigt dan zijn voorganger, hetgeen een rijkere muzikale ervaring mogelijk maakt.

Theorieën over muzikale ontwikkeling zijn van groot belang voor het muziekonderwijs, omdat men eruit kan afleiden welke leerstof geschikt is voor de opeenvolgende leeftijdscategorieën. Twee typen van geschikte leerstof kunnen worden onderscheiden: leerstof die overeenkomt met het actuele ontwikkelingsstadium waarin de leerling zich bevindt en leerstof die anticipeert op het eerstvolgende ontwikkelingsstadium. Het eerste type is gericht op een kwantitatieve toename van het muzikaal begrip, het tweede type beoogt de verwerving van muzikaal begrip dat kwalitatief verschilt van het begrip dat tot dusver verworven is. Het stimuleren van de muzikale ontwikkeling dient niet zozeer te worden opgevat als het trachten te versnellen van de ontwikkeling maar veeleer als het waarborgen van de voortgang van de muzikale ontwikkeling en van een zo soepel mogelijke verwerving van nieuwe vormen van muzikaal begrip.

In de vierde studie staat het doelbegrip in de muzikale opvoeding en het muziekonderwijs centraal. Ter oriëntatie op het doelbegrip worden de radicaal verschillende visies van de wijsgerig pedagogen W. Brezinka (1993, 1994) en R. S. Peters (1959, 1966, 1973a) beschreven. Uit de tegenoverstelling komen twee kwesties naar voren die vervolgens worden getraceerd in het werk van vooraanstaande *philosophers of music education.*

De eerste kwestie betreft het onderscheid tussen interne en externe doelopvattingen. In eerste instantie lijken Reimer (1989) en Elliott (1995) verschillende perspectieven te kiezen. Reimer verdedigt een interne kijk, wanneer hij stelt dat het doel van muziekonderwijs gelegen is in het tot ontwikkeling brengen van het vermogen muziek te ervaren en te creëren. Elliott valt deze positie aan door te argumenteren dat muziek een praktisch (en dus extern) doel heeft: het bereiken van zelfgroei, zelfbegrip en vreugde. Bij nader inzien blijken de zaken echter ingewikkelder te liggen. Elliott komt tot een interne doelbepaling, als hij beweert dat muzikale activiteiten "all are worth doing for the doing itself". Reimer op zijn beurt refereert aan een extern doel door te stellen dat muziek een middel is om tot zelfbegrip te komen. Voor beide auteurs geldt dat ze zowel interne als externe doelconcepties hanteren zonder deze duidelijk aan elkaar te relateren.

De tweede kwestie betreft het verschil tussen empirische en conceptuele kwesties. In het overzicht dat Reimer (1989) geeft van de relaties tussen muzikale activiteiten worden de beiden soorten kwesties onvoldoende uit elkaar gehouden, hetgeen tot verwarringen leidt. Reimer komt tot de volgende indeling: (1) *ends behaviors*: *perceiving* en *reacting*; (2) *means behaviors*: *creating, conceptualizing, analyzing* en *evaluating*; en (3) *outcome behavior*: *valuing*. Nadere analyse toont aan dat er tussen *creating* (en ook *listening*) enerzijds en *perceiving* en *reacting* anderzijds geen (empirische) middel-doelrelatie bestaat maar een logisch-conceptuele. Ook Reimers opvatting van *valuing* wordt bekritiseerd, omdat zij geen recht doet aan de verbondenheid van *valuing* met *perceiving* en *reacting*. Geconcludeerd wordt dat Reimers indeling van *perceiving, reacting, creating, listening* en *valuing* in verschillende categorieën een vertekend beeld geeft van de relatie tussen deze activiteiten. Het betreft hier aspecten van één en dezelfde praktijk die logisch-conceptueel met elkaar verbonden zijn en niet via middel-doelrelaties.

Reimers middel-doelopvatting ten aanzien van de relatie tussen *conceptualizing* (dat ook *analyzing* en *evaluating* omvat) enerzijds en *perceiving* en *reacting* anderzijds is wel acceptabel, maar ook hier zijn enkele kanttekeningen op hun plaats. Ten eerste kan *conceptualizing* in bepaalde gevallen ook een doel in zichzelf zijn. Ten tweede belemmert de wijze waarop Reimer

conceptualizing en *aesthetic perceptual structuring* met elkaar contrasteert ons inzicht in de samenhang tussen concepten en de muzikale ervaring. Als alternatief voor Reimers zienswijze wordt een aantal punten aangedragen die bijdragen tot een helderder inzicht in deze samenhang: (1) in de muzikale ervaring spelen concepten wel degelijk een centrale rol, (2) het gebruik van muzikale concepten veronderstelt niet noodzakelijkerwijs kennis van de muziektheorie, (3) de concepten die bij de omgang met muziek worden gevormd kunnen nonverbaal zowel als verbaal zijn, (4) concepten kunnen, in tegenstelling tot wat Reimer suggereert, betrekking hebben op de meest specifieke en concrete zaken. In navolging van Swanwick kan men een onderscheid maken tussen *secondary conceptualization* die betrekking heeft op het spreken over muziek en *primary conceptualization* die een integraal onderdeel vormt van de directe muzikale ervaring. Alleen in het eerste geval is sprake van een middel-doelrelatie.

Tenslotte wordt kort ingegaan op het belang van conceptuele studies zoals de onderhavige: ze kunnen een duidelijker en dieper begrip van de pedagogische praktijk bewerkstelligen, en aldus een adequater handelen tot gevolg hebben. Ze kunnen bovendien leiden tot een nieuwe conceptualisering en een nieuwe inrichting van de pedagogische praktijk.

De vijfde en laatste studie gaat in op de nieuwe situatie die is ontstaan in de *philosophy of music education* sinds het verschijnen van Elliotts *Music Matters* (1995). Elliott zet zich in zijn boek sterk af tegen de tot dusver dominante opvatting, die hij aanduidt als *music education as aesthetic education* (MEAE). Hij presenteert een alternatieve visie op muziek en muziekonderwijs (c.q. de muzikale opvoeding).

Eerst vat ik Elliotts belangrijkste bezwaren tegen MEAE samen: muziek wordt ten onrechte opgevat als een object, men concentreert zich enkel op de perceptie van de muzikale vorm van het werk en de notie van esthetische ervaring die men hanteert is inconsistent en irrelevant. Dan schets ik Elliotts alternatieve opvatting. Muziek dient te worden opgevat als een praktijk waarin twee activiteiten in elkaar grijpen: muziek maken en muziek beluisteren. Deze twee activiteiten zijn in essentie vormen van *thinking-in-action*. De waarde van de omgang met muziek is gelegen in de optimale ervaring, zelfgroei, en zelfkennis die het gevolg zijn van het met succes aangaan van de *cognitive challenges* die dynamische muzikale praktijken voortdurend bieden. Muziekonderwijs dient te worden ingericht als een *practicum* dat muzikale praktijken in het echt zo dicht mogelijk benadert.

Vervolgens ga ik in op de twee belangrijkste punten waarop MEAE en Elliotts filosofie uiteenlopen. Ten eerste stelt Elliott tegenover een esthetisch muziekbegrip een cognitieve conceptie. Hoewel Elliotts kritiek op Langers specifieke conceptie van de esthetische ervaring terecht is, gaat hij te ver als hij suggereert dat esthetische visies in het algemeen inadequaat zijn. Elliotts eigen opvatting kent bovendien tekortkomingen die we niet tegenkomen bij de interessantere esthetische visies op muzikale ervaring: (1) ze is niet specifiek genoeg, waardoor onduidelijk blijft waarin muziek zich van andere soorten cognitie onderscheidt; (2) ze gaat er ten onrechte van uit dat muziek volledig verklaard kan worden in termen van *cognitive challenges*; (3) ze bagatelliseert het belang van het gevoelsaspect in de muzikale beleving.

Het tweede twistpunt betreft de reikwijdte van het muziekbegrip. Elliott stelt dat het esthetische muziekbegrip, voor zover het al bruikbaar zou zijn, te beperkt is. Elliotts verwijt dat MEAE muziek uitsluitend als object opvat is echter feitelijk onjuist. Wel lijkt zijn kritiek dat deze benadering weinig theoretisch inzicht biedt in de aard van de verschillende muzikale activiteiten correct. Belangrijker is Elliotts kritiek dat MEAE door zich te concentreren op de vorm andere dimensies van de muziek negeert. Hoewel sterk aangezet, is deze kritiek in principe op zijn plaats. Wel kan ter verdediging van de esthetische opvatting worden aangevoerd dat de alternatieve dimensies die Elliott aanvoert, niets afdoen aan de centrale rol van de vorm. Zijn derde bezwaar, dat MEAE geen oog heeft voor de diverse functies die muziek kan vervullen naast de esthetische, kan op een soortgelijke manier worden beoordeeld. Hoewel op zichzelf juist, doet het vooralsnog weinig af aan de centrale rol van de esthetische ervaring. Ten eerste liggen bepaalde aspecten van de esthetische ervaring ten grondslag aan vele "niet-esthetische" functies, ten tweede overheerst de esthetische functie van muziek in onze westerse maatschappij, en ten derde is vooralsnog niet duidelijk op welke alternatieve functies het muziekonderwijs zich zou moeten richten.

Het artikel besluit met een correctie van het door Elliott geschetste beeld dat esthetische en *praxiale* benaderingen volstrekte tegenpolen zijn. Beide typen benaderingen zijn compatibel: terwijl *praxiale* zienswijzen ons een beeld kunnen geven van de vele dimensies van muzikale de muzikale werkelijkheid, kunnen esthetische visies ons inzicht bieden in de bijzondere ervaring die uiteindelijk toch altijd de kern lijkt te vormen van muzikale praktijken. De muziekpedagogiek dient zich te laten inspireren door de beste ideeën van beide stromingen.

In de epiloog worden een aantal belangrijke onderzoeksgebieden in de *philosophy of music education* aangeduid en gesitueerd. Muziekfilosofische thema's die aan de orde komen zijn: globale concepties van muziek (zoals formalisme en praxialisme), de verschillende soorten kennis in de muziek, muzikaal begrip, de rol van concepten, muzikale betekenis, gevoelens en emoties, en de verschillende vormen van muziekbeoefening (luisteren, uitvoeren, componeren, etc.). Vervolgens worden enkele wijsgerig-pedagogische kwesties aangestipt: het begrip *education*, leren (*learning* zowel als *teaching*), indoctrinatie, het curriculum, de *educated person*, opvoedings- c.q. onderwijsdoelen, rechtvaardiging en ontwikkeling. Tenslotte wordt nog kort ingegaan op een drietal onderwerpen: de relatie tussen muziek en de andere kunsten in het onderwijs, de inhoud van het muziekonderwijs en multicultureel muziekonderwijs.

Muziekfilosofie en *philosophy of music education* maken de laatste jaren een snelle ontwikkeling door, maar er staat nog veel werk te wachten. Beide terreinen bieden een grote variëteit aan boeiende onderzoeksthema's die veel verder en diepgaander bestudeerd dienen te worden.

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Curriculum Vitae

Constantijn Koopman werd 15 januari 1966 geboren in Nijmegen, waar hij de lagere school en de middelbare school doorliep. Na het behalen van het VWO-diploma in 1984 studeerde hij aan de Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht Muziekwetenschap als hoofdvak en Wijsbegeerte, Kunstgeschiedenis, Geschiedenis en Italiaans als bijvakken. In 1990 legde hij het doctoraal-examen Muziekwetenschap af en het propedeuse-examen Wijsbegeerte. Van 1992 tot 1997 was hij als Assistent in Opleiding werkzaam aan de Vakgroep Algemene Pedagogiek van de Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen. Thans is hij aan dezelfde vakgroep verbonden als post-doctoraal onderzoeker.

Constantijn Koopman was born January 15th 1966 in Nijmegen, the Netherlands, where he went to primary and secondary school. He studied musicology at the University of Utrecht, philosophy, art history, history, and Italian being his minor subjects. In 1990 he got his Master's degree. From 1992 to 1997 he worked as a research assistant at the Department of Philosophy and History of Education of the University of Nijmegen. Currently he is attached to the same department as a postdoc-researcher.

Stellingen

bij het proefschrift
Keynotes in music education: A philosophical analysis
van Constantijn Koopman

1. Muziek geeft een uniek soort ervaring; maar dat is op zichzelf nog geen argument ten gunste van het muziekonderwijs.

2. In de rechtvaardiging van het muziekonderwijs wordt de intrinsieke waarde van de muzikale ervaring vaak onderschat.

3. Zingen, spelen en andere muzikale activiteiten in het muziekonderwijs laten zich niet categoriseren in termen van middelen en doelen.

4. De onkritische toepassing van concepten uit de linguïstiek en de semiotiek heeft in veel theoretische bijdragen tot een onjuist begrip van muzikale betekenis geleid.

5. Het toekennen van veel extrinsieke betekenis aan muziek kan evenzeer op een arme als op een rijke muzikale beleving duiden.

6. Concepten spelen een onmisbare rol in de muzikale ervaring.

7. Beethovens cadens voor het eerste deel van Mozarts pianoconcert in d KV 466 doet afbreuk aan de subtiliteit van Mozarts compositie.

8. Schubert is een meester van de expositie, Beethoven een meester van de doorwerking; daarom is de laatste — althans voor wat betreft de instrumentale werken — de grotere componist.

9. Over smaak valt niet te twisten, maar over kunst kan men redelijk van mening verschillen.

10. Dat kunst nergens voor dient is niet zozeer haar zwakte als wel haar kracht.

11. Het hoorcollege is hard op weg de meest ondergewaardeerde onderwijsvorm te worden.

12. Afdingen door toeristen in derde-wereldlanden is vaak uitbuiting tot spel verheven.